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HE two most valued devices to inject flexibility into a
testamentary or inter vivos plan of distribution are powers of appointment and rights of withdrawal or invasion.
This resultant flexibility is a necessity because of the uncertainty of future events, and very few wills or trust agreements are drawn today which do not incorporate one or both
of these devices.
Since any plan of distribution is necessarily based to some
extent on the taxable incidents of its use, any question
raised as to the taxable status of the plan creates doubt and
limits its application. Powers of invasion or withdrawal
have generally been considered as outside the purview of
the Federal Estate Tax. Recently, however, some doubts
have been expressed as to the soundness of this conclusion,
and for this reason it has been deemed advisable to give
some consideration to the question. All doubts expressed
have been admittedly predicated on fear of general taxing
policies and trends, and not on statutory provisions or court
decision. There is a noteworthy lack of judicial authority.
The scope of this review is limited to that class of powers
in which the beneficiary is given an unlimited and unfettered
right to invade the corpus. A life estate is granted to A with
the right, at any time and from time to time, to withdraw
any or all of the principal, with remainder over to B. Upon
the death of the life tenant, A, the question raised is whether
*Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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or not the unexercised right of withdrawal should be included in his estate as a taxable interest for Federal Estate
Tax purposes. Clearly, if A exercised the power and then
died possessed of the property it would be subject to the
tax. Estates pur autre vie are also excluded, as they are
given special treatment by the Regulations.'
Those instances in which the right is to be exercised by
the beneficiary with the consent of the trustee or some other
person, or is confined to support and maintenance, or to a
certain percentage of the corpus in any year, present only
limited difficulties and are treated only by way of summary.
At the outset it should be noted that the Supreme Court
and the Courts of Appeal have not passed upon the question.
This fact in itself indicates that there has been no serious
attempt to subject such rights to taxation. There have been
two recent cases, however, which have some bearing upon
the proposition and which deserve study and comment. The
first of these cases is Lehman v. Commissioner' recently decided by the Board of Tax Appeals, in which the decedent,
Harold M. Lehman, had created two irrevocable trusts on
December 6, 1930, directing the entire net income therefrom
to be paid to his brother, Allan S. Lehman, who was also
granted the right to withdraw $75,000 from each trust at any
time prior to December 31, 1935. The brother had simultaneously executed two similar trusts, in like amounts and
terms, in favor of the decedent, granting him a life estate
and the right to withdraw $75,000 of the principal of each
trust.
The Commissioner had endeavored to include in the decedent's gross estate the entire value of the two irrevocable
trusts created by him for his brother. The Commissioner's
contention was that since the decedent and his brother had
executed reciprocal trusts, in like amounts and terms, those
created by the decedent were in effect for his own benefit,
and therefore taxable as transfers to take effect at or after
death, under sections 302(c) or 302(d) of the Revenue. Act of
1926. The trusts were irrevocable and the decedent had re1 "There should also be included the value of an annuity payable to, or an
interest or an estate vested in, the decedent for the life of another person who
survives him." Regulations 80, Article 13 (1937 ed.), Bureau of Internal Revenue.
2 39 B.T.A., No. 3 (Jan. 3, 1939).
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tained no rights which would otherwise subject the corpus to
taxation in his estate.
The Commissioner also contended that in the event the
entire corpus of the trusts created by the decedent were not
taxable, there should be included in the decedent's gross
estate the sum of $150,000, representing the amount which
the decedent at the time of his death had a right to withdraw
from the two trusts created by his brother. The Commissioner's theory was that the decedent had, in effect, retained the
right to take down that amount from the trusts created by
him. In other words, the taxability of the right to withdraw
was predicated solely on the reciprocal trust theory.
However, this question was presented to -the Board for
decision apparently as an afterthought on the part of the
Commissioner. Upon the hearing before the Board, counsel
for the Commissioner had stated: "Personally, I think there
is a technicality there, but I do not propose to urge that
point, in view of the reciprocal nature of this disposition."
No argument was made on the point in the petitioner's main
brief, and the Commissioner included argument on this question for the first time in his reply brief. That it was a mere
afterthought is clearly evidenced by the fact that the pages
upon which the argument appears were inserted after the
entire brief was completed, as pages 26 a and b, and the index does not contain any reference to the argument at all.
The brief filed by the petitioner further shows that no evidence or testimony was offered at the hearing in connection
with this issue, and that the stipulation was completely silent with regard to the question because no specific claim
was made in the deficiency letter by reason of the existence
of this right.'
After considering at length the Commissioner's argument,
that the entire amount should be included as a transfer to
take effect at or after death, the Board of Tax Appeals held
that the two trusts created by the decedent were not taxable
on this theory. The decision on the question of reciprocal
trusts is very interesting and sound, but need not be discussed further.
S Acknowledgment is made of the cooperation of attorneys for the petitioner,
Edgar J. Bernheimer and Sydney J. Schwartz, of New York City, who very
willingly submitted a copy of their Reply Brief and an extract of the Commissioner's Reply Brief.
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The Board then proceeded to approve the taxation of the
$150,000 which the decedent had the right to withdraw, 4 stating:
It cannot be questioned that the decedent gave his brother, Allan S. Lehman, the right to receive the income for life of the two trusts created by
him and had a right to withdraw $150,000 from the principal of the trust
estates during his life or until December 31, 1935, in exchange for similar
rights of the decedent in the trust estates created by Allan. The right to
make this withdrawal out of the reciprocal trusts created by Allan was
the equivalent of a right in the decedent to withdraw that amount from
the trust estates which he had created. This right had a value at the time
of decedent's death of $150,000. It was an interest in property "which
ceased by reason of the death." Edwards v. Slocum, supra. We are of
the opinion that the respondent did not err in including the $150,000 in the
gross estate of the decedent.5

A reading of the majority opinion clearly discloses that the
decision is limited to the facts of the particular case. The
Board states that "the right to make this withdrawal out of
the reciprocal trusts created by Allan was the equivalent of
a right in the decedent to withdraw that amount from the
trust estates which he had created." The reciprocal trust
theory is therefore made the basis for the applicability of
Section 302(d). The statement that "It was an interest in
property 'which ceased by reason of the death,' " citing Edwards v Slocum6 is not to be taken literally the predicate for
the decision. This particular quotation is discussed more
fully in another connection.7 Had the decedent survived the
date on which his power to withdraw expired by the terms of
the instrument, i.e. December 31, 1935, no question would
have arisen at all.
The majority opinion on this point has been quoted in full.
5 Black, joined by Arundell, Van Fossan, Leech, and Arnold, wrote a dissenting
opinion stating:
"I do not agree to that part of the majority opinion.... Manifestly if the
right to withdraw this $150,000 had survived decedent's death and was available as an asset to decedent's estate, then it is includable as a part of decedent's
estate. This inclusion would be by reason of the provisions of section 302(a) of
the Revenue Act of 1926, and not by reason of section 302(d) of the same act....
"Article 13 of Treasury Regulations 80 (1937 Ed.), Estate Tax, would seem to
cover the situation which we have here, where it says: 'Nor should anything be
included on account of an interest or an estate limited for the life of the decedent.' "
6 264 U. S. 61, 44 S. Ct. 293, 68 L. Ed. 564 (1924).
This case, cited by the Board,
involved the question of the computation of the tax where deductions for charitable residuary bequests were involved, and the opinion of the Circuit Court,
reported in 287 F. 651 (C.C.A., 2d, 1923), is famous for its statement that "algebraic formulae are not lightly to be imputed to legislators."
7 See discussion at pages 9, 10.
4
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Since the Board first held that the entire amount was not
taxable in decedent's estate as a transfer to take effect at or
after death, even though the trusts were reciprocal, and
since, in arriving at that conclusion, it was determined that
the transfers effected by each brother were independent, irrevocable, complete conveyances, 8 the soundness of the
reasoning leading to the taxability of the $150,000 might well
be questioned. However, the decision seems clearly limited
to its own peculiar facts and can hardly be made the basis
for an extension of the doctrine to the type of case under
consideration.
Although the Lehman case approved taxability of the right
to withdraw under Section 302(d) on the theory of the reciprocal trusts involved, that section has no bearing whatsoever on the general type of case with which we are concerned. The only section of the act which can be applicable
is Section 302(a) which includes all property (except real estate outside of the United States) "to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." This
section is a "catch all" and intended to cover and include
those interests not specifically treated under the other sections of the Act which clearly have no application.
It would be safe to assume that had the Commissioner
considered the right to withdraw in the Lehman case taxable
under Section 302(a), he would have urged the point in the
first instance. The failure of the Commissioner to assert taxability of such rights in other instances also indicates that
they are not considered to be within the purview of the statute, but are treated as interests "limited for the life of the
decedent."
There are two interesting provisions in the Regulations
8 Citing Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed.
410 (1929), in which it was said: "In its plan and scope the tax is one imposed on
transfers at death or made in contemplation of death and is measured by the
value at death of the interest which is transferred ....
One may freely give his
property to another by absolute gift without subjecting himself or his estate
to a tax, but we are asked to say that this statute means that he may not
make a gift inter vivos, equally absolute and complete, without subjecting it to
a tax if the gift takes the form of a life estate in one with remainder over to
another at or after the donor's death." Also cited were May v. Heiner, 281 U. S.
238, 50 S. Ct. 286, 74 L. Ed. 826 (1930), which quoted the language above with
approval; Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 47 S. Ct. 461, 71 L. Ed. 764 (1927);
McGregor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 82 F. (2d) 948 (1936); Kaufman
v. Reinecke, 68 F. (2d) 642 (C.C.A., 7th, 1934).
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relating to Section 302(a). It is stated that this section is intended to include all property the "beneficial ownership" of
which was in the decedent at the time of his death. In setting
forth exclusions, however, the Regulations provide "nor
should anything be included on account of an interest or an
estate limited for the life of the decedent." 9
In another recent case, however, the Commissioner did
endeavor to claim that a right of sale was the equivalent of
ownership and therefore taxable. In Davis v. United
States, 10 the decedent was entitled to receive a share of the
trust income during his lifetime and also had a remainder
interest contingent upon his surviving his brother. The court
stated, "Plainly these interests, both of which became extinct at the decedent's death, are not touched by section
302(a)." The court then discussed the Commissioner's argument in connection with the right of sale possessed by the
decedent during his lifetime:
Its argument is that the decedent had a power of sale over a portion of
the real estate, the power expiring with his life, that this power was one
to sell an absolute interest, and that in effect the portion of the property
over which he had power of sale belonged to him. We may pass the point
whether the power was one to sell an absolute interest or was merely one
to sell the defeasible interests that the decedent himself had in the property, a point on which the trust instruments are by no means clear. For
even if the power of sale were a power over an undivided share outright,
such a power is not an "interest" within the meaning of section 302(a).
That provision deals with property owned by a decedent and passing at
death by will or intestacy.

There is little difference between a right of sale and a right
of withdrawal for our purposes. In the former case the sale
is a condition precedent to the right to use the proceeds,
while in the latter case the formalities of withdrawal constitute the conditions precedent, there being no necessity to
change the form or character of the asset before it may be
subjected to the donee's use. In other respects, the rights of
the life tenants and the remaindermen are identical. The remainders are vested subject to being divested by the life
tenant, and the nonexercise of the right merely permits the
remainder to vest in possession as well as interest. For these
reasons, the Davis case is particularly important even
though it deals with a right of sale and not a right of withdrawal.
9 Regulations 80, Article 13 (1937 ed.), Bureau of Internal Revenue.
10 Decided Feb. 6, 1939, U. S. Dist. Ct., So. Dist., N. Y.
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The definition of Section 302(a) contained in the last sentence of the quoted portion of the opinion would preclude any
possibility of a right of withdrawal or invasion being taxable
under that section. The property subject to the unexercised
right is not owned by the decedent at death, and does not
pass by his will or under the laws of descent." This definition, therefore, is identical with that contained in the Regulations in that it excludes from taxation an interest limited
for the life of the decedent. Likewise, it properly limits the
words "beneficial ownership" to interests which are devisable or inheritable. This too would seem to be the intent of
the Regulations. In article 2 it is provided: "In addition to
property passing under a will or the intestate laws, the
gross estate .

.

.

includes .

.

.

" the transfers and inter-

ests specifically covered by subsections (b) to (g) of Section
302.12 Thus we have vested remainders included and contin-

gent remainders excluded, and we have reversionary interests taxed 13 and mere possibilities of reverter eliminated. 4 In fact, the only provision which gives any concern is
the one referring to "beneficial ownership."
It will be admitted that a power to invade is a beneficial
right. In fact, every right the exercise or non-exercise of
which lies within the discretion of the donee is a beneficial
one. Although the Regulations use the words "beneficial
ownership," there must be such ownership as shall be the
subject of transfer by will or laws of descent.
The Federal Estate Tax is not a succession tax. As the
Board of Tax Appeals said in the Lehman case: "If anything
is settled with respect to the Federal Estate Tax law, it is
that it is not a 'succession excise' tax." This statement was
made in reply to the Commissioner's argument that the tax
was upon the transfer of the right to possession or enjoyment, and not upon the passing of the fact of possession or
enjoyment. A predicate for this contention, said the Board,
is that the "estate tax 'is a strict succession excise.' This is
11 Hasbrouck v. Bookstaver, 114 N.Y.S. 949 (1909); Towler v. Towler, 142 N. Y.
371, 36 N. E. 869 (1894).
12 Regulations 80, Article 2 (1937 ed.), Bureau of Internal Revenue.
1 Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231, 51 S. Ct. 398, 75 L. Ed. 996 (1931).
14 St. Louis Trust Co. v. Becker, 76 F. (2d) 851 (1935), affirmed in Becker v.
St. Louis Union T. Co., 296 U. S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78, 80 L. Ed. 35 (1935); Helvering v.
St. Louis Union T. Co., 296 U. S. 39, 56 S Ct. 74, 80 L. Ed. 29 (1935).
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a statement of what the Federal Estate Tax is not-not of
what it is."
Perhaps the Commissioner failed to remember the following words of Justice Holmes: "Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of logic." 's
In this connection the Regulations make a clear and unambiguous statement that "The
.
tax is imposed upon
the transfer of the net estate." 11
The Federal Estate Tax, said Justice Holmes in Edwards
V. Slocum, 7
is a tax upon a transfer of his net estate by a decedent, a distinction
marked by the words that we have quoted from the statute, and previously commented upon at length in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 49,
77. It comes into existence before and is independent of the receipt of the
property by the legatee. It taxes, as Hanson, Death Duties, puts it in a
passage cited in 178 U.S. 49, "not the interest to which some person succeeds on a death, but the interest which ceased by reason of the death."

The quotation from Hanson, if standing alone, would be
confusing, and would appear to include any interest "which
ceased by reason of the death." Taken literally, that language
would include a pure life estate and all interests limited
for the life of the decedent. This, of course, is not intended.
Such interests are clearly excluded by the Regulations and
the Board has held that a life estate is not the subject of
tax. 8
The statement from Hanson refers to the English Finance
Act of 1894, which, among other things, expressly covers
property over which the decedent had no power of disposition. 9 Under that act life estates, leases, annuities, and all
interests which "cease" by reason of death are subject to
tax. But, as Hanson states, "the scheme of the Act is to tax
not the interest which has ceased, but the property out of
which the interest was enjoyed. Thus A has a life interest in
£10,000; estate duty is payable on his death, not according
to the value of the life interest he has enjoyed, but on £10,15 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 at 349, 41 S. Ct. 506, 65 L. Ed. 963
at 983 (1921).
10 Regulations 80, Article 3 (1938 ed.), Bureau of Internal Revenue.
17 264 U. S. 61, 44 S. Ct. 293, 68 L. Ed. 564 (1924).
This statement of Justice
Holmes is frequently quoted by the courts.
18 Security First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 38 B.T.A. (Aug.. 30, 1938).
19 Hanson, Death Duties (8th ed., London: Street & Maxwell, Ltd.), p. 5.
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000. ' ' 20 And again at page 6 he states: "So long as the interest ceased on the death, the quality of the interest does not
matter, unless, indeed, it was an interest granted for money." The peculiarities of the English law are readily observed, and further distinctions in the scope and application
of that Act and ours are to be found in Hanson's book.
Section 302(a) does not attempt to tax an interest because
it ceases, but because it is the subject of a transfer. It is, of
course, essential to the transfer of an interest that all prior
estates or interests cease and terminate. But the time or
point at which the tax attaches in the process of transfer is
important to distinguish it from a succession tax. Thus "it
comes into existence before and is independent of the receipt
of the property by the legatee." Beyond that point, it is submitted, the quotation from Hanson has no applicability to
the interpretation of our act, and no attempt should be made
to give literal effect to the language used. The Board's abbreviated presentation of this quotation in the Lehman case
should be guarded against and carefully noted in future decisions.
In St. Louis Union Trust Company v. Becker,2 1 in which a
mere possibility of reverter based on a condition subsequent
was held not taxable, the court stated:
The only interest, then, which he retained was the right to have the trust
property revert to him in case the beneficiaries should predecease him.
That right to the reversion was not an interest which passed to the beneficiaries as a result of Mr. Guy's death. It was merely an interest which
was obliterated by his death. It passed not to the living, but entirely out of
existence. So far as we can discern, the rights of the beneficiaries to the
trust property were complete at the time the declarations of trust were
executed. . . . However, in the case of estate taxes, the actual benefit
for which the tax is paid must be a benefit which passes from the dead
to the living, and where a complete transfer is made prior to death, the
transferor certainly retains no "actual benefit" justifying the imposition
of the tax.

The right of withdrawal, which is not self-conferred, is an
interest which is obliterated by death to the same extent as
a possibility of reverter predicated on a condition subsequent, and the transfer to the remaindermen is complete by
the act of the donor and not by the donee. The interest
20
21

Ibid.

76 F. (2d) 851 at 861 (1935), affirmed in Becker v. St. Louis Union T. Co., 296
U. S. 48, 56 S. Ct. 78, 80 L. Ed. 35 (1935).
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ceases and expires, and there is no transfer "from the dead
to the living."
Since the tax is upon a transfer, the only basis on which
the right of withdrawal could be held taxable would be that
the right attaching to the life estate enlarges it or invests it
with inheritable or devisable qualities. If any such change
occurred it would, of course, be determined by and subject to
state law.2 2
In some cases it has been held that if the gift to the first
taker is coupled with the absolute power of disposal or disposition, the gift over fails.2" In all of these cases, however,
the courts have found that the subsequent language used
was insufficient to cut down or limit the prior grant of the
24
fee, and the limitations over were therefore repugnant.
Typical of these cases is Sweet v. Arnold,25 in which the testator devised his residuary estate to "my beloved wife, Hannah J. Stewart, and if at her decease there be any unexpended remainder" it should be distributed as directed by the
will.
However, limitations after a life estate created by express
terms, are held to be valid, even though contingent upon
alienation by the life tenant2" and in such cases the executory limitations to take effect in default of the exercise of the
rights vested in the life tenant, or to the extent to which such
22 Blain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 5, 57 S. Ct. 330, 81 L.
Ed. 465 (1937); Letts v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 84 F. (2d) 760 (C.C.A.,
9th, 1936); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35, 54 S. Ct. 308, 78 L. Ed. 634 (1934);
Uterhart v. U. S., 240 U. S. 598, 36 S. Ct. 417, 60 L. Ed. 819 (1916); Warburton v.
White, 176 U. S. 484, 20 S. Ct. 404, 44 L. Ed. 555 (1900).
23 Dalyrymple v. Leach, 192 Ill. 51, 61 N. E. 443 (1901); Wilson v. Turner, 164
Ill. 398, 48 N. E. 820 (1896); Wolfer v. Hemmer, 144 Ill. 554, 33 N. E. 751 (1893).
24 Dalyrymple v. Leach, 192 Ill. 51, 61 N. E. 443 (1901); Wilson v. Turner, 164
Il. 398, 48 N. E. 820 (1896); Wolfer v. Hemmer, 144 Ill. 554, 33 N. E. 751 (1893);
Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 296, 11 S. Ct. 1005, 35 L. Ed. 721 (1891); Smith v.
Phillips, 131 Ala. 629, 30 So. 872 (1901); Byrne v. Weller, 61 Ark. 366, 33 S. W.
421 (1895); Mansfield v. Shelton, 67 Conn. 390, 35 A. 271 (1896); Cameron v.
Parish, 155 Ind. 329, 57 N. E. 547 (1900); Rowe v. Rowe, 120 Iowa 17, 94 N. W.
258 (1903); Ball v. Hancock's Adm'r, 82 Ky. 107 (1884); Stuart v. Walker, 72 Me.
145 (1881); Knight v. Knight, 162 Mass. 460, 38 N. E. 1131 (1894); Gadd v. Stoner,
113 Mich. 689, 71 N. W. 1111 (1897); Walton v. Drumtra, 152 Mo. 489, 54 S. W. 233
(1899); Banzer v. Banzer, 156 N. Y. 429, 51 N. E. 291 (1898); Bass v. Bass, 78
N. C. 374 (1878); Meacham v. Graham, 98 Tenn. 190, 39 S. W. 12 (1897); Judevine's
Ex'rs v. Judevine, 61 Vt. 587, 18 A. 778 (1889); Wilmoth v. Wilmoth, 34 W. Va.
426, 12 S. E. 731 (1890); Bassett v. Nickerson, 184 Mass. 169, 68 N. E. 25 (1903).
25 322 Ill. 597, 153 N. E. 746 (1926),
in which the court stated at page 601:
"Where, in a will, language is used which, standing alone, is sufficient to create
an estate of inheritance in the first taker, any subsequent language, in order to
cut down such estate, must be clear and unmistakable."
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rights have not been exercised, are held good and will take
effect.27 Thus, in People v. Freese," the will provided, "I
hereby give and bequeath and devise all of the property,
real, personal, and mixed, of which I shall die seized, to her,
Minnie Phrehm, for and during her natural life. I direct
that she, Minnie Phrehm, shall have full control of all my
property and use the same as she shall desire, and that
what remains after her death shall go to the nearest of my
kin living at the time of my death." The court held that Minnie Phrehm took but a life estate.29
It will be found useless to attempt to analyze all of the
cases on this subject, since they turn on the interpretation
of the language of the particular instrument under consideration in each instance. Also, most of the older cases involve
legal life estates instead of equitable ones, although for our
purposes, this distinction is not important. The generalities
expressed are deemed sufficient.
In most modern instruments involving trusts the life interests are definitely expressed, although it must be admitted that too frequently difficulties of interpretation arise due
to faulty drafting. In most cases we can safely assume that
the life estate will be couched in sufficiently clear terms to
prevent any difficulty, and when so expressed there are no
devisable or inheritable characteristics superimposed. This
being the case, there would seem to be no possibility of such
an interest coming under Section 302(a) on that theory.
For inheritance tax purposes in New York, however, un26 Welsch v. Belleville Savings Bank, 94 Ill. 191 (1879); Dickinson v. Griggsville Nat. Bank, 209 Ill. 350, 70 N. E. 593 (1904).
27 Henderson v. Blackburn, 104 Ill. 227 (1882); Evans v. Folks, 135 Mo. 397, 37
S. W. 126 (1896); Cushman v. Goodwin, 95 Me. 353, 50 A. 50 (1901); Bryson v.
Hicks, 78 Ind. App. 111, 134 N. E. 874 (1922); People v. Peoples Savings Bank, 314
Ill. 529, 145 N. E. 597 (1924); People v. Freese, 267 Ill. 164, 107 Ill. 857 (1915);
Reed v. Reed, 194 Mass. 216, 80 N. E. 219 (1907); Mims v. Davis, 197 Ala. 88, 72
So. 344 (1916); Collins v. Wickwire, 162 Mass. 143, 38 N. E. 365 (1894); Girard Life
Ins. & Trust Co. v. Chambers, 46 Pa. St. 485 (1864); Olson v. Weber, 194 Iowa
512, 127 N. W. 465 (1922); Trustees Presbyterian Church v. Mize, 181 Ky. 567, 205
S. W. 674 (1918); Scott v. Gillespie, 103 Kan. 745, 176 P. 132 (1918); In re Olsen's
Will, 165 Wis. 409, 162 N. W. 429 (1917); Richards v. Morrison, 101 Me. 424, 64 A.
768 (1906); Brant v. Virginia Coal and Iron Co., 93 U. S. 326, 23 L. Ed. 927 (1876);
Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N. E. 61 (1894); Drier v. Gracey, 203
Mich. 399, 171 N. W. 749 (1919); Angel v. Wood, 153 Ky. 195, 154 S. W. 1103 (1913).
28 267 Ill. 164, 107 N. E. 857 (1915).
29 But see Davis v. Heppert, 96 Va. 775, 32 S. E. 467 (1899), in which it is held
that even though a life estate is given by express terms, an absolute power of
disposition will enlarge the estate into a fee.
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der statutes authorizing the tax on contingent interests at
the highest possible rate, it has been held that exhaustion of
the entire estate by the life tenant will be assumed if a
greater tax can be collected at the death of the donor. For
example, if the remainder interest were to a child, the entire estate would be taxed to the life tenant; whereas, if the
remainderman were a stranger, they would assume that the
remainder would vest in possession undiminished by the life
tenant.30 This treatment has been expressly refused by Illinois, however, and it is held that the possibility of exhaustion should be ignored.3l
As an argument against taxability, the theory is sometimes advanced that until the right of withdrawal has been
exercised there is no acceptance of the grant of the power
evidenced by the life tenant. A similar argument has also
been proposed to defeat taxation of property passing by reason of the nonexercise of a general power of appointment. 2
It is submitted that the theory of nonacceptance is not the
proper answer to the question, and that it cannot be relied
upon with safety. Nevertheless, the theory deserves some
discussion because of its prevalence.
A beneficiary is not compelled to accept a devise or gift
without his consent. This principle is generally recognized
and is not subject to dispute. However, in the absence of
-evidence to the contrary, a beneficial devise will be presumed to have been accepted." This presumption of acceptance is not conclusive and may be overcome by renunciation or disclaimer or by a showing that the donee has
had no opportunity to elect.3 4 But it has been held that where
there has been an opportunity to reject and the donee has
failed to evidence his renunciation or disclaimer, there is a
presumption of acceptance which may become conclusive.3 5
The beneficiary must accept or disclaim the trust as a
80 Cf. In re Zborowski's Estate, 213 N. Y. 109, 107 N. E. 44 (1914); In re
Rogers' Estate, 149 N. Y. S. 462 (1914); Kidder, State Inheritance Tax and Taxability of Trusts (1st ed.), 83 ff.
31 People v. Freese, 267 Ill. 164, 107 N. E. 857 (1915); People v. People's Savings
Bank, 314 Ill.
529, 145 N. E. 597 (1924).
32 Cf. Montgomery, Federal Taxes on Estates, Trusts and Gifts (New York:
The Ronald Press Co., 1938), 207.
493, 175 N. E. 846, 75 A. L. R. 890 (1931).
33 Peter v. Peter, 343 Ill.
34 In re Howe's Estate, 112 N. J. Eq. 17, 163 A. 234 (1932).
35 Ibid.
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whole within a reasonable time after notification of the existence of his interest.8 6 He will not be permitted to accept in
part and reject the balance except where there are both
beneficial and onerous provisions which are properly separable. 7 Where the onerous and the beneficial provisions
constitute an entire gift, the beneficiary must make his election to reject the whole."8
The general doctrine has been well stated by the court in
Strom v. Wood:
The settled doctrine, however, is that a devisee is presumed to accept a devise favorable to him. This comports with human nature. A gift or
devise by which one's estate is materially increased naturally carries a
material benefit, and it is not human nature to refuse or reject such visitations of the fickle Goddess of Fortune, and the law does not require such an
absurd result to be inferred or presumed. This being the sensible and
practical presumption, it would naturally be expected that if the devisee
should desire to renounce he would do so at least within a reasonable
time. 8 9

The acceptance of income by the life tenant would seem
to be an overt act sufficient to evidence acceptance of the
entire gift, and it might well be held that, unless the right to
invade were rejected prior to the acceptance of the first payment of income, the life tenant has accepted the entire gift.
It would seem, therefore, unless there is a renunciation or
disclaimer by some overt act of the life tenant, that acceptance of the entire grant would be presumed. 0 Certainly the
right to withdraw is a beneficial right granted to the life
tenant. He may reduce to his possession and control the
corpus of the trust within the limits of his power. It is conceivable that the complications arising from exercise of the
86 G. G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, I, 504, 505, § 173; Wickwire-Spencer Steel
Corporation v. United Spring Mfg. Co., 247 Mass. 565, 142 N. E. 758 (1924); Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 237 Mass. 241, 129 N. E. 391 (1921); Rogers Locomotive
Works v. Kelley, 88 N. Y. 234 (1882). These cases held that it was not necessary
for the beneficiary to consent to the creation of the trust.
87 Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F. (2d) 914 (C.C.A., 6th, 1933).
88 Wisner v. Richardson, 132 Ark. 575, 202 S. W. 17 (1918); Lewis v. Carver, 140
Md. 121, 117 A. 108 (1922); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 111 Va. 325, 68 S. E. 990
(1910); W. H. Page, The Law of Wills (2d ed.), II, 2058, § 1233.
89 100 Kan. 556 at 560, 561, 164 P. 1100 (1917).
40 Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan, 556, 164 P. 1100 (1917); Schoonover v. Osborne, 193
Iowa 474, 187 N. W. 20 (1922); Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N. W. 564 (1931);
DeFreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N. W. 505 (1896); Perry v. Hale, 44 N. H.
363 (1862); Albany Hospital v. Hanson, 214 N. Y. 435, 108 N. E. 812 (1915); Bradford v. Leake, 124 Tenn. (16 Cates) 312, 137 S. W. 96 (1911); Crossman v. Crossman's Estate, 100 Vt. 407, 138 A. 730 (1927); In re Howe's Estate, 112 N. J. Eq.
17, 163 A. 234 (1932).
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right might become onerous and burdensome, but those
would be consequences independent of the initial grant and
acceptance of the power. The right to exercise should be distinguished at all times from the manner of exercise.
Not only does the theory of nonacceptance seem to fail
upon the very proposition of law upon which it is predicated,
but it would seem to constitute an admission difficult to
overcome in many cases. Not infrequently the life tenant is
granted the right to invade "at any time and from time to
time." Suppose that the life tenant with such a power has at
one time withdrawn a thousand dollars. The proponent of
such a theory is compelled to undertake the difficult argument that each exercise is but a pro tanto acceptance. As a
matter of fact it would seem in any case that by demurring
to the question of taxability on the theory of nonacceptance
it is impliedly admitted that a subsequent exercise should
result in taxation. Such an admission would, of course, be
wholly destructive.
The principles involved in the nonexercise of a general
power of appointment are analogous to the principles involved in the nonexercise of a right of withdrawal, and for
that reason should be considered. The analogy is particularly strong since in each instance we are dealing only with
rights which are not self-conferred.
The taxation of property passing under a general power of
appointment is specifically provided for by the Revenue
Act, 4 and it is predicated on the theory that there is no distinction between a disposition of property subject to the
general power and disposition of the fee. The donee of a
general power may exercise the power in favor of any appointee without limitation, including his own estate or creditors. 42 "To take a distinction between a general power and
a limitation in fee, is to grasp at a shadow while the substance escapes." 41
It will be readily admitted that, in the event the donee of
the power of withdrawal exercised the right, the property
thus reduced to his absolute possession and control and ownRevenue Act of 1926, § 302 (f), as amended in 1934, 26 U. S. C. A. § 411 (f).
See Regulations 80, Bureau of Internal Revenue.
43 Sugden, Powers (8th ed.), 396. See also Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities
(3rd ed.), § 526 (b).
41
42
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ed by him at time of death will be taxed in his estate in the
same manner as property passing under a general power of
appointment.
According to the common law, .the appointee is deemed to
take the property directly from the donor. 44 The donee merely acts for the donor -to the extent of the power conferred
upon him, 45 and until the interest over is finally disposed of
by the exercise of the power the estates limited upon default
of exercise are considered as vested, subject to being divested."' In the event of the nonexercise of the power the
property does not pass in the estate of the donee, but in the
estate of the donor of the power.
It should be noted that the Revenue Act does not attempt
to tax the nonexercise of a power of appointment. If Congress were to attempt taxation in such cases, grave doubts
as to the constitutionality of such a provision would certainly be raised. 47 Although the donee may exercise his discretion and permit the property to pass in default of the
power, such transfer takes effect and is complete by force of
the instrument creating the power and not by the act of the
donee. The remainders vested in default of exercise merely
become vested in possession. The donee has granted nothing
and has taken away nothing and the shifting of economic
benefits has occurred in the donor's estate and not the donee's. As the New York Court of Appeals, in the case of In
re Lansing's Estate,5 said, "Where there is no transfer
there is no tax. . . . " The same principles were approved
44 Kent, Commentaries on American Law (14th ed.), 337; United States v.
Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41 S. Ct. 256, 65 L. Ed. 617 (1921).
45 In re Luques' Estate, 114 Me. 235, 95 A. 1021 (1915); United States v. Field,
255 U. S. 257, 41 S. Ct. 256, 65 L. Ed. 617 (1921); Kidder, State Inheritance Tax and
Taxability of Trusts (1st ed.), 41.
46 Sugden, Powers (8th ed.), 622.
47 Cf. Montgomery, Federal Taxes on Estates, Trusts and Gifts (New York:
The Ronald Press Co., 1938), 207. For an interesting recent discussion of the
constitutionality of such a provision, see Erwin N. Griswold, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 Harv. L. Rev. 929 at 953, and W.
Barton Leach, "A Dissent," ibid., 961 at 963, in which it is assumed that Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 S. Ct. 225, 72 L. Ed. 565 (1928), is determinative, evidently overlooking the fact that in that case the court expressly limited
its consideration to the retroactivity of the statute. 276 U. S. 268, 72 L. Ed. 567.
48 182 N. Y. 238 at 247, 74 N. E. 882 (1905), which held that the statute attempting to tax the nonexercise of the power was unconstitutional. But see Minot v.
Stevens, 207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973 (1911), where the constitutionality of a similar
provision was upheld.
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by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Grinnell,49 in which
it was held that no Federal tax attaches if the appointee renounces and elects to take under the default clause. The
court thus recognized that the transfer was completed by
the donor. The Board of Tax Appeals reached the same conclusion and held that property passing under the default
clause" or by the ineffective exercise of the power 5 ' cannot
be included in the donee's estate.
To admit that the failure of the life tenant to exercise the
right of withdrawal was taxable would be to say that such
nonexercise effected a transfer in his estate to the same extent as though he had exercised the right and died possessed
of the property. It should be remembered, however, that the
interests of the remainderman are fixed by the donor of the
power, and not by any act of the life tenant, although they
may be diminished or completely destroyed by the exercise
of the right. The position of the remainderman may be well
likened to that of the default takers under a power of appointment. They are vested, subject to being divested by the
exercise of the power in either case. In fact, there seems to
be no well defined difference whatsoever between an unexercised power of appointment and an unexercised right of
withdrawal, and what has been said with reference to section 302(a) would seem to apply with equal force to both
cases, since neither is accorded special statutory treatment.
In conclusion it is submitted that under the present provisions of the Revenue Act an unexercised right of invasion
or withdrawal cannot be made the subject of tax in the estate of the donee.
It has been suggested, however, that, to avoid any possibility of the entire estate being subjected to tax, the right
to withdraw be limited to a certain fixed percentage in any
calendar year. The amount of the corpus subject to the
power at the instant of death, therefore, would be definitely
limited and would preclude the inclusion of more than that
amount. In most cases such a limitation would be sound
from the sociological and economical standpoint, as well,
294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. Ed. 825 (1935).
50 Estate of Hoffman, 3 B. T. A. 1361 (1926).
51 Lee v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 18 B. T. A. 251, affirmed 57 F. (2d)
399 (1932).
49
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particularly where the amounts involved are substantial.
The suggestion deserves careful consideration, therefore, in
the planning of all estates.
In many cases the right to withdraw is limited for necessities of support and maintenance, or of education, or unusual hospital or medical expenses. Even if we assumed that
such rights were taxable, they probably would be valued according to a reasonable estimate of the needs to which the
power is limited, and the problem would then be one of valuation only.
Where the power is limited so as to require the consent of
the trustee or some other person, it is obvious that the life
tenant does not have a right he could exercise in his own
discretion, and since the interest is not self-conferred, no
reasonable basis for taxation can be established in any
event.

ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
GWEN T. COFFIN*

L

EGAL literature contains the fruits of a vast amount of
careful research analysing and discussing the contractual, quasi-contractual, and tort liability of municipal corporations of all types under a wide variety of situations. One
who scans the voluminous material on this general subject
will doubtless find refreshment in the extent to which governmental agencies are compelled in a democratic society
to assume the responsibilities which are imposed upon individuals and private business organizations in their manifold
relationships. The lowly street vender who recovers a judgment against a great metropolitan city for personal injuries sustained as a result of the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle used by some municipally owned utility contributes to the folklore on this engrossing subject. Certainly
such an event would seem to be strong evidence of the inherent justice embodied in democratic institutions. The
lawyer will readily note that this street vender was fortunate in getting hit by a waterworks or light plant truck instead of by a police wagon, since in the latter event the city
would have been engaged in a "governmental" instead of a
"proprietary" function and would have enjoyed complete
immunity from all liability. We are not, however, presently
concerned with the imbroglio suggested by this unpleasant
possibility. The purpose of our discussion is to focus a little
light upon the word "recover" so often used in references to
the termination of a law suit adversely to a municipal corporation, and to analyze some of the means by which creditors of municipalities can compel payment of their claims.
The limitations upon the various collection devices will also be treated in some detail.
Two fundamental concepts underlying the law of municipal corporations must be kept clearly in mind in the consideration of this general problem. The first is the well
established principle that municipal corporations are crea* Member of Illinois Bar; Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
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tures of the state, have no inherent powers, and derive all
their authority from the state.' However, approximately
one-third of the states have adopted constitutional amendments granting to municipalities the right to frame their
own charters and to determine the extent of their powers in
so far as purely local affairs are concerned and in such jurisdictions municipal corporations are unquestionably something more than administrative arms of the state.2 The
second basic principle is the division of all municipal functions into two classes: those which are public or governmental and those which are private or proprietary in character. The limitations imposed by the application of these
two principles will serve to explain, if not to justify, many of
the peculiar problems underlying the legal relationships between municipalities and their creditors.
The remedies most appropriate for use in connection with
attempts to 'enforce payment by municipal corporations of
their obligations would seem to be execution and levy upon
corporate property, attachment, garnishment, creditor's
bill, mechanics' lien proceedings, and mandamus. Only the
first and last of these possible procedures will be theoretically available in all cases. The other remedies will be available, if at all, in particular situations.
The idea that a creditor of a municipality may reduce his
claim to judgment, secure execution thereon and levy upon
the judgment debtor's property will doubtless startle many
practitioners. It must be admitted that this procedure is
rarely employed, apparently because of the general impression that judgment liens cannot attach to municipal property
on account of some supposedly fixed principle of absolute
immunity extended by the law in order to protect the essential functions of municipal corporations from the disruptions
which might be incident to this remedial process. But a
municipality today may own a considerable amount of prop1 For a complete discussion of the relationship between municipalities and the
state see William B. Munro, Municipal Government and Administration (1925 ed.),
chapters 1-5 and 8.
2 The following states have constitutional provisions for local self-government
adopted in the years shown: Missouri (1875), California (1879), Washington (1889),
Minnesota (1896), Colorado (1901), Oregon (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Michigan
(1908), Texas (1909), Arizona (1910), Nebraska (1912), Ohio (1912), Maryland
(1915), Pennsylvania (1922), New York (1923), Wisconsin (1924).
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erty of a private or proprietary character which is not indispensable to the fulfillment of the public functions for which
such municipality was created. Is there any reason why
such property should not be subjected to the payment of
creditor's claims? Many courts have evidently thought
not.' In a substantial number of jurisdictions the courts
have been unwilling to exempt the private property of municipal corporations from seizure by judgment creditors in
satisfaction of claims, recognizing that payment of just obligations is itself one of the highest duties owed by municipalities to their inhabitants. If this view is sound, then it is
certainly fatuous reasoning to say that the common law
remedy of execution and levy, if allowed, would hinder and
embarrass a municipality in the performance of its corporate
functions, since one of those corporate obligations is to be
enforced by the process. Whatever validity there may be to
the case against making the public property of municipalities subject to execution and levy, little if anything can be
said for the extension of this protection to the property
which is held in a private or proprietary capacity.4 However, some courts have apparently proceeded upon the theory that such private property should also be exempt where
it is revenue producing, since the revenues received may be
used and may be necessary to finance the essential obliga3 In the following cases municipal property held for purposes not connected
with any public function was held to be subject to levy under execution: City of
Sanford v. Dofnos Corporation, 115 Fla. 795, 156 So. 142 (1934), involving property
acquired under tax foreclosure proceedings; City of Bradenton v. Fusillo, 184 So.
234 (Fla., 1938); Southern Railway Co. v. Hartshorne, 150 Ala. 217, 43 So. 583
(1907), involving vacant land which the municipality had attempted to donate
to a railroad company; Murphree v. City of Mobile, 108 Ala. 663, 18 So. 740 (1895),
involving proceeds from sale of land not held for governmental purposes;
Murphree v. City of Mobile, 104 Ala. 532, 16 So. 544 (1894), where land was held
for a burial ground and was not used; C. J. Kubach Company v. City of Long
Beach, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 567, 48 P. (2d) 181 (1935), involving an oil lease on subsurface of property used for waterworks; Beadles v. Fry, 15 Okla. 428, 82 P. 1041
(1905); Gordon v. Thorp, 53 S. W. 357 (Tex., 1899); State ex rel. Courter v. Buckles,
8 Ind. App. 282, 35 N. E. 846 (1893); City of New Orleans v. Home Mutual Ins. Co.,
23 La. Ann. 61 (1871), involving bonds issued by a private company and owned
by city; Doyle v. City of Astoria, Or., 262 N.Y.S. 572 (1932), allowing attachment
of funds in bank derived from operation of waterworks system; Harman v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 234 N.Y.S. 196 (1929), involving bonds and certificates
of indebtedness of port authority owned by city; Shamrock Towing Co. v. City of
New York, 20 F. (2d) 444 (1927); Hart v. City of New Orleans, 12 F. 292 (1882).
4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911), § 992. Execution against public
property which is essential for the rendition of vital public services, cannot, of
course, be defended.
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tions of the municipality. Hence, indirectly, according to
this argument, a sale upon execution of municipal property
held in a proprietary capacity would be just as detrimental
as a judicial sale of property held for strictly public purposes. A further and logical extension of this same argument, however, would lead to the absurd conclusion that the
payment of accrued claims against a municipality should
never be enforced when all revenues received by the municipality could be used to furnish public services more necessary and beneficial than those which gave rise to the accrued claim. The compulsory payment of any accrued debt
even by judicially sanctioned and legislatively approved mandamus proceedings will, of course, result in the "loss" of
funds which would otherwise be available to finance new
services for the benefit of the public. However, the most
ardent advocates of complete immunity would probably not
be willing to maintain that a municipality should be able to
spend all of its income in the performance of current functions to the exclusion of its accrued debts. Some functions,
such as the efficient maintenance of adequate fire-fighting
resources, law enforcement facilities, water supply, and
sewage systems, are doubtless entitled to priority over the
payment of accrued obligations, but there is no virtue in a
policy which would recognize the right of a municipality to
expand its services and embark upon improvements not
indispensable, while creditors of the corporation with claims
overdue are compelled to trust in a more favorable financial
position on the part of the municipality in the uncertain
future.
The case against the allowance of the writ of fieri facias
against municipal corporations was vigorously and fully presented by the Illinois Supreme Court in an early case raising
this issue as a matter of first impression.5 In reaching the
conclusion that the ordinary writ of fieri facias could not
legally be issued against a municipal corporation the court
observed as follows:
There can be no doubt that the property of a private corporation may be
seized and sold under a fi. fa. for the payment of its debts, as in the case of
an individual, such corporation being bound to provide for its just debts,
City of Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ill. 595 (1861).
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whether payment is made by a forced sale of its property for that purpose, or with money from its safe.
The nature, objects and liabilities of political, municipal or public corporations, we think stand on different grounds. These corporations signify
a community, and are clothed with very extensive civil authority and political power. All municipal corporations are both public and political
bodies. They are the embodiment of so much political power, as may be
adjudged necessary, by the legislature granting the charter, for the proper government of the people within the limits of the city or town incorporated, and for the due and efficient administration of their local affairs.
For these purposes, the authorities can raise revenue by taxation, make
public improvements, and defray the expenses thereof by taxation, exercise certain judicial powers, and generally act within their limited
spheres, as any other political body, restrained only by the charters
creating them-beyond them, they cannot go. This power of taxation is
plenary, and furnishes, ordinarily, the only means such corporations
possess, by which to pay their debts. They cannot be said to possess property liable to execution, in the sense an individual owns property so subject, for they have the control of the corporate property only for corporate
purposes, and to be used and disposed of to promote such purposes, and
such only. Levying on and selling such property, and removing it, would
work the most serious injury in any city. Many of our cities, Chicago especially, have costly water works, indispensable to the lives and health of
the citizens. These works are as much the property of the city as any other
it may control, and, in appellee's view, liable to be seized and sold on execution, to the great discomfort and probable ruin of the inhabitants. Fire
engines are also indispensable; they too can be seized and sold, and a
great city exposed to the ravages of fire, and all this to enable one or
more creditors of the city to obtain the fruits of judgments against the
city, which, by another process, not producing any of these destructive inconveniences, they could fully obtain. The money raised by taxation could
also be levied upon, and the whole business of the city be broken up and
deranged. Its offices and office furniture, its jails, hospitals and other public buildings, taken from the corporate authorities, and sold to strangers,
who would have a right to the exclusive possession of them, if not redeemed. In the absence of an express statute authorizing a proceeding,
fraught with such consequences, we must hold, that a fi. fa. cannot issue
against the city of Chicago. 6
6 The majority opinion elaborates further: "Before we can assent to the proposition that political corporations, clothed with so many important powers of
government, and so essential to be sustained in the exercise of all their rights
and privileges, and be 'secured in their property and means by which their
functions can be properly exercised for the benefit of the citizen, we must see
some positive act of the legislature authorizing the issuing of such writ. The
property of such corporations, and the taxes collected by them for public purposes, are a constituent part, and a necessary ingredient of their public power,
and are no more liable to seizure and sale than the whole power itself would be.
If not so, a party obtaining a judgment against the city would be able to do
indirectly what no power short of the legislature can do-destroy the corporate
powers and franchises by taking away the aliment which sustains them. Under
our constitution it cannot be admitted that any power or any individual possesses,
directly or indirectly, such an overwhelming influence over other powers as
would enable either of them to put an end to their functions, and thus disorganize
the government. It cannot be so. The power, if conceded, to seize the property
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One of the justices, however, was unpersuaded by the
reasoning of the majority and in a vigorous dissenting opinion denied that there was any adequate basis either in precedent, in statutory provisions, or in the inherent nature of
municipal corporations which called for a judicial determination to the effect that municipal property is exempt from
execution and levy. In his dissenting opinion the justice
stated:
As municipal corporations are created alone for public and not for private benefit, it may constitute a cogent reason why the legislature should
exempt their property from sale on execution, or that such process should
not issue against them, but does not, as I conceive, create the exemption.
If such an exemption exists, I feel confident that it is not by the common law. After a careful search of all the elementary books and reports
of adjudged cases which have come within my reach, I am unable to find
that such a rule has ever been announced. I find at the common law they
were liable to be sued, and judgment rendered against them precisely as
if they were corporations created for private purposes. When it is remembered that the execution is the fruit of the judgment, if such an important
exception existed, it would certainly have been announced either in Great
Britain or some of the States of the Union. To my mind the fact that the
question has never arisen, is conclusive that such an exception does not
exist at the common law.
It will be conceded that this city is a body politic or corporate, as its
charter has in terms declared that it shall be a "corporation by the name
of the city of Chicago," and by that name may sue and be sued, complain
and defend in any court. Nor does the charter exempt the city from having its property sold on execution. It would also seem that when the general assembly provided that the corporation might be sued, that as they
failed to relieve it from the effects and consequences of a recovery in
ordinary cases, that it must have been the design of the law-making power to leave them in precisely the same situation as individuals, or private
corporations.

It will be noted that the Illinois court did not expressly distinguish between the property of a municipal corporation
held for public purposes and property held in a private or
proprietary capacity for revenue producing purposes. While
it unquestionably is true that no satisfactory distinction can
of the corporation would involve the right to seize its revenues, and this involves
the right to destroy the corporation. The power to create the corporation of
the city of Chicago for purposes of local government, involves the power to preserve and protect it; but that protection would be unavailing, if the corporation
could be deprived of the means without which it could not perform this function.
For all useful and practical purposes, we think the exercise of the right claimed
by the judgment creditor in this case would as effectually annul the charter of
the city, as if it had been repealed by law. This would be repugnant to the
spirit of the constitution."
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be made between the two classes of corporate property in
many instances, 7 still cases frequently arise where the differentiation can be made with complete unanimity in the
result, as where property acquired for corporate uses has
ceased to be needed for the purposes intended and is vacant
or leased to private individuals or concerns. As to such property, the writ of fieri facias can hardly be said to be more
disruptive of municipal administration than the approved
remedy of mandamus which may and often does divert
revenues from useful public projects.
Nevertheless, the decision in City of Chicago v. Hasley
has been scrupulously followed by the Illinois courts without
question or qualification.8 It would seem that, if the courts
so desired, they could interpret that case as denying the
7 For a representative and scholarly discussion of the difficulties inherent in a
division of municipal functions into two general classes, governmental and proprietary, for the purpose of determining liability in tort, see Professor E. M.
Borchard's exhaustive series of articles in 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, 229; 36 Yale L. J.
1, 757, 1039; 28 Col. L. Rev. 577, 734.
As suggested elsewhere in this article, the classification of municipal activities
on the basis of their governmental or proprietary character, for the purpose of
deciding tort liability, is not followed in determining what corporate property
may be seized to satisfy the claims of creditors. The private property of public
bodies which may be seized upon execution is much more limited in scope than
might be suggested by the usual classification where the pertinent question to be
considered is one of tort liability. For example the following cases held that
property which would normally be regarded as related to the private or proprietary functions of a municipality if a question of tort liability were involved,
was not subject to execution: Mayor of City of Monroe v. Johnston, 106 La. 350, 30
So. 840 (1901), involving a gravel pit furnishing gravel for streets; Brockenborough v. Board of Water Commissioners, 134 N. C. 1, 46 S. E. 28 (1903), waterworks; Main Water and Power Co. v. Town of Sausalito, 49 Cal. App. 78, 193 P.
294 (1920), waterworks; United Taxpayers' Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. 264, 259 P. 1101 (1927), involving a jail building leased to private
concern; C. J. Kubach Co. v. City of Long Beach, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 567, 48 P. (2d)
181 (1935); Eastern Union Co. of Delaware v. Moffet Tunnel Improvement District, 6 Harr. (Del.) 488, 178 A. 864 (1935), rental revenues; Board of Councilmen
of City of Frankfort v. White, 224 Ky. 570, 6 S. W. (2d) 699 (1928), revenues from
lease of opera house; Martin v. City of Asbury Park, 114 N. J. L. 298, 176 A. 172
(1935), land leased to private persons for a public bathing beach; City of Coral
Gables v. Hepkins, 107 Fla. 778, 144 So. 385 (1932), golf course leased to private
concern; Equitable Loan & Security Company v. Town of Edwardsville, 143 Ala.
182, 38 So. 1016 (1905), stock of liquors in municipal liquor dispensary.
s See the following cases; Elrod v. Town of Bernadotte, 53 Ill. 368 (1870); Board
of Trustees v. Schroeder et ux., 58 Ill. 353 (1871); City of Kinmundy v. Mahan, 72
Ill 462 (1874) ; City of Bloomington v. Brokaw & Co., 77 Ill. 194 (1875); City of Elgin
v. Eaton, 83 Ill. 535 (1876); Village of Kansas v. Juntgen, 84 Ill. 360 (1877); City
of Paris v. Cracraft, 85 Ill. 294 (1877); City of Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 Ill. 587
(1877); City of Flora v. Naney, 136 Ill. 45, 26 N. E. 645 (1891); Village of Dolton v.
Dolton, 196 Ill. 154, 63 N. E. 642 (1902); Farrow v. Eldred Drainage District, 359
Ill. 347, 194 N. E. 515 (1935).
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right of execution only against municipal property held in
trust for essential public purposes. Such a limitation, however, would likely afford only a very limited extension of
the opportunities available for the collection of creditors'
claims, since the division of corporate functions into governmental and private for the purpose of determining tort liability would probably not be followed in classifying municipal property with reference to its exemption or non-exemption from execution. Municipalities are not authorized,
ordinarily, to engage in operations of a strictly private nature and consequently the property which will normally be
held for purely commercial purposes will never be very
extensive. If municipal creditors are to be adequately protected, therefore, any extension in the use of the writ of
execution will leave us far from a complete solution.
From an examination of the limitations upon the use of
the writ of fieri facias we turn to a consideration of the writs
of attachment and garnishment as instruments for the collection of municipal debts. Logically we should expect the
same judicial attitudes with reference to these remedies as
those which have been expressed in connection with the use
of the common law writ of execution, and the cases reflect
this parallelism.' The funds of a municipality as well as its
real and personal property may be essential to maintain
necessary governmental functions, and public policy should
prevent the subordination of public interests to the demands
of creditors. The test here, as in other creditor's actions
should be the extent to which the assets pursued are vital to
the efficient rendition of basic public services. The source of
the revenues involved in an attachment action should be immaterial, since the municipality may well have computed
the income to be derived from proprietary operations and
property as well as the income from public or governmental
sources in drawing the annual appropriation ordinance providing for essential municipal functions. Some courts have
not recognized this test, but it is submitted that no other approach to the problem is feasible under the present status of
the law on this subject.
9 See note in 89 A.L.R. 863 and cases cited therein; Murphree v. City of Mobile,
108 Ala. 663, 18 So. 740 (1895); Vanderpoel v. Mt. Ephriam, 111 N. J. L. 423, 168 A.
575, 89 A. L. R. 862 (1933).
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Incidentally, it should be noted that in general the courts
have also held municipal corporations exempt from garnishment process in suits where third persons are the principal
debtors."° While the problems presented in such cases are
essentially different from those involved in actions where
the municipalities are themselves the principal debtors, the
same solicitude for safeguarding the interests of the public
is manifested. It is questionable, however, whether the disruption of municipal administration envisioned by the
courts, if such actions were tolerated, is a necessary consequence. There is some reason to believe that the self interests of municipal creditors would have a strong tendency to
forestall wholesale garnishment suits, and that the expense
of defending such suits as were filed would not be especially
burdensome particularly where liability was not contested.
Moreover, private organizations are not visibly burdened by
the liability to garnishment process. Nevertheless, where
this judicial hostility to the subjection of municipal corporations to garnishment suits exists, there is little that can be
expected in the way of relaxation of the exemption protecting municipal property against judgment executions.
Occasionally statutory provisions have definitely set to
rest any questions which might otherwise have arisen with
reference to the possibility of issuing executions against
the property of public corporations." For example, an Illinois statute expressly prohibits the issuance of executions
against the lands or other property of a county. 12 Such public quasi-corporations, however, have quite uniformly been
regarded as distinct from municipal bodies possessing extensive and more or less complete powers of local self10 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911), § 249; McQuillan, Municipal
Corporations (2d ed., 1928), § 2681; Merwin v. City of Chicago, 45 IM. 133 (1867).
See also J. B. Fordham, "Garnishment of Public Corporations," 39 W. Va. L.
Rev. 224.
11 In the following jurisdictions, public property is exempt from execution by
statutory provision: Alaska, Comp. Laws of Alaska 1933, HI 3726, 3753, 3819;
Arkansas, Pope's Digest of Stats. of Ark. 1937, § 5286; Florida, Comp. Laws of
Fla., 1936 Supp., § 4492(4); Georgia, Code of Ga. Ann. 1937, Tit. 69, § 69-305;
Iowa, Code of Iowa 1935, § 11771; Kansas, Gen. Stats. of Kan. 1935, Ch. 13, § 1406;
Massachusetts, Gen. Laws of Mass. 1932, Ch. 254, § 6; Missouri, Rev. Stats. of
Mo. 1929, Ch. 5, §§ 1161, 1162; Nevada, Nev. Comp. Laws, 1929, § 5755; North
Dakota, Comp. Laws of N.D. 1913, §§ 3251, 4234; Oklahoma, Okla. Stats. 1931,
§ 6818; Oregon, Ore. Code Ann. 1931, § 5-505; South Dakota, Comp. Laws of S.D.
1929, §§ 5792, 6121.
12 IUl. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 24, § 34.
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government. Counties, townships, school districts, park
districts, and the like, generally possess only very limited
powers and are organized for specialized purposes as arms
of the state government. The functions which they perform
are functions of the state and governmental in character.
Cities and villages, on the other hand, are organized to exercise a wide range of powers many of which are indistinguishable from the activities of private concerns, and
such municipal corporations serve local needs primarily. It
is improper, therefore, to analogize as to the legislative
policy with reference to the issuance of executions against
city or village property from the statutory provisions on this
subject enacted with reference to political subdivisions of a
quite distinct type. Moreover, we have already indicated
that the property of a municipality which is held solely for
governmental purposes should be exempt from seizure by
its creditors.1 8 This exemption would necessarily extend
to all of the property of such public quasi-corporations as
those mentioned, since they are presumed to be exclusively
engaged in governmental as distinguished from proprietary
functions. Finally it is idle to speculate as to the significance
which should be attached to a legislative expression on this
question in the case of one type of municipality when no specific provision has been made in other instances. It would
be no more logical to assume a general legislative policy
opposed to the awarding of executions against all the property of all municipal corporations than it would to presume a
policy permitting such process in all instances where no
express prohibition was declared. Such speculations may afford a basis for argument but they can scarcely lead to any
intelligent conclusion.
In some of the New England states a peculiar doctrine
with reference to municipal indebtedness prevails either by
statute or by immemorial usage. According to this doctrine
the property of the inhabitants of a municipality may be
seized and applied against corporate obligations in the event
that the corporation is unable to pay its debts. 14 This unique
IsSee note 4 supra.
14 Rev. Stat. Maine 1930, Ch. 98, § 30, and Ch. 56, § 116;
1926, II, Ch.346, § 8; Public Laws of Vt. 1933, § 2253. This
follows: "When judgment is rendered against a county,
or fire district, execution shall issue against the goods or

Public Laws of N. H.
latter section reads as
town, village, school,
chattels of the inhabi.
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and drastic remedy does not seem to have been adopted
elsewhere in the United States and has in fact been expressly repudiated upon occasion." In the states where this
remedy is available, however, a high level of municipal
credit prevails and few defaults on municipal obligations
have occurred, and these conditions may be attributable, at
least in part, to the restraining effect of such a weapon in
the hands of creditors. 6
Where attempts have been made to avoid the judicial or
legislative restrictions upon the use of the writ of fieri facias
against the property of municipal corporations by resort to
the equitable creditor's bill, the courts have extended the
doctrine of immunity to cover this action as well. In the
case of Addyston Pipe Company v. City of Chicago, 7 the
Illinois court held that essentially a creditor's bill seeking to
reach moneys in the hands of a municipality held for payment to a third person and to subject the same to the payment of the creditor's judgment against such third person
was very similar to a garnishment proceeding and that the
same arguments applicable to the use of the latter process
were applicable to the use of a creditor's bill. Obviously
there can be little dispute as to the soundness of this position. Whatever the merits in the reasoning may be, the same
tants of such county, town, village, school or fire district, and may be levied or
collected of the same."
In Connecticut and Massachusetts the property of inhabitants has been subjected to executions to satisfy judgments against municipalities by immemorial
usage. Atwater v. Inhabitants of Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223, 16 Am. Dec. 46 (1826);
McLoud v. Selby, 10 Conn. 390, 27 Am. Dec. 689 (1835); Beardsley v. Smith, 16
Conn. 368, 41 Am. Dec. 148 (1844); Nichols v. City of Ansonia, 81 Conn. 229, 70 A.
636 (1908); Hawkes v. Inhabitants of Kennebec, 7 Mass. 461 (1811); Chase v.
Merrimack Bank, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 564 (1837); Gaskill v. Dudley, 6 Met. (Mass.)
546 (1843); Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Nat. Bank, 121 U. S. 121, 7 S. Ct. 865, 30
L. Ed. 923 (1887).
15 In jurisdictions outside New England there are numerous constitutional and
statutory provisions directed specifically against the subjection of private property to the payment of judgments against municipal corporations: Iowa Code
(1935), § 11771; Montana Constitution, Art. XII, § 8; Comp. Laws of N. D. (1913), I,
§ 3251; Comp. Laws of S. D. (1929), § 5792. This procedure has been repudiated
elsewhere by judicial decision. Horner v. Coffey, 25 Miss. 434 (1853); Lyon v.
City of Elizabeth, 43 N. J. L. 158 (1881).
10 Securities and Exchange Commission-Report on the Study and Investigation
of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, Part IV, Committees for the Holders of Municipal and QuasiMunicipal Obligations, Section III.
17 170 IMl. 580, 48 N. E. 967 (1897). See also Lamb v. Lamb, 256 Ill. App. 226
(1930).
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case can be made against both procedures. A different situation is presented where the municipality is the principal
debtor, but the objections to a creditor's bill or to garnishment to reach assets of a municipal corporation in the hands
of third persons would be even stronger.'"
Creditors of municipal corporations whose claims arise
out of labor performed or materials furnished in connection
with the construction of public works and buildings, may
have a lien upon such property under mechanics' lien statutes unless excluded by express limitations therein or judicial pronouncements of public policy. The Illinois Mechanics' Lien Act, like that of many other states, gives a lien to
''any person" furnishing labor or materials to the owner of
a tract of land in various types of construction work and
such lien attaches, when appropriate steps have been taken,
to the land improved by such labor or materials. 9 Subcontractors, in the case of public improvements, are given a
lien on the money due the principal contractor, provided that
a written notice of claim is presented to the disbursing officers of the public body and proceedings are brought for an
accounting within sixty days after the filing of the claim.2"
There is no express exemption of municipal property from
the operation of this statutory lien and no particular reason
to assume that the lien given subcontractors on public funds
is exclusive of all other remedies. However, the Illinois
court had occasion to consider the interpretation of similar
language under an earlier statute and reached the conclusion that "the Mechanics' Lien Law is framed with reference to such property as is subject to be sold under execution" and that property essential to the performance of
governmental functions, such as a schoolhouse or a courthouse, could not be made the subject of a lien.2 Under this
construction of the statute the word "owner" as used by the
legislature does not include public bodies or political subdi28 C. J. 168.
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 82, § 1.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 82, § 23.
Bouton v. McDonough County, 84 Ill. 384 (1877).
The leading Illinois
case on this point is Board of Education v. Neidenberger, 78 Ill. 58 (1875). The
court there held that the mechanic's lien "proceeding is restrictive of the common law power to issue a fteri facias to collect the judgment" and that an
action of mandamus to compel the payment of the claim or the levying of
sufficient taxes for its payment was a "sure and complete remedy." Accord:
McMillan v. Joseph P. Casey Co., 311 Ill. 584, 143 N. E. 468 (1924).
18

20
21
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visions. The only remedy available to the contractor who is
not paid presumably is by mandamus, and the subcontractor must look to the principal contractor for payment or
seek to enforce a lien on any funds which may23 be due to
him2 2 or sue on the contractor's statutory bond.
The decisions on this subject are quite uniformly opposed
to the allowance of mechanics' liens on public property and
the reason generally stated is that such liens would be contrary to public policy, since the ordinary method of enforcing a lien is by a sale of the lien property and this would
result, in the case of public agencies, in the impairment or
destruction of necessary governmental functions. 24 The public policy involved in this situation is the same as that discussed previously in connection with executions against
municipal property.
The generally approved device for the collection of claims
against municipal debtors that neglect or refuse to honor
their obligations is mandamus, a legal action with equitable
implications. In many jurisdictions this is said to be the only
remedy available either because of specific statutory provisions or because of a judicially determined public policy.
It is therefore important to observe the possibilities and limitations involved in the use of this proceeding.
While it has been said that the writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ granted upon equitable considerations in the
discretion of the court,2 5 it is not generally true today that
this remedy can be arbitrarily withheld where a petitioner
presents facts clearly indicating a legal claim against the
party sought to be coerced which cannot be adequately satisfied by any other legal process. 26 Statutes have been generally adopted establishing the action of mandamus as an
appropriate remedy in certain cases, and the courts have
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 29, § 16.
24 The following cases are representative: Wilkinson v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 637,
21 N. W. 816 (1884); Boise-Payette L. Co. v. Challis Independent School District
No. 1, 46 Ida. 403, 268 P. 26 (1928). See also cases cited in note 20, Supra.
25 People ex rel. Akin v. Bd. of Supervisors of Adams County, 185 Ill. 288, 56
N. E. 1044 (1900); Hooper v. Rooney, 293 Ill. 370, 127 N. E. 711 (1920); People
ex rel. Beardsley v. City of Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488, 74 N. E. 437 (1905); People
ex rel. Lyle v. City of Chicago, 360 Ill. 25, 195 N. E. 451 (1935).
26 People ex rel. McCormick v. Western Cold Storage Co., 287 Ill. 612, 123
N. E. 43 (1919); People ex rel. Blome v. Nudelman, 371 Ill. 30, 19 N. E. (2d) 933
(1939).
22 IM. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 82, § 23.
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not hesitated to allow the action when it appeared that
other remedies were inadequate or less effective and that
mandamus would afford a convenient, practical, and effective method for the protection of the petitioner's rights.2 7
The discretionary character of the writ is similar to the
discretionary character of any equitable relief. In situations
where it appears that a petitioner has not conclusively established that his claim is founded upon unimpeachable
principles of justice or that ordinary legal processes will not
sufficiently protect his interests, doubtless a court may
grant or withhold equitable relief as its discretion may dictate in the light of all the facts presented to it. However, a
petitioner who has clearly brought himself within bounds of
well-recognized rules controlling the granting of such relief,
cannot arbitrarily be deprived of the aid of equitable remedies. It is not strange to find the courts in considerable confusion in the phrasing of such an elusive rule. The prevalence of the notion that no one can have an absolute right to
equitable and extraordinary remedies has probably led to
the denial of relief in many cases where the court has, largely upon subjective analysis, determined that the applications
for equitable aid did not indicate extreme situations involving a shocking need for an effective legal remedy. That such
a test is entirely too strict, and not in accord with modern
conceptions of the judicial process seems undeniable. The
honest claims of litigants should not be exposed to the
hazards and uncertainties of this sort of erratic treatment.
Recent judicial utterances indicate, however, that the
court's discretion in granting the writ of mandamus cannot
be exercised arbitrarily where an applicant for the writ
shows a clear legal right to its issuance. The importance of
this principle will be readily apparent from a study of the
28
rules and cases to be discussed in the following pages.
Since the writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of discretionary duties," a municipal creditor
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 87. Since the adoption of the Illinois Mandamus Act
in 1874 the adequacy of other legal remedies has not been a bar to mandamus.
People ex rel. Waber v. Wells, 255 Ill. 450, 99 N. E. 606 (1912); People ex rel.
City of Chicago v. Kent, 300 Ill. 324, 133 N. E. 276 (1921); People ex rel. Baird &
Warner, Inc. v. Lindheimer, 370 Ill. 424, 19 N. E. (2d) 336 (1939).
28 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed., 1911), §§ 1483 and 1489.
29 City of East St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Zebley, 110 U. S. 321, 4 S. Ct.
21, 28 L. Ed. 162 (1884); People ex rel. German Insurance Co. v. Getzendaner,
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cannot establish a legal right to the writ until his claim has
been liquidated by a proper audit and certification for payment or by a reduction to judgment. The duty to pay remains discretionary until statutory prerequisites in the form
of an administrative review of the validity of a claim have
been observed, or until it has been judicially determined to
be a legal obligation of the municipality. These preliminary
procedural reviews to place a claim in order for payment
can of course be compelled by mandamus if the proper
municipal officers fail or refuse to act upon it."0 Payment,
however, cannot be enforced, until the claim has been audited and approved by the officers designated for this function, since the disbursing officer's duty to pay is not clear
and nondiscretionary until such steps have been taken. As
long as the municipality has an opportunity to assert defenses to the validity of the claim, the duty to pay the same
is discretionary and not ministerial.
It follows from what has been said above that it is incumbent upon a petitioner for the writ of mandamus to place the
municipality in default by making demand upon its officers
for recognition and payment of his claim."1 It has been
stated, however, that a formal demand is not necessary
when it sufficiently appears that the agents of the municipality have already conclusively indicated a determination not
to honor the claim. 2 Likewise, a demand is held not to be
essential when a writ is sought to compel the performance
137 Ill. 234, 34 N. E. 297 (1891); People ex rel. Bartlett v. Dunne, 219 InI. 346, 76
N. E. 570 (1906); People ex rel. McCormick v. Western Cold Storage Co., 287
Ill. 612, 123 N. E. 43 (1919); People ex rel. Blome v. Nudelman, 371 Ill. 30, 19
N. E. (2d) 933 (1939).
80 United States ex rel. Portsmouth Say. Bank v. Board of Auditors of the
Town of Ottawa, 28 F. 407 (1886); Town of Lyons v. Cooledge, 89 Ill. 529 (1878),
mandamus to compel audit of claim; People ex rel. Mosby v. Stevenson, 272 Ill.
215, 111 N. E. 595 (1916), issuance, signing, and countersigning of warrant;
People ex rel. Northup v. Cook County, 274 Ill. 158, 113 N. E. 58 (1916).
81 People ex rel. Rinard v. Town of Mt. Morris, 137 Ill. 576, 27 N.
E. 757
(1891); State Board of Equalization v. People ex rel. Goggin, 191 111. 528, 61
N. E. 339 (1901); City of Cairo v. Everett, 107 Ill. 75 (1883); City of Olney v.
Harvey, 50 Ill. 453 (1869); People ex rel. Thatcher v. Village of Hyde Park, 117
I1. 462, 6 N. E. 33 (1886).
32 The court held in United States ex rel. The Aetna Ins. Co. v. Auditors of
the Town of Brooklyn, 8 F. 473 (1881), that a demand upon town officers to pay
a judgment was unnecessary where the officers knew of the judgment and
failed to pay. The court recognized that a formal demand would, in such a
case, be entirely futile.
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of duties owed to the
public generally as distinguished from
33
private obligations.
The municipal creditor who has reduced his claim
to
judgment and who has made demand for payment, may
find it necessary in some jurisdictions to have execution issued upon his judgment and the same returned nulla bona,
in order to establish the inadequacy of remedies other than
mandamus.3 4 In jurisdictions allowing execution against
municipal property held for proprietary use, there may be
some justification for this requirement, but it would be an
empty and senseless gesture to establish such a requirement
in a jurisdiction not allowing execution against any public
property.
Assuming that a creditor has met the usual requirements
for bringing an action of mandamus, what defenses are commonly available to defeat the relief sought? If the record
shows that there is an unqualified duty to pay and that sufficient funds are available from which payment can legally
and properly be made, a peremptory writ should issue. However, suppose the municipality alleges that there ate no
funds on hand with which the claim can legally be paid or
that all the revenues of the corporation are necessary for
the support of essential functions of the government. Certainly it would seem that the courts should not attempt to
compel public officers to do that which is impossible or to
violate the law by diverting money from funds created by
specific appropriation. 5 Unless a specific appropriation has
33 City of East St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Zebley, 110 U. S. 321, 4 S. Ct.
21, 28 L. Ed. 162 (1884); People ex rel. German Insurance Co. v. Getzendaner,
137 Ill. 234, 34 N. E. 297 (1891); People ex rel. Bartlett v. Dunne, 219 Ill. 346, 76
N. E. 570 (1906); People ex rel. McCormick v. Western Cold Storage Co., 287
Ill. 612, 123 N. E. 43 (1919); People ex rel. Blome v. Nudelman, 371 Ill. 30, 19
N. E. (2d) 933 (1939).
34 This seems to be an unnecessarily burdensome procedure in view of the
general acceptance of mandamus as the most appropriate remedy for the
enforcement of private claims against municipalities. The requirement is criticized by Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.), § 1510. It is recognized by
a New York Court in Shamrock Towing Co. v. City of New York, 20 F. (2d) 444
(1927).
35 Actual want of funds has always been a good defense to an application for
a writ of mandamus to compel immediate payment, but this argument has
become so standard that many courts require a detailed account of fiscal
administration before denying relief. If there are no available funds out of
which payment of the claim can legally be made, there is still room, of
course, for a writ to compel the appropriation and levy of sufficient taxes to
discharge it. De Wolf v. Bowley, 355 IIl. 530, 189 N. E. 893 (1934); People ex rel.
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been made for the payment of the claim in question there is
not much likelihood that any "free" funds will be available
out of which the claim can be paid. This problem is acute in
all claims not founded upon direct contractual relations and
may exist even in the latter situations when the governing
body of a municipality has been delinquent in the performance of its duties and has neglected to include in the annual
appropriation ordinance provisions covering all express and
contingent liabilities."6 If an .appropriation has been made
and taxes levied and collected for purposes which include
the creditor's particular claim, the exhaustion of available
funds even by diversion into improper uses may constitute
a defense to an application for a writ of mandamus or render
the writ futile if granted.
It may thus be incumbent upon the individual creditor,
availing himself of the use of mandamus as a remedy, to
bring successive actions to achieve a desired result. If there
are no funds presently available for the payment of his
claim, and if the governing body of the municipality refuses
to take the necessary action to provide a fund for the payment of the claim, then the creditor must petition for a writ
of mandamus to compel the appropriation and levy of a sum
sufficient to discharge his claim. 7 But the officers of the
municipality may and probably will neglect or refuse to pay
over the taxes collected on account of the obligation unless
Western News Co. v. City of Chicago, 292 Ill. App. 186, 10 N. E. (2d) 832 (1937);
People ex rel. Bunge v. Downers Grove Sanitary District, 281 Ill. App. 426
(1935); Amos v. Burrus, 11 Ill. App. 383 (1882); Highway Commissioners of
Highways of Montgomery Township v. Snyder, 15 Ill. App. 645 (1884); People
ex rel. Downs v. Brown, 281 Ill. 390, 118 N. E. 67 (1917).
s6 People ex rel. Bunge v. Downers Grove Sanitary District, 281 111. App. 426
(1935). The court, in Board of Supervisors v. People ex rel. Ashbrook, 226 Ill.
576, 80 N. E. 1066 (1907), held that by adjournment without having included the
payment of any outstanding judgments after demand had been made among
the purposes of its tax levy, a county board could not escape its duties and that
mandamus would lie to compel the board to reconvene and provide for the
payment of such claims.
37 Galena v. United States ex rel. Amy, 72 U. S. 705, 18 L. Ed. 560 (1867);
German Insurance Co. v. Getzendaner, 137 II. 234, 34 N. E. 297 (1891); The
People ex rel. Fox Howard & Co. v. City of Cairo, 50 Ill. 154 (1869). The latter
case illustrates an intelligent attitude toward the interests of all parties concerned. The court ordered the municipality to levy the maximum tax allowed
by statute and to pay over to the judgment creditor a sufficient sum to discharge his claim after providing for the most economical expenses of the city.
The city was not required to issue bonds because of the poor market for its
securities and because of the discretion involved in such a procedure.
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compelled to act by another writ. This condition necessitates
a constant and careful study of municipal financial operations in order to forestall any attempted diversion of tax
moneys which should be segregated for the satisfaction of
the claim. Presumably a court to which application has been
made for a writ of mandamus to compel the payment of a
claim might issue a writ directing the performance of all the
successive acts necessary to effect an actual liquidation of
the account and retain jurisdiction for the purpose of supervising the performance directed, although this procedure
does not appear to be commonly employed. Formerly, an
additional hazard had to be met. Municipal officers, whose
acts were necessary to effect a payment of municipal indebtedness, could forestall relief to creditors indefinitely by
resigning in the face of mandamus process. According to
one writer88 this practice became so common that it was
necessary for candidates who aspired to appropriating and
disbursing offices to promise to resign if mandamus proceedings to compel the payment of certain obligations were
instituted. Modern statutes have made this easy form of
repudiation impossible by permitting the writ to be directed
against the municipality generally or against the offices concerned with payment. The writ, under such procedure, does
not abate upon the death or resignation of particular officers
but continues against their successors.89
The above comments, tacitly assume that the municipality's refusal to pay legal claims asserted against it is due to
a wilful repudiation and not to physical impossibility of performance. However, the latter may well be the case. Mounting costs and falling revenues may have combined to make
it impossible to discharge all obligations in full as they accrue. Constitutional and statutory debt and tax limitations
fix definite bounds to the revenue producing power of most
municipalities, and tax delinquencies may reduce actual collections far below the theoretical maximum. While ordinarily courts should and do direct the levying of taxes up to the
limits set by law, where a municipal creditor shows that
existing revenues are insufficient to discharge his claim
8 Dillon Municipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911), § 1520 et seq.
89 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 87, § 8. See also County Comrs. v. Sellew, 99 U. S.

624, 25 L. Ed. 333 (1879).
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and that a reserve of taxing power is available, still it does
not follow that this procedure will be productive of satisfactory results either from the standpoint of the petitioning
creditor, the tax-bearing public, or other creditors. During
periods of economic depression, low property values and reduced incomes may establish a point of diminishing tax returns short of constitutional or statutory tax limitations. If
taxes become too burdensome, many taxpayers may conclude that efforts to keep their property free from tax liens
are futile and financially unjustifiable. Moreover, other creditors spurred on by the prospect of having all the municipal
debtor's resources exhausted in the process of meeting one
creditor's obligations in full, may be prompted to make more
diligent efforts to collect their claims without loss of priority. If the sum total of all unsatisfied outstanding obligations
is beyond the practical power of the municipality to pay, the
net result will necessarily be a large amount of litigation
costly both to the creditors and to the municipality whose
energies and finances will be diverted from more useful purposes into a defense against this mass assault upon its
revenues. This sort of a "trial by battle" may be a happy
condition for a few lawyers in a position to exact fat fees as
a result of the turmoil, but it cannot be productive of any
equitable results to the municipality, its creditors, or its tax40
payers.
Furthermore, practical difficulties confront the creditor
and the court in the use of mandamus to compel a municipality to use its taxing powers. The writ commonly takes the
form of an order directing the municipal debtor through its
proper officers to levy the maximum rate permitted by law
and to pay over to the judgment creditor the amount of his
claim out of any surplus that may remain after provision
has been made for the most economical administration of
the affairs of the municipality. 4 This sort of an order has a
pleasing sound but the creditor beneficiary is still a long way
40 For a good description of an actual litigation record involving creditors'
fruitless suits against an insolvent municipality see the article by Edward J.
Dimock, "Legal Problems of Financially Embarrassed Municipalities," 22 Va. L.
Rev. 39 at 41-42.
41 The People ex rel. Fox Howard & Co. v. City of Cairo, 50 Ill. 154 (1869);
People ex rel. Anderson v. Village of Bradley, 367 II. 301, 11 N. E. (2d) 415
(1937).
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from the cash payment of his claim. Even granting that the
court may be willing to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of
compelling the production of detailed and itemized accounts
of municipal expenditures in order to determine whether
there has been a bona fide attempt at compliance with the
writ, it is still primarily a legislative and not a judicial function to determine the ordinary and minimum public functions
which should not be sacrificed in order to provide funds for
individual creditors. 2 The courts have repeatedly held that
a receiver cannot be appointed to take over in whole or in
part the management of municipal affairs in order to make
certain that revenues will be set aside for the payment of
the claims of judgment creditors.4 8 Even if such a procedure did not involve an infringement of the fundamental
principle of separation of powers, the practical difficulties
would still be almost insurmountable. Under the present volume of municipal indebtedness in default, the administrative
and supervisory burden would undoubtedly so tax the facilities and time of the courts as to make effective and efficient
results virtually impossible, to say nothing of the neglect
which must perforce befall the business of other litigants.
We need not therefore be surprised at the fact that, while
the city of Chicago has outstanding and unpaid judgments
standing against it to an amount in excess of six million
dollars,4 4 with the total mounting yearly, it nevertheless
finds itself able to carry out a costly system of public improvements involving the beautification of lake front property, the construction of subways and numerous other
projects. We do not wish to be understood as taking a stand
upon the morality of this procedure but only as suggesting
that the creditor's ability to secure an effective use of his
municipal debtor's taxing power for his benefit is narrowly
circumscribed.
42 City of East St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Zebley, 110 U. S. 321, 4 S. Ct.
21, 28 L. Ed. 162 (1884). But where a municipality alleged that its revenues were
insufficient to meet current expenses, it was held that the burden was upon such
public body to establish this fact by the submission of figures upon receipts and
operating costs. People ex rel. Bunge v. Downers Grove Sanitary District, 281
Ill. App. 426 (1935).
43 Rees v. Watertown, 86 U. S. 107, 22 L. Ed. 72 (1874); Meriwether v. Garrett,
102 U. S. 472,. 26 L. Ed. 197 (1880), which held that a court cannot levy and
collect taxes through its own marshal.
44 People ex rel. Krajci v. Kelly, 279 IM. App. 22 (1935).
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The city of Chicago has found another convenient and effective device to block mandamus-seeking creditors who
hope to secure payment of their claims out of funds derived
or to be derived from a special judgment tax authorized by
statute. According to the statute 45 and an ordinance of the
city passed pursuant thereto, judgments must be paid out of
the fund "in the order in which same were obtained." Under
this provision a petitioner for a writ of mandamus to compel'the payment of a judgment out of the judgment tax fund
must allege and prove, according to one decision," that his
judgment is first in order of unpaid judgments against the city.
Over six million dollars in unpaid judgments are outstanding
and apparently the want of diligence on the part of the holder
of an early judgment would block holders of subsequent judgments from any right to participate in the proceeds of the
tax fund if this ruling stands. It would appear that a few
early judgments placed in sympathetic hands might constitute a perfect protection against creditors' attacks through
this inviting but deceptive hole in the municipality's defense
armor.
While courts will not issue peremptory writs of mandamus
to compel the levy and collection of taxes in excess of statutory or constitutional limitations, 47 it is nevertheless frequently possible to stay within these limitations if the levy is
directed to be spread over successive years so as to produce
only a portion of the amount of the judgment in any one
given year. 48 This procedure, moreover, in cases when the
ratio of the judgment to the total appropriation for the taxing
district is large, avoids the dangers of a tax strike inherent
in any excessive levy. With this flexible arrangement avail45

IMI. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 24, § 697 a.

46 See People ex rel. Krajci v. Kelly, 279 Ill. App. 22 (1935).

The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the constitutional provision that compensation must be made for private property taken for public use cannot be
impaired by statute or ordinance and that a judgment for such taking or damage
must be paid, if funds are available and if there is no showing that creditors
with prior rights are actually claiming such funds. People ex rel. John V.
Farwell Co. v. Kelly, 361 Ill. 54, 196 N. E. 795 (1935); People ex rel. John V.
Farwell v. Kelly, 367 Ill. 616, 12 N. E. (2d) 612 (1937).
47 United States v. County Court of Macon County, 99 U. S. 582, 25 L. Ed.
331 (1879); Clay County v. United States ex rel. McAleer, 115 U. S. 616, 29 L. Ed.
482 (1885); City of East St. Louis v. People ex rel. Seim, 6 Ill. App. 76 (1880);
City of East St. Louis v. Board of Trustees, 6 Ill. App. 130 (1880).
48 This procedure was employed in People ex rel. Euziere v. Rice, 290 Ill. App.
514, 8 N. E. (2d) 683 (1937).
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able there is seldom any occasion warranting the use of a
mandamus writ to compel the issuance and sale of bonds for
the purpose of raising money with which to pay a petitioner's claim. This probably accounts for the fact that there
are very few cases in which mandamus has been used for
such a purpose. There are to be considered in this connection
also statutory limitations upon the purposes for which bonds
may be issued. Obviously, however, a municipality seeking
to defeat the granting of a mandamus writ on the ground of
lack of funds and the necessity of using all its taxing power
to raise revenues for necessary current operations, should
be required to establish its good faith by submitting detailed
figures and estimates showing with considerable exactitude
its financial needs.4
It will then be incumbent upon the
court to determine whether the awarding of the writ will be
likely to produce funds for the payment of the creditor's
judgment without undue embarrassment to the fiscal administration of the municipality. If it appears that the
awarding of the writ may create confusion and disorder in
the management of municipal affairs to the serious detriment of the inhabitants, the remedy should, of course, be
withheld. Although there may be strong objections to a judicial determination upon political or legislative matters, this
condition is apparently inescapable in meeting the problem
presented with a proper regard for the various interests at
stake. Moreover, no realistic person will any longer main49 The court held in People ex rel. Euziere v. Rice, 290 Ill. App. 514, 8 N. E.
(2d) 683 (1937), and in People ex rel. Bunge v. Downers Grove Sanitary District,
281 Ill. App. 426 (1935), that a municipality must do more than merely allege
the inadequacy of existing revenues to meet the expenses of maintaining essential
governmental functions. Presumably the courts will make some sort of independent determination of the need for the application of the full revenue raising
power to meet the economical administrative requirements of the municipality.
People ex rel. Fox Howard & Co. v. City of Cairo, 50 Ill, 154 (1869).
The court, in Cunningham v. City of Cleveland, 98 F. 657 (1899), held that
after a writ of mandamus has issued directing a municipality to levy the maximum tax rate permitted by law, the city could not expend a portion of the taxes
so levied for the purpose of erecting school buildings. This was not an ordinary
current expense to which the revenues of the city could be applied while it owed
money on a judgment for a debt incurred as a current expense, the court held.
The municipality could and should have paid for the buildings out of the proceeds
of a bond issue authorized by its charter.
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Leland, 214 N. C. 235, 199 S. E. 7 (1938), the
court said, "We have no definite classification as to the kind of service a
municipality may furnish its citizens to the postponement or defeat of Its
obligations to creditors." It was indicated, however, that the court would not
be governed by an arbitrary classification.
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tain that a clear cut separation of legislative and judicial
functions is observed under the political and constitutional
systems as they are now operating. Lip service is still paid
to the time worn apothegm that the courts are not and cannot be concerned with the wisdom of legislative practices
and policies, but judicial decisions are nevertheless constantly being based upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness of legislative action. This process of necessity involves some- degree of substitution of judicial predilection
for legislative determinations. Hence, judicial scrutiny of
municipal expenses for the purpose of determining the feasibility of issuing a writ of mandamus is not only a conventional process but an appropriate and even necessary operation if the judicial discretion involved in the awarding of
the writ is to be wisely exercised.
The above discussion leads inevitably to the conclusion
that the usual legal remedies available to enforce the payment of creditors' claims against municipal corporations
and quasi-corporations are oftentimes inadequate and unscientific when viewed in the light of the wider interests involved. A realistic appraisal of the situation can be made
only in the light of the magnitude of the problem involved
and the alternative solutions which may be evolved within
the framework of our present legal structure. A recent study
made by the Securities and Exchange Commission 0 states
that there are approximately 175,000 taxing units in the
United States and that between two and three thousand of
these taxing districts were in default in 1933 upon an estimated $1,200,000,000 out of a gross municipal bonded indebtedness of $18,500,000,000. Many more municipalities not actually in default were reported as being unable to meet
their current expenses except by resort to dubious schemes
of financial jugglery. While these figures apply to funded indebtedness they nevertheless indicate the almost hopeless
situation confronting the ordinary judgment creditor in
many areas. Approved legal remedies will not produce funds
for the satisfaction of a creditor's claim when the municipal
debtor has no property or income subject to execution and
its taxing and debt incurring power has been exhausted. The
available data with reference to local governmental indebt50

See note 15, supra.
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edness strongly indicates that a considerable volume of
municipal obligations will not be honored in full under present conditions. What, then, can be suggested as a sane and
practical approach to the problem?
Fundamentally, of course, some thorough-going revision in
archaic tax levies may be necessary as well as state administrative control over expenditures of local taxing units.
Scientific application of new mechanical techniques will not
produce milk from a dry cow. However, if the cow is not dry,
but can't be milked because too many opposing and insistent
milkers are vying with one another for a chance to do the
job, then it may be necessary to give the beast a little air
and compromise these claims upon her resources. The evidence available shows that many taxing units have tapped
all their resources without producing sufficient revenues to
meet their obligations and that a breathing spell will not
solve the problem. In such cases it is difficult to see any
solution other than a compromising of creditors' claims
through some sort of voluntary agreement or through resort
to municipal bankruptcy proceedings.
. We have already seen that municipal creditors cannot accomplish much toward the satisfaction of their claims
through such legal remedies as judgment levies and executions, garnishment and attachment, creditors' bills, and mechanics' lien proceedings, and that the effectiveness of mandamus depends upon the existence of funds or taxing power
which may be used to effect a payment of such claims. In
some cases statutory or constitutional increases in the taxing and debt incurring power might afford partial relief.
Special judgment taxes or bonds might be authorized with
the provisions that they should not be considered in computing the maximum tax or debt limits fixed by law. 51 This
procedure has found some support and undoubtedly has considerable merit when considered upon moral grounds. If
coupled with some sort of state administrative control over
51 The Ohio Gen. Code 1930, §§2293-3, 2293-13, authorizes municipalities to
issue bonds to pay judgments for personal injuries and other non-contractual
obligations and provides that such bonds shall not be included in the net indebtedness of the issuing bodies.
The Illinois statutes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 24, § 65.5) give cities and villages
the power to issue bonds for the purpose of paying or funding judgment debts,
but such bonds would be included in the constitutional and statutory limitations
upon indebtedness.
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municipal expenditures it might go far toward achieving an
equitable result in the case of municipalities whose operating
expenses are not grossly disproportionate to the reasonable
value of their assessed property. Some restraint upon outlays for ordinary current expenses seems inevitable if
creditors' claims are not to be generally postponed or defeated by the exhaustion of municipal revenues and revenue
producing powers upon such operating costs. Presumably
this restraint would require the creation of a state board
with general and extensive control over the budgets of all
taxing districts.52 The adoption of such a plan admittedly
would necessitate the overcoming of strong prejudices in
favor of the sanctity of local self-government and the supposedly inherent right of local inhabitants to control local
affairs. However, the history of the past few years should
have sufficiently demonstrated that responsible and intelligent management of the functions and fiscal policies of
local taxing districts cannot always be expected. The reasons, which are to be found primarily in the inexperience of
underpaid officials, are not of primary importance in the
search for an immediate and practical method by which
improvements may be effected.
Where municipalities are actually insolvent, the immediate problem obviously must involve some scaling down
of the total indebtedness either by voluntary agreements or
by proceedings under the municipal debt readjustment act.
Voluntary compositions by creditors are difficult to work out
and afford many opportunities for the pursuit of policies
which do not accord equitable treatment of the rights of all
the parties concerned. Unless all creditors cooperate in the
composition preferences will result either from voluntary
treatment or from individual coercive measures such as
mandamus actions. In most cases it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to work out a debt adjustment plan which will
command a one hundred per cent indorsement. Proceedings
under the Federal bankruptcy statutes will,5" therefore, be
52 For an excellent study of the subject of state administrative control over
municipal indebtedness see Stason, "State Administrative Supervision of
Municipal Indebtedness," 30 Mich. L. Rev. 833.
s 11 U. S. C. A. H§ 401 et seq. The first municipal debt readjustment act was
held unconstitutional as an impairment of the sovereignty of the states. Ashton
v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U. S. 513, 56 S, Ct. 892,
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the preferable, if not the only solution, in cases involving
insolvent municipal corporations.
It is to be hoped that the various state legislatures will
recognize in the near future the seriousness of the municipal
debt problem and will undertake careful studies of the matter in all its aspects to the end that some permanent improvement in conditions may be forthcoming. As indicated
in these pages, any real solution must go farther than merely to perfect and enlarge present legal remedies available to
creditors but must recognize the necessity for a re-establishment of municipal credit and solvency by the adoption of
measures designed to facilitate the liquidation of hopelessly
excessive debt burdens, to improve the tax structure both
as to the subject matter of taxation and the methods of collection, and to extend state administrative supervision over
municipal budgetary operations. Authorization of additional
taxes and bond issues for debt service should be considered
as a part of a complete program of credit reconstruction but
with an intelligent understanding of the limited scope of the
relief involved in this process alone. A thorough analysis of
municipal indebtedness might even disclose that our system
of local taxing units enjoying large measures of autonomy
is obsolescent and unsuited to present-day social, economic,
and political needs. Only harm can come from an ostrichlike habit of refusing to face the dangers involved in the
continued growth of local indebtedness with mounting defaults.
80 L. Ed. 1309 (1936).
Justice Cardozo in a dissenting opinion remarked, "If
voluntary bankruptcies are anathema for governmental units, municipalities and
creditors have been caught in a vise from which it is impossible to let them out.
Experience makes it certain that generally there will be at least a small minority
of creditors who will resist a composition, however fair and reasonable, if the
law does not subject them to pressure to obey the general will."
A revised edition of the same statute was upheld in United States v. Bekins,
304 U. S. 27, 58 S. Ct. 811, 82 L. Ed. 1137 (1938).
State legislation is advisable, if not necessary, to supplement the Federal
statute in order to establish the consent to municipal bankruptcy procedure
required by the statute. For an example of such legislation see Mason's Minn.
Stats. 1938 Supp., Ch. 10, §§ 1938-23, 24.

SOME PROBLEMS ARISING FROM MUNICIPAL
SUBWAY CONSTRUCTION
ROBERT WIEFERICH AND JEROME RICHARD*

3

HE recent commencement of construction on Chicago's
long awaited subway has focused attention upon the legal
problems arising from any such undertaking. There is no
doubt that the city has power to construct the subway.' However, there are certain problems confronting the city in the
exercise of this power. These problems may be classified
into those arising because of injuries to the interests of encroaching landowners, and those arising from the possibility
of injury to the interests of adjoining landowners.
The principal obstructions on the right of way are encroaching foundations, underground vaults and safes, and subsurface transportation facilities, such as elevators and tunnels.2
Emphasis has been placed on cases involving subsurface
obstructions, as obstructions upon or above the street are
generally distinguishable, since the latter necessarily impede
traffic, and are therefore nuisances.'
There are four principal theories upon which an abutting
owner may allege a right to maintain an encroaching structure beneath a street. These are: (1) a right of prescription,
or title by adverse possession; (2) a right created by contract; (3) the right remaining in the abutting owner when
the city took less than a fee in establishing the street; (4) an
estoppel arising which prevents the city from asserting its
paramount title to the land occupied by an encroaching
structure.
Members of Illinois Bar.
1 IM. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 24, § 569; People v. City of Chicago, 349 Iln. 304, 182

N. E. 419 (1932); Barsaloux v. City of Chicago, 245 Ill. 596, 92 N. E. 524 (1910).
2 While existing utility facilities will probably prove to be greater physical
obstacles than those above mentioned, in practically all cases, the utilities have
agreed, as a condition of their original construction permit, to remove at their
own expense, such facilities in the event the city requires this space. Thus any
litigation arising in connection with the relocation of such utilities will revolve
upon the interpretation given to such agreements. See Chicago Tribune, March 1,
1939, page 27, column 2.
s In City of Chicago v. Norton Milling Co., 196 Ill. 580, 63 N. E. 1043 (1902), the
court expressly distinguished the case of Hibbard & Co. v. City of Chicago, 173
11. 91, 50 N. E. 256 (1898), involving an awning erected over the public easement,
from Gregsten v. City of Chicago, 145 Ill. 451. 34 N. E. 426 (1893), concerning a
subsurface vault, on the ground that the Hibbard case involved an obstruction
to street travel and was a purpresture.
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It is generally agreed that an abutting owner cannot,
through adverse possession or by prescription, acquire the
right to occupy permanently a portion of a city street, whether
the encroachment be on the surface or merely a subsurface
structure. A brief unequivocal statement of this position by
the Illinois Supreme Court is found in Russell v. City of Lincoln, 4 where the court said, "A street and all its parts are
held for a public use, and title to no part thereof can be obtained against the public by adverse possession."
The court has elaborated upon this position in several cases.
In Hibbard & Co. v. City of Chicago,5 the court stated that
property held for street purposes by a city is held in trust
for the public and to allow any title to be taken by a third
party would be to divert trust property. The court went on
to say that it is beyond the power of a municipality to grant
permanently an exclusive use of a portion of a street for
private purposes.' In City of DeKalb v. Luney, " it was held
4 200 Ill.511 at 522, 65 N. E. 1088 (1902),
and see E. McQuillan, Municipal
Corporations (2d ed.), IV, 76, § 1423: "A municipality cannot authorize any use of
its streets by a private person inconsistent with the future legitimate uses of
the street by the municipality . . . and no right to use the street for private
purposes can be acquired by prescription as against the municipality." Cf. Shirk
v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill.298, 63 N. E. 193 (1902), where the court said: "It
being established, then, that the city of Chicago was the owner of the fee of
Michigan avenue, including the strip in question, no rights in the strip as a part
of the street could accrue to the appellant, or any of his grantors, by reason of
any possession of the strip, no matter how long continued."
5 173 III. 91 at 96, 50 N. E. 256 (1898).
6 "The municipal corporation can grant no easement or right therein [in public
streets] not of a public nature, and the entire street must be maintained for
public use, hence no individual or corporation can acquire any portion of the
street for exclusive private use to the exclusion of the public. The city council
has no power to grant such use. . . . There is no power in the municipality to
sell or grant for private use a public street and exclude the public therefrom.
A permanent encroachment upon a public street for a private use is a
purpresture, and is, in law, a nuisance." Cf. Dallenbach v. Burnham, 248 I1.
468, 94 N. E. 41 (1911), where the city acquired a prescriptive easement over an
abutting owner's land although the abutting land owner had actually built upon
part of the property himself. The adjoining owner held in fee a 20" strip, which
strip was used by the city as part of a street for twenty-five years. A part of
the adjoining owner's home had been built on the strip, including foundation
stones extending out beneath the surface and an encroaching cornice above the
surface. The owner now sought to add to the front of his home on the remainder
of this strip, but the city secured an injunction on the ground that by using the
strip for travel over a twenty-five year period, it had acquired an easement
therein. The rationale of the case was that since the owner's use was not inconsistent with the acquisition of the easement by the city it did not prevent the
easement from arising.
7 193 Ill. 185 at 189, 61 N. E. 1036 (1901).
"Adverse possession of a portion of
the street by the appellee and those in the line of his title or possession, no
matter how long continued, had no effect, by reason of the provisions of the
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that the Statute of Limitations does not run to bar the right
of the public as against an encroacher.
While it follows from the preceding position of the court
that no prescriptive right can be acquired by a private party
for the exclusive and permanent use of a portion of the street
as against the right of the public to use such street for travel
purposes, nevertheless a private party may obtain by contract
the right to maintain an encroaching structure for a relatively
extended period of time. However, in all of the cases involving contractual agreements, the Illinois courts have
clearly indicated that such agreements must be made subject
to revocation when the use of the street is required for public
travel. Thus, in Gregsten v. City of Chicago," a case most
frequently cited for the proposition that a private party can
have a contractual right to maintain a structure encroaching
beneath the street, the agreement expressly reserved to the
city a right of revocation in the event the public interest
should require it. In People v. Field & Company,' the city of
Chicago provided in the ordinance granting the defendant
the right to construct a tunnel under a street that the city
might revoke it at any time and in any event the permit
should cease after twenty years. The court expressly distinguished all of the cases relied upon by the plaintiff, a tax
payer, on the grounds that in those cases encroachment upon
the street was of a permanent nature and for a fixed time
and not, as here, under conditions where the encroachment
could be removed at any time. ° The city may not, however,
Statute of Limitations, to bar the right of the city to be restored to possession
of the street to the full width thereof. The title to the street is vested in the
city in its governmental capacity . . and the Statute of Limitations does not run
in favor of appellee to bar the right of the public."
8 145 IlL 451, 34 N. E. 426 (1893). This case involved a vault built beneath a
public alley by the plaintiff, an abutting owner, pursuant to a revocable permit
and the posting of a bond which required plaintiff to keep a portion of the alley
in good repair. The plaintiff kept the alley in good repair, thus furnishing good
consideration, and after a long period of time the city attempted to revoke the
permit, not in the interest of public necessity for travel, but in order to allow
a private party to construct a vault on the other side of the alley. Such revocation was not permitted. Obviously, the case may be reconciled with those
involving revocation in the interest of public necessity.
9 266 IMI.609, 107 N. E. 864 (1915).
10 Ibid., p. 627. In City of Chicago v. Norton Milling Co., 196 Ill. 580, 63 N. E.
1043 (1902), it was held that a lease by the city of a vault space would be a
legal and binding agreement, the city receiving consideration in the permission
of the Norton Milling Company allowing it to swing the end of the Madison
Street bridge over its property. It is significant that the court specifically noted
that if the use of the public so required, the city might reclaim the space leased.
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arbitrarily or capriciously revoke this right."
Distinguished from cases involving the acquisition by an
adjoining land owner of a new right to encroach are those
involving the exercise of the rights left in the landowners
when the city acquired only an easement for street purposes.
In discussing the difference between ownership of streets in
fee and in easement by the city, the courts have never
specifically identified the rights remaining to an abutting
owner after the city acquires an easement for street purposes.
The general conclusion in such a situation has been that the
abutting owner may make any use of the street not inconsistent with the city's easement. 2
The principal question in connection with the construction
of a subway is whether the easement is broad enough so that
any use of the street which is inconsistent with the construction of a subway is an interference with the easement which
must be removed at the abutting owner's expense. The
language of a leading Illinois case, People v. Field & Company," indicates that the city's easement in such a situation
will be paramount.
11 Swaim v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 233, 171 N. E. 871 at 877 (1930). Reh.
den., 202 Ind. 233, 173 N. E. 287 (1930). Cf. footnote 8 supra.
12 The People v. Field & Company, 266 Ill. 609, 107 N. E. 864 (1915): "This
court has quite recently had before it for consideration the respective rights of
abutting property owners, the city authorities and the public with reference to
the use of the space under the surface of the streets, both when the fee was owned
by the city and when it was owned by the abutting property owners. In those
cases it was decided that . . . when the abutting owner was the owner of the
fee he had the right to make any reasonable use of the street which did not interfere with the free enjoyment of the public . . . that the city would not be estopped
by any action of its own from requiring the space occupied beneath the street
to be surrendered to the city whenever it became necessary for the uses of the
public." See also City of Dixon v. Sinow & Weinman, 350 Ill. 634 at 636, 183 N. E.
570 (1932). "The easement for a street includes such use of the land at or beneath
the surface as will make the easement effective ....
The owner of the land under
a street, however, may make any reasonable use of his land that is not inconsistent with the proper enjoyment of the easement by the public." See Town of
Palatine v. Krueger, 121 Ill. 72, 12 N. E. 75 (1887).
13 266 Ill. 609 at 623, 627, 107 N. E. 864 (1915). See also City of Dixon v. Sinow
& Weinman, 350 Ill. 634, 183 N. E. 570 (1932); Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. City
of Chicago, 247 Ill. 192, 93 N. E. 153 (1910); People ex rel. Jeffrey v. Murphy, 254
Ill. App. 109 at 113 (1929), in which the court stated: "The rule is well settled
that when a public street is once established, all of the beneficial uses vest in
and devolve upon the public. These uses include the uninterrupted, unimpeded
and unobstructed use of every portion and part of such public highway, not only
that they [the public] may use all the ground for foundation to travel upon, but
that they may likewise enjoy the uses of the air above and the ground beneath
the surface." The Massachusetts court has taken a similar position in Sears v.
Crocker, 184 Mass. 586, 69 N. E. 327 (1904), and in Peabody v. City of Boston, 220
Mass. 376, 107 N. E. 952 (1915), both involving subway construction.
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In any event, whether the fee title was in the city or the abutting property
owner, the street under the surface of the ground could only be used in
such a manner as would safeguard the paramount right of the public
to the full and unobstructed use of the street for the purpose for which
it was dedicated; that the city would not be estopped by any action of its
own from requiring the space occupied beneath the street to be surrendered to the city whenever it became necessary for the uses of the public.
*

.

.

Under the authorities in this as well as other jurisdictions, if the

subsurface of the street is needed by the public for travel or other public
uses, the mere fact that such public use will deprive abutters of the use
of vaults and other similar underground structures in the street theretofore maintained, cannot stand in the way of the construction of sewers
or subways. "Abutters are bound to withdraw from the occupation of
streets above or below the surface whenever the public needs the occupied
space for travel."

Any conclusion to the effect that the city's easement in its
streets is not broad enough to cover subway purposes would
have to be based principally on the theory that street purposes were to be limited to those in effect at the time the
easement was acquired or to those specific purposes for which
the easement was then acquired. 4 This argument is supportable on the ground that had the abutting owner contemplated giving up his right to encroach beneath the street
he would have asked a larger consideration."5 As the language of the cases now stands, when a city takes an easement
for street purposes, the rights which remain in the abutting
owner are of nominal value only, becoming valuable principally upon the vacation of a street.
In Town of Palatinev. Kreuger6 the court quoted:
"The more ancient decisions limited the rights of the public to that of
passage and repassage, and treated any interference of the soil, other
14 In Sears v. City of Chicago, 247 Ill.
204 at 217, 93 N. E. 158 (1910), the court
said: "One buying a lot abutting upon a street in which the city has only an
easement must be presumed to purchase with knowledge of the fact that a
conveyance of the abutting lot carries the title to the center of the street, subject
only to the easement of the public therein. The abutting lot owner thus being
the owner of the fee to the center of the street upon which his lot is located,
has the right to make any reasonable use of the same which does not interfere with the full enjoyment of the easement which is held for the use of the
public." The last sentence of the above quotation would seem to indicate, however, in the light of the cases cited in note 13 supra, that the city's easement is
broad enough to include subsurface travel.
15 Ibid. However, Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. 586, 69 N. E. 327 (1904), which
has been frequently cited by the Illinois courts, indicates that when an easement for travel is taken and paid for by the city the entire payment has been
made, regardless of whether the modes of travel change so as to include subterranean travel.
16 121 Ill.
72 at 76, 12 N. E. 75 (1887). Quoting from J. K. Angell and T. Durfee, Highways (2d. ed), § 312.
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than was necessary to the enjoyment of this right, as a trespass. But
the modern decisions have very much extended the public right, and,
particularly in the streets of populous cities, have reduced the interest
of the owner of the soil to a mere naked fee of only a nominal value."

Where the city owns the fee in a street, the abutting owner's
rights are limited to ingress and egress, an easement for light
and air and the right to use the street in common with all
other persons, and such owner has no right to appropriate
exclusively any portion of a street, either above or below the
surface. 7
The remaining theory upon which an encroaching landowner may establish a right to maintain a structure beneath
the street rests in the possibility of an equitable estoppel
against the city. The Illinois cases conclude generally that
where a municipality, by affirmative acts, has induced an
abutting owner to build permanent structures encroaching
upon a municipal easement or fee, the municipality will be
estopped to require the encroacher to remove such structures, particularly when such removal involves great expense
or hardship. 8
While it is true that foundations, tunnels and vaults are
regarded as permanent structures, and therefore meet one
of the requisites for an estoppel, 9 nevertheless before a landowner can show the necessary inducement on the part of the
city, he must show that it has taken certain positive steps
which led him to build."0 Generally this affirmative act consists of the city's building a street on the wrong property and
17 Sears v. City of Chicago, 247 IM. 204, 93 N. E. 158 (1910).

IsSee People v. City of Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488, 74 N. E. 437 (1905). In this
case a railroad had occupied part of the surface of a street for over fifty years
and spent $400,000 in improvements. The street remained wide enough to permit
ordinary travel, and in this suit by a private citizen seeking a mandamus to
compel removal of the tracks, the court held that an estoppel had arisen, saying:
"Where a party acting in good faith under affirmative acts of a city has made
such expensive and permanent improvements that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights acquired, the doctrine of equitable estoppel
will be applied." One distinguishing feature of this case, however, is that the
city had actually obtained consideration for the use of the street by the railroad.
Cf. Shirk v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 298, 63 N. E. 193 (1902).
19 City of DeKalb v. Luney, 193 Ill.
185, 61 N. E. 1036 (1901); Russell v. City of
Lincoln, 200 Ill.
511, 65 N. E. 1088 (1902); Kennedy v. Town of Normal, 359 Ill.
306, 194 N. E. 576 (1935). In the latter case the plaintiff had fenced in an alley
which had been dedicated to the city but never used as an alley, and built a
bird house and planted trees and bushes on the enclosed portion. The court
held that these were not permanent improvements.
20 See People v. City of Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488, 74 N. E. 437 (1905).
Cf.
Shirk v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 298, 63 N. E. 193 (1902). See also note 18, supra.
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later attempting to re-route the street,2 or having indicated
that not only was the surface or a portion of the street not to
be used but rather that no street at all was to be used.2 2 In
the construction of the subway there are at least two points
in favor of the city upon this inducement issue:
1. The courts have apparently recognized that the use of
the subsurface of the street for travel is not an unexpected
development of the street and therefore a private owner cannot be said to have built without some contemplation that
the street would be used for such subsurface travel.
In People v. Field & Company," the court stated:
The courts, in applying the rules of law to questions of this nature,
should not permit the streets to be used in such a manner as to prejudice
the rights of abutting owners while at the same time fully safeguarding
all the rights of the public therein. These public rights do not depend
upon the methods of travel recognized at the time the streets were opened
or such public uses as have been sanctioned by long continued custom
and acquiescence. The use of the streets must be extended to meet the
new needs of locomotion, both above and below the surface of the ground.
The public uses to which a city street may be applied cannot be limited
by arbitrary rules, but must be extended to meet public wants and necessities occasioned by the enlarged uses to which the abutting property is
devoted.... The right of the public in the city streets necessarily includes
every kind of travel and communication for the movement or transportation of persons or property which is reasonable and proper. The original
owners of lands in the great cities of our country did not foresee the
growth of population and business which has caused property owners in
such cities to erect buildings twenty stories or more in height and to
excavate under them basements, cellars, and sub-cellars; nor was it
anticipated that the surface of the streets would be insufficient for the
use of the people ...

2. The approval of the City Building Commission of plans
allowing an abutting owner to encroach with foundations or
other structures beneath the surface of the street is not
sufficient as an affirmative act by the city to create an
estoppel.
In Tacoma Safety Deposit Company v. City of Chicago,' the
court said:
Village of Itasca v. Schroeder, 182 Ill. 192, 55 N. E. 50 (1899).
Jordan v. .City of Chenoa, 166 Ill. 530, 47 N. E. 191 (1897).
23 266 Ill. 609, 107 N. E. 864 (1915).
Cf. Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. 586, 69 N. E.
327 (1904); Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. City of Chicago, 247 Ill. 192, 93 N. E. 153
(1910); Fifty Associates v. City of Boston, 201 Mass. 585, 88 N. E. 427 (1909).
24 247 Ill. 192, 93 N. E. 153 (1910).
This case involved an attempt by the city
to require an abutting owner to pay rent for the use of the subsurface beneath
the street for vault space. Accord, Leo N. Levy Corporation v. Dick, 190 N. Y. S.
238 at 243 (1921). There is language in two Illinois cases in which the court
21

22

MUNICIPAL SUBWAY CONSTRUCTION

It is also urged that the city, having granted to the complainant a permit to construct its building upon its premises according to plans and
specifications which provided for the construction of subways beneath
the sidewalks adjoining its premises, is now estopped to deny the right
of the complainant to maintain said subways upon the property of the
city free of charge. It is too clear for argument, we think, that the city
had the right to regulate the construction of complainant's building at the
time it was erected; and the fact that it may, through its building department, have approved certain building plans which were submitted to it by
the complainant and granted to it a permit to construct its building, we
think obviously did not estop the city afterwards to require the complainant to pay for the use of the city's property, which its building in part
occupied, or to remove its building, or the part thereof which rested upon
the city's property. The complainant, at most, we think, obtained a
license to construct a subway beneath the sidewalk of the city adjoining
its building, which license could be revoked by the city in case the complainant refused to comply with the ordinance which required it to pay
to the city compensation for the use of the space beneath the sidewalk
in the street which belonged to the city.

Even if an inducement could be shown, the lapse of time
since the construction of most of the obstructions, though
frequently emphasized in the cases,2" should not in this instance be significant in creating an estoppel. No lapse of
time can give rise to a prescriptive right.2 6 The original
investment of anyone who builds permanent structures such
as the foundations of buildings, vaults, etc., usually overshadows any subsequent expenditures on his part. Therefore, whatever reliance took place, occurred at the time of
the initial investment, and the subsequent unmolested use
of the city's property cannot be set up retroactively as a
justification for the original expenditure.
II
The remaining problems are concerned with the rights of
the owners of land adjoining the subway. There are three
bases upon which liability for damages to adjoining property
pointed out that once a city permitted an encroaching structure to be built, It
could not be absolved from its duty of care toward the property simply because the building encroached upon the public right of way. Nixon v. City of
Chicago, 212 Ill. App. 365 (1918), cert. denied; Gridley v. City of Bloomington,
68 Ill. 47 (1873). However, these cases obviously do not control in the present
instance, as they decided merely that a city may be estopped with respect to
a negligence action but not that it can be estopped to require the removal of an
encroaching structure.
25 Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 68 Ill. 47 (1873); Nixon v. City of Chicago,
212 Ill. App. 365 (1918).
511, 65 N. E. 1088 (1902). Cf. Shirk v. City
26 Russell v. City of Lincoln, 200 Ill.
of Chicago, 195 Ill. 298, 63 N. E. 193 (1902).
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could be imposed upon the city. It might be imposed because
of the constitutional provision prohibiting the damaging of
private property for the public use without just compensation. 2 The city might also be held liable for the damage done
by independent contractors because the work of such contractors involved intrinsically dangerous activity, liability
for which the principal cannot escape. Thirdly, if the contractor were negligent and the city retained a sufficient
degree of control, it might be considered as a master-servant,
rather than as a principal-contractor relationship, and liability imposed accordingly on principles of respondeat superior. Again the discussion of these problems will be confined,
as closely as possible, to cases involving excavating and
tunnelling.
As between two private citizens, each owning an adjoining
piece of land, it has been held that if the excavation on one
lot causes an adjoining unimproved lot to settle or otherwise
injures it, there is liability on the excavating landowner even
in the absence of negligence.2 8 If, however, the injury is to
an improved lot or to the improvements thereon, the excavator is liable only if he is negligent. Otherwise, a landowner,
by erecting a building, would be imposing an additional
responsibility on his neighbors, since they would owe him
the same duty of care, despite the fact that by erecting a
structure upon his own land, he increases the hazards confronting them.2 9
Although the construction of tunnels by municipalities
might seem to involve problems analogous to those arising
when a private party excavates near the land of another, a
distinguishing factor is found in the clause of the Constitution
27 "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation. Such compensation, when not made by the state, shall be ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law. The fee of land taken for railroad tracks, without consent of the owners thereof, shall remain in such owners
subject to the use for which it is taken." Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13.
28 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Rothschild & Co., 213 Ill. App. 178 (1919).
29 Best Manf. Co. v. Creamery Co., 307 Ill. 238, 138 N. E. 684 (1923); City of
Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231 (1875); Mamer v. Lussem, 65 Ill. 484 (1872); Korogodsky v. Shimberoff, 256 Ill. App. 255 (1930); Noceto v. Weill, 166 Ill. App. 162
(1911). See also, 50 A.L.R. 486; E. Leesman, "Significance of the Doctrine of
Lateral Support as a Real Property Right," 16 Ill. L. Rev. 108 at 115. The fact
that independent contractors were employed has not caused courts to shift all
liability to the contractors. They hold that since the work is done by the order
of the principal he is liable. Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Rothschild & Co., 213 InI.
App. 178 (1919); Starr v. Standard-Tilton Milling Co., 183 Ill. App. 454 (1913),
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of 1870, reading as follows: "Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. ' ' 30
This obviously imposes a greater liability upon the city. The
old Illinois Constitution of 1848 required payment for property taken, but had no provision regarding the necessity for
payment for property damaged for the public use. 3 1
However, the courts did attempt to provide compensation
to injured landowners. On one occasion, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that injury to property resulting from a city's
negligence in constructing a street constituted in effect a
"taking" of that property under the eminent domain provision. 2
When the present Constitution was adopted, the necessity
for such judicial legislation was eliminated. Courts continued to impose liability for damage to property under the
"eminent domain" provision,"3 and did so in cases where the
injury was caused by negligence, and by inherently dangerous activity, as well as on purely "eminent domain" grounds,
i.e., where the injury was caused without the fault of the
public body involved.
Three cases involving liability without fault have been
found. They apparently turn on the fact that the city in each
case either used or permitted the use of space beneath the
surface of a street in such a manner as to result in injury to
private property. In two of these cases, the city allowed a
street railway company to construct tunnels under the Chicago River at La Salle Street. In both cases, the property
of adjoining landowners was damaged. In neither case was
there any allegation of negligence. In Barnard v. City of
4 the court said,
Chicago,"
Before the Constitution of 1870 . . . acts authorized to be done by a valid
act of the legislature, performed with due care and skill, in conformity
with the provisions of the act, could not be made the ground of an action,
however great the damage done. Since the Constitution of 1870, however,
the power of the legislature has been restricted and the statute constitutes no defense where property has been damaged for the public use.
30 Ill.
Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13.
31 Ill.
Const. 1848, Art. XIII, § 11.
82 Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 Il.502 (1866).
3s Article II, § 13 of the Ill. Const. will be referred to throughout this discussion
as the "eminent domain" provision, including both the taking and damaging of
private property for the public use, although usually the term is reserved for
cases involving the judicial taking of property.
84 270 Ill. 27, 110 N. E. 412 (1915).
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The court concluded that where the city permits such a
public use of a street, or any space beneath the surface of
the street as results in damage to private property, it will
be liable for such damage, notwithstanding it may be caused
by the withdrawal of lateral support of the weight of a building or other structures on the private property involved.
The other two cases, Peck v. Chicago Railways Company"'
6 reached similar results.8 7
and Schroeder v. City of Joliet,8
The courts have also held that the same series of events
gave an injured landowner a right of action against the public
body for its contractor's negligence, as well as a right of
action under the eminent domain provision.
In Bruno v. City of Chicago,8 the city contracted for the
construction of a water tunnel. Dynamite blasts were set
off. The plaintiff charged that the contractor's negligence in
allowing the adjoining land to settle and in producing vibrations by means of blasting had damaged the plaintiff's building. The court said, "While the plaintiff's pleadings do make
charges of negligence, they also contain such allegations as
make out a right of action for damages suffered by the plaintiff's property for a public use."
In Nixon v. City of Chicago,"' the plaintiff's building was
damaged by the construction under Dearborn Street of a
tunnel which was being built by the Illinois Tunnel Company
pursuant to a permit issued by the city which reserved the
power of supervision over the city. The court said, "Where
a tunnel is constructed under a public street and for a public
use, pursuant to authority granted by the municipality and
under its supervision and inspection, and there is an injury
caused to owners of adjoining property by such construction,
the city will be liable for the damages sustained." The court
went on to say, "Since the adoption of the Constitution of 1870,
where such an operation in a public street as is involved in
the case at bar causes damage to adjoining private property,
the city has been held to be liable in damages, the basis of the
liability being the interference with the rights of the owner to
36 189 Ill.
48, 59 N. E. 550 (1901).
37 The latter case is discussed elsewhere in this article.
88 214 Ill.
App. 498 (1919).
39 212 Ill.
App. 365 (1918), cert. denied; Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. City of
Chicago, 257 Ill.192, 93 N. E. 153 (1910); Leo N. Levy Corp. v. Dick, 190 N. Y. S.
238 (1921); Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 68 Ill.47 (1873).
85 270 Ill.
34, 110 N. E. 414 (1915).
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the full use and enjoyment of his property, including the
building." In this case, also, the plaintiff had alleged negligence on the part of the contractor, and again there was a
combination of liability on both theories.4 °
A further group of cases couples liability for damage done
because of inherently dangerous activity with liability under
the eminent domain provision. In City of Chicago v. Murdoch,4 1 the city let a contract for the construction of a water
tunnel. Dynamiting was necessary and the explosions caused
the plaintiff's adjacent building to settle and cracked its walls.
The court stated that usually a principal is not responsible
for the negligence of an independent contractor, but added
that the rule "does not apply where the contract directly
requires the performance of a work intrinsically dangerous,
however skillfully performed." 42 The court approved two
instructions, one imposing liability because of fault and the
other imposing liability under "eminent domain" principles.
Although it seems clear that the city would be liable for
damages to adjoining buildings under the eminent domain
provision, either solely on the constitutional basis, or that,
together with some other basis of liability, it seems worthwhile to investigate briefly the other two possible theories
upon which injured landowners might rely.
It has been held that the principal is liable for damage
caused by an independent contractor when the nature of the
work done by that contractor may be described as "intrinsically dangerous." A succinct statement of the rule may be
found in the very recent case of Macer v. O'Brien:4 8
As a general rule, a municipality cannot be held liable ex delicto unless
the tort was committed by its agents or servants under circumstances
such as would bring the doctrine of respondeat superior into operation.
An exception to this rule is where the contract requires the doing of work
which is intrinsically dangerous in and of itself, no matter how carefully
it may be performed. In cases of that kind, such as the boring of tunnels,
the deep removal of large areas of lateral support, the use of high ex40 See also Eldred Drainage & Levee Dist. v. Wilcoxson, 365 Ill.
249, 6 N. E.
(2d) 149 (1936), in which "eminent domain" liability was again imposed for
damage done in the construction of a public works project, and in which the con-

tractor was negligent.

212 Ill.
9, 72 N. E. 46
42 Citing City of Joliet
Chapman, 137 Ill.
438, 20
App. 427 (1904).
48 356 Ill. 486, 190 N. E.
41

(1904).
v. Harwood, 86 Ill.
110 (1877); Village of Jefferson v.
N. E. 33 (1889). Cf. City of Chicago v. Rusk, 117 IlM.
904 (1934).
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plosives, etc., the principal remains liable, regardless of the intervention
of an independent contractor.

It is difficult to think of a project which fits more neatly
into the definition of the class of intrinsically dangerous work
than does the construction of the subway. All three elements
-the boring of tunnels, the deep removal of large areas of
lateral support, and the use of high explosives-will be
present.
In this case the city had passed an ordinance granting permission to the Sanitary District of Chicago to build a sewer
under certain streets. The Sanitary District agreed to
indemnify the city against all claims for damages. The contracts for the work were let by the Sanitary District to various
contractors, who in turn employed various subcontractors,
one of which was a codefendant in this case. The negligence
of this subcontractor in breaking up a street caused injury to
the plaintiff's adjoining property. The City had notice of the
manner in which the work was being done, and was held
liable for permitting its licensee to work on the streets in
such a manner as to injure others.
This case, of course, did not involve the relationship of
principal and contractor in the same manner that it would
have if the city had been a principal to the contracts, and
therefore it might be argued that the above quotation is
merely dictum. However, since the city's relationship to
the contractor was not as close as it would have been had the
city been a principal, it seems that the statement would apply
with even more force in the subway case, where the city
will be a principal.
Moreover, this case is supported by other Illinois cases
which appear to be directly in point. In the City of Joliet v.
Harwood,"' the city let a contract for the construction of a
sewer. The agreed statement of facts read substantially as
follows: "The contractors 'used all due care, skill, and caution in the discharge of, and the covering of, all blasts discharged in the prosecution of the work; that from, and by
means of, a blast in said sewer a stone was thrown against
[and damaged plaintiff's building]. . . .' " The court held
that since the city had caused intrinsically dangerous work
to be done, it was liable for the damage resulting therefrom
44

86 I1. 110 (1877).
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even in the absence of negligence, as the natural, although
not the necessary, consequence of the work was injury to
the plaintiff's property 5 The court did not discuss the
eminent domain problem.
There is also the possibility that the agreement between
the city and each contractor will reserve a high degree of
control to the city over the work, as a result of which the
courts may consider the relationship as being one of master
and servant, rather than one of principal and independent
contractor. If that were the case, the city would be liable to
third persons for injuries caused by the contractor, on the
theory of respondeat superior.4 6 However, under the doctrine of the Macer case,47 the construction of the subway
would seem to involve inherently dangerous activity with
consequent liability on the city, regardless of the degree of
control it retained.
It thus appears probable that the city can be held liable for
damage done to adjoining property on one theory or another.
The question next arises as to what standard should be used
to measure the damages. At one time, Illinois courts held
that the measure of damages for injuries to property resulting from the construction of a public improvement was the
actual cost of the necessary repairs.4 8 However, the court
now takes the view that the measure of damages is the difference in the market value of the property before and after the
construction of the improvement, plus the cost of such repairs
as are made to preserve the property during the period of
construction.4 9
A good expression of this'rule may be found in the Peck
case.5 0 In the course of construction of a tunnel under the
Chicago River at LaSalle Street certain steps were taken by
See also Robbins v. City of Chicago, 71 U. S. 657, 18 L. Ed. 427 (1867).
46 City of Chicago v. Murdoch, 212 Ill. 9, 72 N. E. 46 (1904), citing City of
Chicago v. Joney, 60 Ill. 383 (1871), and City of Chicago v. Dermody, 61 Ill. 431
(1871).
47 Macer v. O'Brien, 356 Ill. 486, 190 N. E. 904 (1934).
48 FitzSimons & Connell Co. v. Braun, 199 II. 390, 65 N. E. 249 (1902); City of
Chicago v. Rust, 117 II. App. 427 (1904); City of Chicago v. Murdoch, 212 Ill. 9,
72 N. E. 46 (1904).
49 Bruno v. City of Chicago, 214 II. App. 498 (1919); Schroeder v. City of Joliet,
189 IlM.48, 59 N. E. 550 (1901); Peck v. Chicago Railways Co., 270 Ill. 34, 110 N. E.
414 (1915); Beidler v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 211 Ill. 628, 71 N. E. 1118
(1904); Osgood v. City of Chicago, 154 Ill. 194, 41 N. E. 40 (1894).
50 Peck v. Chicago Railways Co., 270 Ill. 34, 110 N. E. 414 (1915).
45
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the plaintiff to protect his adjoining building, after he was
notified by the contractor and by the City Building Commissioner that he should brace and protect the building, as work
was about to be commenced upon the tunnel. However,
despite the precautions taken the building settled, causing
great damage to the plaintiff. The court said that an instruction declaring the difference in market value to be the measure of damages was improper because it omitted any reference to the expenses incurred in the effort to diminish the
damages, stating:
It is true that in this case there is no breach of contract or tort. The
declaration makes no charge of negligence or complaint as to the manner
in which the improvement was made or the skillfulness with which the
labor upon it was performed. The damages must therefore be estimated
under the same rules as upon a petition to condemn the property. We
see no reason why a different rule should prevail in such a case, and if
from the evidence it appears that expenses were incurred by the appellees
[plaintiffs] in good faith and in the exercise of a reasonable and prudent
judgment in an effort to reduce the damages, those expenses should be
regarded as a part of the damages to their property.

In Schroeder v. City of Joliet,51 as a result of an excavation
for a street improvement, plaintiff's property was damaged
because of the removal of the lateral support. The only question raised concerned the measure of damages. The court
held, .....
the measure of damages is the diminution in value
of the property by reason of the act of the city. . . . But if,
upon a consideration of the effects of the improvement upon
the property, there is no damage, neither the constitution
nor the law authorizes a recovery."
In Biedler v. The Sanitary District of Chicago,"2 the court
quoted:
"Where an action is brought to recover damages, where no part of the
plaintiff's property has been taken, but merely damaged by a public
improvement, the law is well settled that a recovery cannot be had unless the property claimed to be damaged has been depreciated in value
by the construction of the public improvement. In other words, if the
fair market value of the property is as much immediately after the construction of the improvement as it was before the improvement was made,
no damage has been sustained, and no recovery can be had."

In Bruno v. City of Chicago," the court said, "Of course, if
51 189 Il. 48, 59 N. E. 550 (1901).
52 211 Ill. 628, 71 N. E. 1118 (1904).
53 Citing Springer v. City of Chicago, 135 IMl. 552, 26 N. E. 514 (1891). See also
Osgood v. City of Chicago, 154 IMI 194, 41 N. E. 40 (1895). The court's latest
expression of this view may be found in Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Barton, 371 Ill. 11, 19 N. E. (2d) 935 (1939).
54 214 Ill. App. 498 (1919).
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there has been no depreciation in the value of the property
there can be no recovery, regardless of the question of the
cost of repairs." Consequently if the construction of the subway results in an increase in the value of adjoining property,
such increase could be set off against the damages caused
by the injury to the property, and only an amount equal to
the difference would be payable to the injured landowner.
It should also be noted that there can be no recovery except
for an actual physical injury to the property. Thus in the
Peck case5 5 the court said, "Inconvenience, expense or loss
of business necessarily occasioned to the owners of abutting
property during the progress of the work by the construction
of a public improvement in a street give no cause of action
"'I
against a municipality ...
In an attempt to mitigate damages, the city may itself shore
up adjoining buildings, but it is more probable that it would
request each landowner to shore up his own buildings by
giving him notice to do so. The legal effect of such notice
should not be emphasized although its practical effect may
57
be great.
In cases where private adjoining landowners are involved,
the court has apparently not considered the question of notice
as significant in determining the extent of liability. The court
has indicated that it would impose liability under the same
principles in circumstances similar in every sense, except
that in one case notice was given and in the other no notice
was forthcoming.5 8 Even if such shoring is done, under the
55 Peck v. Chicago Railways Co., 270 Ill. 34, 110 N. E. 414 (1915).
56 Citing Osgood v. City of Chicago, 154 Ill. 194, 41 N. E. 40 (1895); Lefkovitz v.

City of Chicago, 238 Ill. 23, 87 N. E. 58 (1909); Chicago Flour Co. v. City of Chicago, 243 Ill. 268, 90 N. E. 674 (1910).
57 There is some doubt as to whether the city could compel any land owner
to shore up his building, although it is probable that failure to do so after
notice was given would result in a diminution in the amount of recovery for the
damages. In Peck v. Chicago Railways Co., 270 Ill. 34, 110 N. E. 414 (1915),
the court said, "A person injured by another's breach of contract or tort is
bound to use reasonable care to render the injury as light as possible ....
However, in Korogodsky v. Shimberoff, 256 Ill. App. 255 (1930), the Appellate
Court refused to allow the excavator to recover the cost of the shoring of the
adjoining building, saying, "A party cannot of his own volition create an obligaIt may be
tion in his own favor by doing some act for his own interests. . .. .
that the cases are reconcilable, since a public body was involved in the Peck case,
whereas in the other case two private parties were involved.
58 Starr v. Standard-Tilton Milling Co., 183 Ill. App. 454 (1913); Korogodsky
v. Shimberoff, 256 Ill. App. 255 (1930).
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doctrine of the Peck case,59 the city would be responsible for
expenditures made by any such landowner in a reasonable
attempt to minimize the damage to his property, whether or
not that attempt proved successful.
The only remaining question to be discussed deals with the
possibility of the city's shifting its liability. There are various
ways in which this may be done. It could conceivably secure
some form of insurance, although the cost might prove prohibitive as a practical matter. In New York, subway contracts have contained provisions designed to shift all liability
to the contractors. Such contracts have been upheld 0 together with contracts imposing ultimate liability on subway
builders for all damages caused by their negligence alone."'
59 Peck v. Chicago Railways Co., 270 Ill.
34, 110 N. E. 414 (1915).
60 Dooley v. M'Mullen, Snare & Triest, 172 N. Y. S. 135 (1918); Freedman v.
Hart & Early Co., 293 N. Y. S. 525 (1935); Schnaier v. Bradley Contracting Co.,
169 N. Y. S. 88 (1918). The provisions read as follows:
"Article 38-The contractor expressly admits and covenants to and with the
city that the plans and specifications and other provisions of this contract, if the
work be done without fault or negligence on the part of the contractor, do not
involve any damage to the foundations, walls or other parts of adjacent buildings
or structures or to navigation; and the contractor will at his own expense make
good any damage that shall, in the course of construction, be done to any such
foundations, walls or other parts of adjacent buildings or structures or to navigation. The liability of the contractor under this covenant is absolute and is not
dependent upon any question of negligence on his part, or on the part of his
agents, servants or employees, and the neglect of the engineer to direct the contractor to take any particular precautions or to refrain from doing any particular thing, shall not excuse the contractor in case of any such damage. Where
the work is required to be done by tunnelling the same admission and covenant
is also applied to the foundations, walls and other parts of buildings and to any
other structures or surface over the tunnel. But this admission and covenant
shall not apply to the foundations, walls or other parts of buildings or any part
thereof acquired by the city and which the engineers may determine should be
raised.
"Article 40-The contractor shall be solely responsible for all physical injuries
to persons or property occurring on account of and during the performance of
the work hereunder, and shall indemnify and save harmless the city from liability
upon any and all claims for damages on account of such injuries to persons or
property, and from all costs and expenses in suits which may be brought against
the city for such injuries to persons or property. It being distinctly understood,
stipulated and agreed that the contractor shall be solely responsible and liable for
and shall fully protect and indemnify the city against all claims for damages
to persons or property occasioned by or resulting from blasting or other methods
or processes in the work of construction, whether such damages be attributable
to negligence of the contractor or his employees or otherwise."
61 Rigney v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 217 N. Y. 31, 111 N. E. 227 (1916);
148 Smith Street Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 288 N. Y. S. 1012 (1935). In
some cases, the court permitted the injured landowners to bring actions against
the contractors directly on the theory that the plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of the contract. Dooley v. M'Mullen, Snare & Triest, 172 N. Y. S. 135
(1918); Schnaier v. Bradley Contracting Co., 169 N. Y. S. 88 (1918); the Rigney
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It is problematical as to which is the least expensive method
of shifting the city's liability. Presumably the cost of insurance would be prohibitive and the inclusion of contractorliability clauses in the contracts merely results in higher bid
prices. The city has adopted the latter expedient by inserting into the subway contracts provisions imposing ultimate
liability for negligence upon each contractor. The weakness
in any such clause is that it cannot permit the city to evade
the absolute liability imposed upon it by the Constitution, and
therefore is only a partial solution of the problem.
case, supra. However, there is nothing to prevent the landowner from bringing
an action against both the city and the contractor, as codefendants. In such a
case, the primary liability would still rest upon the contractor in accordance
with his agreement. In 148 Smith Street Realty Corp. v. City of New York, supra,
the court directed that the city should have a judgment against the contractor to
enable it to reimburse itself in the event that it would be forced to pay the
judgment of the injured property owner.
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NEGOTIABILITY OF ILLINOIS MORTGAGES

Does the assignee of a negotiable note, and the mortgage securing it,
take the mortgage subject to all the equities, infirmities, and defenses
which the mortgagor could have asserted in an action brought to enforce the mortgage by the original mortgagee?
Marks v. Pope,' the latest Illinois case on this subject, has taken another important step toward removing Illinois from the small minority
of states 2 which have answered the above query in the affirmative.
This case arose when a trustee sought to foreclose a trust deed on
Chicago real estate for the benefit of the holders of bonds secured by
the trust deed and the maker of the bonds asserted a defense of usury.
The facts of the case were somewhat involved 3 and the findings of the
trial court were not as complete as they might have been, but the
court passes over the non-essential facts to state the question as follows,
"The question for decision, therefore, is whether the individual maker
of a series of bonds which are payable to bearer, so as to be negotiable
without endorsement, may interpose the defense of usury as against a
holder in due course, when the trustee brings an action to foreclose the
4
trust deed for the benefit of all bondholders."
In an able and well reasoned opinion by Chief Justice Shaw, the court
answered this question in the negative, limiting its decision, however,
to the particular facts of this case. The court seemed to be impressed
with the importance of the question here involved as it affects present
day real estate loan transactions and hence consented to reexamine the
1 370 Iln. 597, 19 N. E. (2d) 616 (1939).
2 Only three states seem to have followed the minority rule consistently. See
28, 148 N. E. 882
Olds v. Cummings, 31 Ill. 188 (1863); Hirsh v. Arnold, 318 Ill.
(1925); Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 176 (1862); Smith v. Parsons, 55 Minn. 520,
57 N.W. 311 (1893); Union Trust Co. v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R. Co., 9 Ohio
Dec. 773 (1887); Baily v. Smith, 14 Ohio St. 396 (1863).
5 The essential facts in the Marks case: Nicholas Pope and his wife, on October
8, 1925, executed a trust deed conveying real estate to Arnold K. Marks, as
trustee, to secure the payment of their fifty-eight bonds, aggregating $40,000 in
principal amount, dated October 10, 1925, due serially to October 10, 1932, payable
to bearer, with interest at 7 per cent per annum. All of the bonds were delivered
by the makers to Marks & Company, the house of issue, but, by a collateral agreement, Marks & Company withheld a commission of $4,000, or 10 per cent. Bonds
totalling $18,000 in principal amount were paid as they matured, and all interest
coupons due to and including October 10, 1932, were paid as due. There was a
default in payment of the remaining $22,000 of principal on October 10, 1932, and
the trustee filed a bill to foreclose for the benefit of the bondholders. The defendant
asserted a defense of usury, and the trial court found that the defense had been
proved, but held that it could not be asserted against holders in due course. The
appellate court reversed the decree of the chancellor. Marks v. Pope, 289 Ill. App.
558, 7 N. E. (2d) 481 (1937).
4 The appellate court had some difficulty with the question of whether the
intervenor (a bondholder) had proved herself to be a holder in due course, but
the Supreme Court dismissed the question, stating that Section 59 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act (IlI. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 98, § 79) provides that "every
holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course .. "
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entire doctrine as laid down by previous Illinois cases.
The problem is probably as old as the practice of making mortgages
of real estate to secure loans of money, but it seems to be peculiarly
an American problem, since the practice of giving negotiable notes,
instead of individual non-negotiable bonds, to evidence the indebtedness
arose in this country. The history of the problem, the two contrary
doctrines, and the reasons underlying them have been ably set out by
Professor Britton in his article on assignment of mortgages 5 and need
not be reexamined here.
The earliest case in Illinois squarely to present the problem was OIds
v. Cummings, 6 decided in 1863, wherein the court committed Illinois
to the rule later designated as the minority rule.7 Although the opinion
indicates that the court had found no cases contrary to the rule adopted
5 Win. E. Britton, "Assignment of Mortgages Securing Negotiable Notes," 10 Ill.
L. Rev. 337 (1915). Professor Britton states that the first case presented to an
American court was Reeves v. Scully, Walkers Ch. (Mich.) 248 (1843), wherein
the Michigan court adopted the majority rule without argument and without
citing authority. The entire decision is as follows, "The decree must be entered
for the amount of the note and mortgage. Reeves, as a bona ftde endorsee of the
note, was not affected by the equities existing between Hawkins and Scully. It
would have been otherwise, if a bond, instead of a note, had been given with the
mortgage." According to Professor Britton, the next cases arose as follows: Fisher
v. Otis, 3 Pinney (Wis.) 78 (1850) stated the majority rule by way of dictum;
Martineau v. McCollum 3 Pinney (Wis.) 455 (1852) adopted the majority rule without mentioning the previous Wisconsin or Michigan cases; Dutton v. Ives, 5
Mich. 515 (1858), and Craft v. Bunster, 9 Wis. 503 (1859), follow the previous
holdings of these states. In Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 176 (1862), the court
examined the Michigan and Wisconsin cases but refused to follow them, adopting
the minority rule. In 1863 came Olds v. Cummings, 31 Ill. 188, and Baily v. Smith,
14 Ohio St. 396, in which both courts adopted the minority rule on independent reasoning. In 1870 the Colorado Territorial Court, in Longan v. Carpenter,
relied on Olds v. Cummings, 31 Ill. 188 (1863), and adopted the minority rule. This
decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Carpenter v. Longan,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 21 L. Ed. 313 (1873) in a strong opinion. This soon became
the leading case in the United States and was the basis for the rapid adoption
of the majority rule in various states. For further discussion of the general
topic, statements of the two rules and the reasoning on which they are based,
and further citation of authorities see 41 C. J. 693, 694.
6 31 Ill. 188 (1863).
7 Perhaps the clearest statement of the minority rule is contained in Union
Trust Company v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 9 Ohio Dec. 773 (1887), 'Whatever may be the law of any other state . . . in this state, it has been the settled
and undisputed law . . . that a mortgage given to secure negotiable notes or
bonds is itself a non-negotiable chose in action, and open to all defenses existing
between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, even when the notes and bonds
secured thereby, in the hands of innocent holders for value are not themselves
open to any such defenses." A complete statement of the majority rule is contained in State National Bank v. Flathers, 45 La. Ann. 75, 12 So. 243 (1892): "A
bona fide holder of a negotiable note acquired before maturity, secured by a
mortgage duly recorded, which has been executed by one having lawful authority
to make it, and bearing on its face nothing to impeach its validity, cannot be
defeated in his mortgage rights by secret equities between the original parties
existing before or arising after its execution, of which neither the act nor the
public records afforded any notice, and of which he had no actual notice, at least
when such equities are opposed by the original mortgagor or in his right."
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in that case,8 there were already decisions in other states holding to
both the minority rule 9 and the majority rule.' 0
As with most legal problems affecting a large proportion of the people
and involving substantial amounts of money, there were logical arguments to support both views. It was only natural that the early courts
were loath to allow mortgages to take on the character of negotiable
paper when mortgagor and mortgagee were known to each other, with
the mortgagee usually being also the payee of the note and with neither
party intending that the instruments circulate in commerce in the manner of bills and notes." This view was adequate to the transactions of
our pioneer days and, no doubt, worked substantial justice in most
cases. It was no hardship in those days for a purchaser of a mortgage
to get in his buggy and drive over to the mortgagor's house or farm
and inquire whether the mortgage was valid and would be paid. 12 The
Illinois court seemed satisfied with the rule of the Olds case and, during
the next twenty years, applied it without question to cases of individual
mortgages where the assignee attempted to defeat the defenses raised
1
by the mortgagor.
With the coming of the railroads and the growth of large cities, new
methods of finance were necessary to raise the capital to develop our
resources. The very size of industrial enterprises and construction projects made it necessary that the lenders of money be numerous and
widely scattered. The device of the conveyance to a disinterested trustee
to secure the payment of large issues of notes and bonds then came
into general use. That this presented new problems to the courts is
readily apparent. What inquiry could a bondholder in Illinois make of
a railroad corporation in Delaware regarding the building of the road
in Nebraska or the existence of fraud or usury in the contract with
8 The court states, "We have not met with a single case, where remedy has
been sought in a court of chancery, upon a mortgage, by an assignee, in which
every defense has not been allowed which the mortgagor or his representatives
could have made against the mortgagee himself. .... "
9 Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 120 (1862).
10 Reeves v. Scully, Walkers Ch. (Mich.) 248 (1843); Dutton v. Ives, 5 Mich.
515 (1858); Fisher v. Otis, 3 Pinney (Wis.) 78 (1850); Martineau v. McCollum, 3
Pinney (Wis.) 455 (1852); Croft v. Bunster, 9 Wis. 503 (1859).
11 This view is admirably expressed in the Olds case: "Here is expressed the
very essence of the reason of the law. Mortgages are not commercial paper.
It is not convenient to pass them, from hand to hand, performing the real office
of money in commercial transactions, as notes, bills and the like . . . it [commercial paper] relies upon personal security, and is based upon personal credit.
It is a part of the credit system, which is said to be the life of commerce, which
requires commercial instruments to pass rapidly from hand to hand. Mortgage
securities are too cumbersome to answer these ends."
12 In the Olds case, it was said: "When one takes an obligation secured by a
mortgage, relying upon the mortgage as the security, he must do it deliberately,
and take time to inquire if any reason exists why it should not be enforced ....
"
13 Hamilton v. Lubukee, 51 Ill. 415 (1869); Kleeman v. Frisbie, 63 Ill. 482 (1872);
White v. Sutherland, 64 Ill. 181 (1872); Haskell v. Brown, 65 Ill. 29 (1872); Thompson v. Shoemaker, 68 Ill. 256 (1873); Bryant v. Vix, 83 Ill. 11 (1876); Melendy v.
Keen, 89 I1. 395 (1878); U. S. Mortgage Co. v. Gross, 93 Ill. 483 (1879); Ellis v.
Sisson, 96 Ill. 105 (1880).
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the corporate trustee or underwriting house in New York? Should the
holders of such bonds, who were unquestionably bona fide purchasers
for value without notice, be deprived of their rights because of some
latent infirmity in the mortgage transaction as between the maker of
the bonds and the underwriter, or between the maker and the construction company which accepted the bonds in payment for services and
sold them on the market? There could be but one answer to the latter
question and the Illinois court had no difficulty in answering in the
14
negative in Peoria and Springfield Railroad Co. v. Thompson, decided
in 1882. That case expressed dissatisfaction with the rule of the Olds
case, stating, "The rule ... rests, at least in part, on technical grounds,
which have lost much of their force in more recent times...."
Since that time the court has held that the rule of the Olds case does
not apply to large bond issues, but has continued to apply the rule to
16
individual mortgages, 15 and also to chattel mortgages. The court, howmade the
the
mortgagor
where
the
rule
apply
to
ever, has refused
17
payee his agent to sell the notes in the market, where the notes were
accommodation paper,' 8 and where the defenses arose out of a collateral
19
transaction between the mortgagor and mortgagee.
of the Olds case
rule
broad
the
Thus the court has whittled away at
and it is apparent that the rule now applies only within the narrower
confines of individual mortgage transactions; but the basic, underlying
principle that mortgages are assignable only in equity and that they
pass to the assignee subject to all equities and defenses remains in the
20
law of Illinois.
No reason is apparent why the present day individual real estate
loan, secured by a mortgage or trust deed, should not also be held to
be free from all equities and defenses in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The reasons for the former rule have
almost completely disappeared and it seems that the rule should go
with them. It is now almost the universal practice, at least as regards
urban loans, to execute bearer notes negotiable in form and to convey
103 Ill. 187 (1882).
Towner v. McClelland, 110 Ill. 542 (1884); Shippen v. Whittier, 117 Ill. 282, 7
N. E. 642 (1886); Hazle v. Bondy, 173 Ill. 302, 50 N. E. 671 (1898); Schultz v.
Sroelowitz, 191 Ill. 249, 61 N. E. 92 (1901); Bouton v. Cameron, 205 Ill. 50, 68 N. E.
800 (1903); Bartholf v. Bensley, 234 Ill. 336, 84 N. E. 928 (1908); Peacock v. Phillips,
247 Ill. 467, 93 N. E. 415 (1910); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Kransz, 291 Ill. 84, 125
N. E. 730 (1920); Hirsh v. Arnold, 318 Ill. 28, 148 N. E. 882 (1925).
16 Bryant v. Vix, 83 Ill. 11 (1876); Hodgson v. Eugene Glass Co., 156 Ill. 397, 40
N. E. 971 (1895).
491 (1882).
17 McIntire v. Yates, 104 Ill.
18 Naef v. Potter, 226 Ill. 628, 80 N. E. 1084 (1907); Foreman Trust & Savings
Bank v. Cohn, 342 II. 280, 174 N. E. 419 (1931); Miller v. Larned, 103 InI. 562 (1882).
19 Colehour v. State Savings Institution, 90 Ill. 152 (1878).
20 In Marks v. Pope, 370 Ill. 597, 19 N. E. (2d) 616 (1939), after summarizing the
history of the doctrine in Illinois, the court states, "Inasmuch as the reasons for
the decision in the Olds v. Cummings case do not exist in cases of a bond issue
secured by a trust deed and intended to be sold on the open market, the rule does
not apply." This seems to leave the rule of the Olds case in force in Illinois, with
the few exceptions mentioned above.
14
15
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the property to a corporate trustee who has no interest in the transaction (save to identify the note and trust deed). The mortgagor usually
has all his dealings with a mortgage house or loan correspondent who
handles all the details of closing and paying out the loan, but who has
no intention of retaining the paper for investment. A large proportion
of the loans are sold to insurance companies, investment trusts, university endowment funds, trust funds, and city banks, the purchasers of the
loans relying on what is disclosed on the face of the instruments and
on the public records. 21 Does it seem equitable to hold that such holders
of notes and mortgages should be subject to all equities, defenses, and
infirmities that may arise between a mortgagor and his broker or mort22
gage banker in an active and competitive loan market?
The trend of thought among the members of the bar seems to be
toward the view that notes and mortgages should be allowed to circulate
as freely as possible, as is shown by some of the provisions of the proposed mortgage act prepared by a committee of the Chicago Bar As23
sociation.
It is well that we now have definite assurance that urban bond issues,
intended to be sold to the public, are free from latent equities and defenses; but the decision comes at a time when most of the defaulted
bond issues of the 1920's have been foreclosed. 24 What will be the trend
21 Of course, the large investors usually require the mortgagor to execute a
so called "waiver of defense," in order to give themselves some protection from
latent equities or defenses. This document merely recites that a certain mortgage
and note, executed on a certain date and recorded on a certain date, is good and
valid and free from all equities and defenses. The usual practice is to date these
waivers subsequent to the note and mortgage, but they are generally executed
in blank along with the mortgage and filled in later by the mortgagee or broker.
Just what value this document would have in a real controversy, if the true facts
of its execution were known, is problematical.
22 While most loans are now being made at low rates of interest and small commissions, it must be remembered that we are not so far away from the days when
6 per cent to 7 per cent interest was not unusual and commissions often exceeded
4 per cent and 5 per cent. Thus the usurious loan contract is not wholly theoretical.
23 See "Draft of a Bill for an Act to Revise the Law in Relation to Mortgages
of Real Estate and the Foreclosure Thereof," Chicago Bar Association, 1939. Section 12 reads as follows: "A mortgage shall be considered as incident to the indebtedness thereby secured and shall be subject only to such matters of defense
as appear of record at the time the mortgage is recorded or appear in the mortgage itself or would be available in an action at law upon the instrument evidencing the indebtedness secured by the mortgage."
24 Foreclosures filed in Cook County, as reported in "Statistics on Mortgages
and Foreclosures" published by Chicago Mortgage Bankers Association quarterly,
Consideration
January, 1939, edition:
Number
Involved
Year
15,302
$587,055,603
1932
352,084,797
15,993
1933
166,661,467
1934
12,632
106,590,771
9,859
1935
91,613,274
1936
8,369
4,843
50,242,764
1937
35,949,564
3,247
1938
For a thorough discussion of the foreclosure of urban bond issues see Homer
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of the methods of financing in the next real estate boom is a matter of
conjecture, but it now seems that a larger portion of the financing will
be done by the corporate investors and trust funds mentioned above.
It is to be hoped that the statutes can be revised to place Illinois in
the list of states which allow mortgage paper to circulate freely, thus
making real estate loan investments more attractive. But, until the
statutes are revised, it is to be hoped that the Illinois Court will take
the next logical step beyond the Marks case and overrule Olds v. CuMmings 25 expressly and completely, thus freeing all mortgages from latent
equities and defenses.

RELEASE-RIGHT

TO CONTEST

W. S. McCLANAHAN
VALIDITY-RESTORATION

OF CONSIDERATION

AS

PREREQUISITE To AVOIDANCE OF RELEASE PROCURED BY FRAUD IN THE INDUCE-

MENT.-In the last issue of the CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw we had occasion to consider the question as to whether the Illinois courts would hold
restoration of consideration to be a prerequisite to the avoidance of a release procured by fraud in the inducement, in a subsequent tort action
2
based upon the same subject matter.' The New York case upon which
s
the comment was predicated has since been affirmed. As the review of
the earlier cases tended to indicate, it is now certain in New York that,
where the cause of action is founded upon a completed rescission, payment or tender must be made before commencement of the action, but
if the action is designed to secure rescission it will be sufficient to offer
to return the amount received in the complaint and make the tender on
the trial.
Eight days after the aforementioned decision, the Illinois Appellate
4
Court handed down a decision which throws some official light on the
question so far as this state is concerned. The action was brought under
5
the Injuries Act to recover for the death of the plaintiff's intestate arising from an automobile collision. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss.
attaching thereto a copy of a release procured from the deceased in his
6
lifetime. Upon denial of the motion, the defendant asserted the same
matter in an answer. The plaintiff filed a reply in which it was averred
that the deceased at the date of the release was of unsound mind and
was unable to comprehend the nature of the release. Defendant denied
the allegations of the reply, and the case was at issue. At the close
of the evidence the defendant entered a motion for a directed verdict on
the ground that the plaintiff's failure to return the fifty dollars which had
been paid for the release was fatal to the cause of action. The Circuit
Court overruled this motion and gave judgment for the plaintiff on the
verdict. On appeal by the defendant, this was reversed, on the ground
F. Carey and John W. Brabner-Smith, "Studies in Realty Mortgage Foreclosures
in Cook County," 27 Ill. L. Rev. 475, 595, 717, 849, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 1.
25 31 Ill. 188 (1863).
1 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 93.
3 19 N. E. (2d) 785 (1939).
2-Gilbert v. Rothschild, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 52 (1938).
4 Roggenkamp v. Marks, 19 N. E. (2d) 828 (Ill. App., 1939).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 172 (g).
5 Ila. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 70.
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that the court should have sustained the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict.
The court points out that a person seeking to avoid a contract for misrepresentation or lack of capacity is bound to restore all that he has received under it, and, while he might not be compelled to rescind before
the suit is brought, as where he does not know of the existence or
nature of the contract, still the rescission and offer to restore must be at
the earliest practicable moment. The plaintiff's failure to so offer before
defendant's motion for a directed verdict resulted in too long a delay and
hence barred a recovery. Seemingly the only element which obviates the
7
necessity of returning the money is "actual intended fraud."
L. BRUNETTE
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
AcTIoN-ABoLITION OF DISTINCTION AS TO FORm-AvAABiTY OF MoTION IN NATURE OF CORAM NOBIS IN CHANCERY PROCEEDINr.-Section 721 of

2
the Illinois Civil Practice Act, abolishing the writ of error coram nobis
and providing a similar remedy by motion to correct "all errors in fact.
committed in the proceedings of any court of record, and which, by the
common law, could have been corrected by said writ," was held applicable to chancery proceedings in the recent case of Frank v. Newburger.3
It has generally been held, in the absence of statutory provision otherwise,
"that a writ of error coram nobis has no place in chancery proceedings,
and is strictly a common-law writ, ' 4 although some equity courts have
treated the petition for the writ as a bill to avoid a decree5 or a motion
for a new trial.6 While the Frank case seems to reach a just result,7

7 Pawnee Coal Co. v. Royce, 184 Ill. 402, 56 N. E. 621 (1900).

1 "The writ of error coram nobis is hereby abolished, and all errors in fact,
committed in the proceedings of any court of record, and which, by the common
law, could have been corrected by said writ, may be corrected by the court in
which the error was committed, upon motion in writing, made at any time within
five years after the rendition of final judgment in the case, upon reasonable
notice ......
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 196.
2 The writ of error coram nobis, or coram vobis, was a common law writ for
the purpose of correcting a judgment in the same court in which it was rendered.
The writ was predicated on an alleged error in fact not appearing on the record,
which error it was presumed would not have been committed had the fact in the
first instance been brought to the notice of the court. See Fugate v. State, 85 Miss.
94, 37 So. 554, 107 Am. St. Rep. 268 (1904), and 2 R. C. L. 305, § 259.
3 298 Ill. App. 548, 19 N. E. (2d) 147 (1939).
4 Bradford v. White, 130 Ark. 532, 197 S.W. 1175, L.R.A. 1918A 1177 (1917).
See
also Reid's Adm'r v. Strider's Adm'r, 7 Gratt (Va.) 76, 54 Am. Dec. 120 (1850).
5 "The pleading . . . though denominated a petition for writs of error coram
nobis, is a bill to avoid a decree as well." Leftwick v. Hamilton, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.)
310 (1872).

6 Estes v. Nell, 163 Mo. 387, 63 S.W. 724 (1901).
7 The original proceeding was one to foreclose a mortgage. The defendants
defaulted. Thereafter, the complainants, by leave of court, amended their complaint without notifying the defendants. The new decree found a larger amount to
be due than that which had been allowed by the original decree and also stated
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendants "the value of all
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there is much to be said for the view of the dissent that the clause in
Section 72, "which, by the common law, could have been corrected . ..,"
seems to modify "all errors in fact" and thus was probably inserted by
the legislature for the purpose of limiting the use of the motion to cases
in which coram nobis was available before the act. W. L. SCHLEGEL
APPEAL AND ERROR-JuRISDICTION-WREN

APPELLATE COURT HAS JURISDIC-

DIsMISsAL.-The First Division of the Illinois Appellate Court, in the recent case of Melsha v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corporation,' has held that, where an appeal was dismissed for failure to file the transcript of the record within the sixty day period from
the date of the filing of the notice of appeal, 2 which failure was not
due to culpable negligence on the part of the appellant,3 the appeal could
TION OVER APPEAL PERFECTED AFTER

still be perfected under Section 764 of the Civil Practice Act, it being
shown that there was merit in the appeal. The contention that this practice would permit two appeals was rejected on the ground that the first
attempt had resulted in a nullity.
Under the former practice the right to appeal was statutory, and it
was held that the statute must be strictly followed. The reason for this
strictness lay in the fact that relief by writ of error could still be
secured as a matter of right in civil cases even though the original appeal failed. 5 Since the writ of error is now abolished, the court concludes
that the reason for the rule of strict construction no longer exists. 6
The decision appears to be just. Any other construction of the section
would mean that the right to have a judgment reviewed might be denied to one having a meritorious case through a mere technicality.
M. H. TUTTLE
assets received by them from the two estates of their parents for any deficiency ....
" The defendants filed their motion under Section 72 to vacate the
new decree and all other orders subsequent to that decree, in order that they
might defend the amended bill of foreclosure, which petition was granted.
1 299 Ill.
App. 157, 19 N. E. (2d) 753 (1939).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 259.36, as amended by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1938 Supp.,
Ch. 110, § 259.36, provides among other things that "The record on appeal shall be
transmitted to the reviewing court not more than 60 days after notice of appeal has
been filed."
3 The failure arose from the illness of appellant's counsel.
4 "No appeal shall be taken to the Supreme or Appellate Court after the expiration of ninety days from the entry of the order, decree, judgment or other
determination complained of; but, notice of appeal may be filed after the expiration of said ninety days, and within the period of one year, by order of the reviewing court, upon motion and notice to adverse parties, and upon a showing by
affidavit that there is merit in appellant's claim for an appeal and that the delay
was not due to appellant's culpable negligence." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 200.
5 Drummer Creek Drain. Dist. v. Roth, 244 Ill. 68, 91 N. E. 63 (1910).
6 The court distinguishes the case of People ex rel. Bender v. Davis, 365 Ill.
389,
6 N. E. (2d) 643 (1937), which was followed by the Appellate Court for the third
division in Schroeder v. Campbell, 289 Ill. App. 337, 7 N. E. (2d) 329 (1937), and
Moss v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 289 Ill. App. 379, 7 N. E. (2d) 468 (1937), on the
ground that in the Bender case the appeal had been heard on its merits and that
the matter came up in the Supreme Court on a petition for mandamus in which
the order dismissing the appeal could not be considered.
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EXECUTION-ExEcUTION AGAINST THE PERSON-SPECIAL FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS MALICIOUS AS CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ISSUANCE OF THE
WRIT UNDER ILLINOIS STATTE.-The recent Illinois Appellate Court case

2
of Miles v. Glad' involves an interesting change in the Illinois statute
5
relating to executions against the person. Formerly, the successful
out
execution
against the person of
plaintiff in a tort action could take
the defendant without any showing of malice. 4 The defendant was then
compelled to apply to the County Court for a determination that the
tort action was not founded on malice in order to obtain his release. 5
The Miles case decided that, under the present modified act, it is a condition precedent to the issuance of such an execution that the jury, or
the court, if the case is tried without a jury, make a special finding that
malice is present. The court also held that, if the defendant feels that
execution has been improperly issued, his remedy is to apply to the court
where the judgment was rendered to have the execution quashed. 6

W. L. SCHLEGEL
1 19 N. E. (2d) 844 (III. App., 1939).
2 Prior to amendment, the provision read as follows: "No execution shall issue
against the body of the defendant, except when the judgment shall have been
obtained for a tort committed by such defendant, or unless the defendant shall
have been held to bail upon a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum (respondendum) as
provided by law, or he shall refuse to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his
creditors." Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 77, § 5. The defendant obtained his
release under Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 72, § 5, which reads as follows:
"When any person is arrested or imprisoned upon any process issued for the
purpose of holding such person to bail upon any indebtedness, or in any civil
action when malice is not the gist of the action ...
such person may be released
from such arrest or imprisonment upon complying with provisions of this Act."
This latter provision has not been amended, but the former section now reads:
"No execution shall issue against the body of the defendant except when the
judgment shall have been obtained for a tort committed by such defendant, and
it shall appear from a special finding of the jury, or from a special finding by the
court, if the case is tried by the court without a jury, that malice is the gist
of the action ..
" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 77, § 5.
3 Execution against the person was a well known common-law remedy. It was
affected by the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. It is well settled that such an
execution is not a violation of a constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for debt. The judgment, while a debt for some purposes, is considered in the nature of a punishment where it has been obtained for tort. People ex rel. Brennan
v. Cotton, 14 Ill. 414 (1853); Lipman v. Goebel, 357 Ill. 315, 192 N. E. 203 (1934),
cert. den. 294 U. S. 712, 55 S. Ct. 508, 79 L. Ed. 1246 (1935).
4 See Fetz v. People, 239 Ill. App. 250 (1926).
5 See Reinwald v. McGregor, 239 I1. App. 240 (1926).
6 Miles v. Glad, 19 N. E. (2d) 844 at 845 (Ill. App., 1939). It was also held that
a special finding by the jury that the defendants were "guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury" was tantamount
to a finding of malice. The court went on to say that "it is manifest that malice
is the gist of an action for assault and battery." In many cases of assault and
battery malice will be present, but sound reasoning would indicate that it is
not an essential element to either of the two torts. See Singer Sewing Mach. Co.
v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N. E. 793 (1911); Booher v. Trainer, 172 Mo. App.
376, 157 S.W. 848 (1913); Pizitz v. Bloomburgh, 206 Ala. 136, 89 So. 287 (1921); Luttermann v. Romey, 143 Iowa 233, 121 N.W. 1040 (1909).
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-PERFORMANCE OR BREACH-DISCHARGE

BY IMPOSSIBILITY WHERE

A CORPOIRTION BECOMES INSOLVENT.-The defendant, in the case of O'Hern
v. De Long,1 had given a note secured by a mortgage. These were assigned to the Peoria Life Insurance Company. A partnership, of which
the defendant was a member, was given an agency by the insurance company. The contract by which the agency was created provided that
the partnership should solicit insurance for the company and would receive as compensation 60 per cent of the first year's premium and 7 per
cent commission from renewal premiums for the second to the tenth year
inclusive on each policy written. It was expressly provided that commissions would only accrue when the premiums had been paid in cash. The
partnership, over a period of several years, wrote a large amount of insurance, of which about five hundred policies were still in force when the
company, because of insolvency, was ordered dissolved at the instance
of the Director of Insurance. The plaintiff, receiver, brought this action
to foreclose the mortgage on the defendant's property. The defendant as
assignee of all claims by the partnership against the corporation set
up a counterclaim insisting that the corporation was guilty of an anticipatory breach of contract whereby the defendant had been deprived of
the renewal commissions that he would have received had the corpora1 19 N.E. (2d) 214 (Ill.
App.,

1939).
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tion remained solvent and in existence. The Illinois Appellate Court refused to allow the counterclaim.
The court seems to reach its result by making an analogy between the
death of a party whose existence is necessary for the performance of
the contract-as where a person has contracted to render personal services-and this case where the corporate "person" has "died" because
of dissolution. In support of this contention the court cited the case of
People v. Globe Mutual Life Insurance Company,2 where the New York
court upon very similar facts said, "The subject-matter of the contract
was that of skilled personal services to be rendered by one and received
by the other. It was inherent in the bargain that a substituted service
would not answer. The company were [sic] not bound to accept another's
performance instead of the chosen agent's, nor was he in turn bound to
work for some other master. The contract in its own nature was dependent
upon the continued life of both parties. With the natural death of one, or
the corporate death of the other, the contract must inevitably end. So
that, in its own inherent nature, by the unexpressed conditions subject to
which it was made, and by the decree enjoining both parties at the same
moment from further performance, the contract was terminated and no
breach existed."
The analogy is probably unfortunate. It attempts to bring a new situation within the purview of a rule laid down to control situations having
materially distinguishing facts. In the case of an individual, death is a
certainty, and the parties can logically be presumed to have intended the
contract to terminate should death prevent further performance. 3 A corporation, on the other hand, is an artificial person capable of "living" on
forever, and therefore its "death" cannot normally be said to be a factor
which was in the minds of the parties at the time of contracting. This
is especially true of corporations whose existence is not specifically limited by law or their charters. A second objection to the analogy is that
the death of a natural person is usually without his fault, while the
dissolution of a corporation is almost without exception a result of the corporation's doing acts or getting into circumstances which are considered
legally the fault of the corporation. Saying that the dissolution of a corporation is analogous to the death of a contracting party only tends to
cause one to lose sight of this very important fact. Still another objection,
apparently overlooked by the courts, is that the dissolution of the corporation has not made its performance impossible. Its obligation is to pay
2 91 N.Y. 174 at 179 (1883). See also Hepburn v. Montgomery, 97 N.Y. 617
(1884); Griffith v. Blackwater Boom & Lumber Co., 46 W. Va. 56, 33 S.E. 125
(1899); McElheney v. Jasper Trading Co., 12 Ga. App. 790, 78 S.E. 727 (1913);
Du Pont v. Standard Arms Co., 9 Del. Ch. 315, 81 A. 1089 (1912); Louchheim v.
Clawson Printing Weighing Co., 12 Pa. Super. 55 (1899); Law v. Waldron, 230
Pa. 458, 79 A. 647 (1911); Williamson County B. & T. Co. v. Roberts-Buford
Dry Goods Co., 118 Tenn. 340, 101 S.W. 421, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 644 (1907); Lenoir v.
Linville Improvement Co., 126 N.C. 922, 36 S.E. 185, 51 L.R.A. 146 (1900).
3 White v. White, 274 IlI. App. 531 (1934); Cutler v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
274 Mass. 341, 174 N. E. 507 (1931); Cameron-Hawn Realty Co. v. Albany, 207 N.Y.,
377, 101 N.E. 162, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 922 (1913).
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money, and its assets still remain for the purpose of satisfying such obligations. We are not confronted with the question of whether the corporation is able to reap the benefits of its bargain. Nor is it logical to
liken the case to the death of a personal employer. The claim of the
defendant in the case under discussion was not based on the refusal of
the employer to continue the employee in its employ, being instead a
claim for compensation accruing for services already rendered.
A view opposed to the New York decisions arose in New Jersey, rec4
ognizing the difficulties of the logic in the New York cases. The courts
there refused to concede that the dissolution of the corporation can reasonably be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties; hence
they refused to concede that its continued existence must be considered
an implied condition to their agreement. The Louisiana court, in Chas.
5
E. & W. F. Peck v. Southwestern Lumber & ExportationCompany, said:
"The argument that the intention of the court, or, in other words, of
the 'sovereign power,' operates as a vis major, loses sight of the fact
that such intervention is the necessary consequence of the acts of the
corporation itself in provoking the appointment of a receiver by the mismanagement of its affairs."
Assuming that the company's insolvency is solely the result of misfortune, this fact, in the case of contracts between individuals, is held to
be only a subjective impossibility, as the party impliedly promises to
keep himself in such financial condition as not to interfere with the performance of the contract. 6 Why there should be a different result in the
case of a corporation is not apparent.
With this very unsatisfactory difference of opinion existing, the United
States Supreme Court was called upon to make a choice between these
two opposing views in the leading case of Central Trust Company of Illinois v. Chicago Auditorium Association.7 In that case a transfer company
made a contract with the Chicago Auditorium Association, providing that
a certain amount of money should be paid by the transfer company in
consideration of being given the exclusive right to transport passengers
and luggage to and from the hotel. The transfer company went into involuntary bankruptcy, and the association submitted a claim for breach
of contract. The court expressly denounced the New York doctrine, saying: -"The same principle that entitles the promisee to continued willingness [to perform on the promisor's part] entitles him to continued ability
4 Spader v. Mural Decoration Mfg. Co., 47 N.J. Eq. 18, 20 A. 378 (1890); Rosenbaum v. U.S. Credit-System Co., 61 N.J.L. 543, 40 A. 591 (1898).
5 131 La. 177, 59 So. 113 (1912). See also Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 20 S. Ct.
780, 44 L. Ed. 953 (1900). In Delaware the courts have made a distinction
between contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for personal services,
holding that dissolution because of bankruptcy does not amount to a breach of
the latter but it does of the former. Compare these cases: Du Pont v. Standard
Arms Co., 9 Del. Ch. 315, 81 A. 1089 (1912); In Re Ross & Son, Inc., 10 Del.
Ch. 434, 95 A. 311 (1915).
App. 254 (1893); Sliosberg v. New York L. Ins. Co.,
6 Dean v. Lowey, 50 Ill.
244 N.Y. 482, 155 N.E. 749 (1927); Slaughter v. C.I.T. Corp., 229 Ala. 411, 157 So.
463 (1934).
7 240 U.S. 581, 36 S. Ct. 412, 60 L.Ed. 811, L.R.A. 1917B 580 (1916).
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on the part of the promisor. In short, it must be deemed an implied term
of every contract that the promisor will not permit himself, through insolvency or acts of bankruptcy, to be disabled from making performance; and, in this view, bankruptcy proceedings are but the natural and
legal consequence of something done or omitted to be done by the bankrupt, in violation of his engagement."
This case overruled the majority of the decisions in the lower federal
courts8 on this point and definitely initiated a trend in the state courts
to a position opposing the New York doctrine. 9
The Illinois court, finding it necessary to avoid the logic of the United
States Supreme Court, differentiates the two cases on the ground that
the corporation's promise and obligations in the Chicago Auditorium case
were unconditional. In the Illinois case, the defendant's promise is conditioned upon the payment of premiums, which condition cannot happen,
and therefore the company's obligation, according to the court, has not,
and never will, come into existence. 10
It is true, that as a general rule, a condition is not excused merely
because it becomes impossible for the condition to occur. One very well
recognized exception to this rule, however, is that the condition precedent
is excused when the person whose promise is thus conditioned prevents,
by his own acts, the happening of the condition. This is, of course, assuming that the parties did not contemplate that the promisor might interfere with the happening of the condition, which brings us right back to
the controversy decided in the Auditorium case, namely, whether the cor8 Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills, 88 F. 680 (1898); Moore v. Security Trust & Life
Ins. Co., 168 F. 496 (1909); In re Imperial Brewing Co., 143 F. 579 (1906); In re
Inman & Co. 171 F. 185 (1909).
9 See Milton v. Bank of Newborn, 30 Ga. App. 55, 116 S.E. 861 (1923), overruling McElheney v. Jasper Trading Co., 12 Ga. App. 790, 78 S.E. 727 (1913).
See also Napier v. People's Stores Co., 98 Conn. 414, 120 A. 295, 33 A.L.R. 499
(1923); Rosenfield v. Connecticut Fruit & Comm. Co., 98 Conn. 428, 119 A. 895
(1923); Baird v. John H. Baird Co., 120 A. 299 (Conn., 1923); American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Blake, 102 Conn. 194, 128 A. 523 (1925).
10 A question might be raised as to the uncertainty of damages, in view of the
fact that they are contingent upon the payment of premiums by the insured.
Although no definite criterion can be found, the best considered cases seem
to indicate that this case is well within those whose damages are provable
with an adequate degree of certainty. Where the promisee is certain to receive
damage, as we must admit he is in this case with five hundred policies in
force at the time of bringing the action, a minimum of proof of the amount
of damage is required. See Leach v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 35 N.Y. S.
305 (1895); Lanahar%v. Heaver, 79 Md. 413, 29 A. 1036 (1894). Especially can
tolerance be exercised in the proof of damages when the breach is the direct
cause of the damages being uncertain. "Where a right to a promised performance is conditional upon the happening of some fortuitous event, the promisee
can recover damages measured by the value of the conditional right at the
time of breach, (a) if it is impossible to determine with reasonable certainty
whether or not the event would have occurred if there had been no breach .. "
Restatement of Contracts, § 332. See Taylor Mfg. Co. v. Hatcher & Co., 39 F.
440, 3 L.R.A. 587 (1889); Myers v. Sea Beach R. Co., 60 N.Y.S. 284 (1899); Shoemaker v. Acker, 116 Cal. 239, 48 P. 62 (1897); Cutting v. Miner, 52 N.Y.S.
288 (1898); Salinger v. Salinger, 69 N.H. 589, 45 A. 558 (1899).
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poration is legally at fault when it becomes insolvent and is thereby dissolved. The Auditorium case answered this in the affirmative, and it may
reasonably be doubted whether one can avoid saying that the corporation has legally prevented the happening of the condition precedent to its
promise if the logic in that case is followed.
W. L. THOMPSON
CRIMINAL LAw-DIRECTION OF VERDICT-POWER OF COURT To RESERVE RULING ON MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.-United States v. Standard Oil Co.
(Indiana)' was a prosecution for violation of the anti-trust laws conducted
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.
At the close of the evidence, motions for directed verdicts were made on
behalf of certain defendants. The rulings on these motions necessitated
the examination of a voluminous record, and, in order not unduly to detain the jury,2 the court reserved its rulings thereon and allowed the case
to go to the jury. Subsequent to the jury's verdict of guilty as to
these defendants, the court, pursuant to the reservation, granted motions
for judgments in form non obstante veredicto resulting in the dismissal of
said defendants.
Following this action a petition was filed by the United States in the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, entitled Ex parte United
States,3 for an order directing the District Judge to show cause why
mandamus should not issue compelling him to expunge the orders of disniissal. 4 The grounds relied upon by the government were (1) that such
action was an invasion of the constitutional right to trial by jury5 and
(2) that there was no authority for the court to adopt such procedure in
a criminal prosecution. 6 The Court denied the United States' petition for
writ of mandamus, holding that there was no valid constitutional objection
to the procedure followed by respondent and that in the absence of prohibitive legislation courts have inherent power to provide themselves with
7
appropriate procedures required for the performance of their tasks.
It is well established that the court's action in sustaining a motion for
a directed verdict does not invade the constitutional guarantee of the right
to trial by jury as it existed at common law, nor does it invade the
1 24 F. Supp. 575 (1938).
2 The jury had been sequestered from October, 1937, to January, 1938.
3 101 F. (2d) 870 (1939).
4 This type of action was necessary to raise the point, since no appeal by
the prosecution was possible after dismissal of the defendants.
5 The government's contention was based upon the fact that at common
law the court could only grant a new trial after verdict had been taken and
could not order a dismissal under these circumstances.
6 The government further contended that the respondent had not in fact
reserved his rulings on the motions for directed verdicts but had taken the jury's
verdicts of guilty unconditionally. The Circuit Court of Appeals found that respondent had in fact so reserved his rulings.
7 The decision in the instant case was forecast by the action taken in Collenger
v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 345 (1931), decided by the same Circuit Court of
Appeals, wherein the court felt itself powerless to act, except to grant a new
trial, as the trial court had not reserved the right to pass on the motion for
directed verdict after taking the verdict.
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province of the jury.8 Decisions upon questions of law are within the exclusion province of the court.9 How, then, could the conditional taking of
a jury's verdict, subject to the court's reserved ruling on such legal question, abridge this guarantee? The question of law as to the legal sufficiency of the evidence remains a question of law until it is disposed of
one way or the other. To take the jury's verdict conditionally, pending the
decision of this legal question by the court, as a convenience to the
jury, court, and litigants, where as a matter of law there is no fact to
be tried by the jury and to so decide subsequently by granting a judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict is tantamount to withdrawing
the case from the jury in the first place, as is done by granting a
motion for directed verdict. Such at least is the holding in civil cases
at present. 10
Do the federal courts possess inherent power to adopt such procedure
in criminal cases where there is no constitutional objection and where
the field is unoccupied by federal legislation? 1 Where Congress has not
directed the courts to follow state laws on a particular subject, the federal courts have frequently in procedural matters, by right of the court's
own power, changed and applied common law principles in the light of
reason, experience, and changing public policy. 12 That the courts have
8 Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1895); United
States v. Fullerton, Fed. Cas. No. 15,176 (1870); United States v. Babcock, Fed.
Cas. No. 14,486 (1876); Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 30, 16 S. Ct. 434, 40 L. Ed.
606 (1896).
9 Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1894); United
States v. Fullerton, Fed. Cas. No. 15,176 (1870); Nosowitz v. United States, 282 F.
575 (1922); Cady v. United States, 293 F. 829 (1923). Nor is the principle that one
shall not be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense violated by
a directed verdict of innocence. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 at 288-9, 50
S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930).
10 In Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U. S. 364, 33 S. Ct. 523, 57 L.
Ed. 879 (1913), the United States Supreme Court held, five to four, that a judgment
of dismissal notwithstanding the jury's verdict was an abridgment of the Seventh Amendment where there had been no reservation of ruling on the motion
for directed verdict, despite the fact that the upper court found that there was no
fact to be tried by the jury. However, in the subsequent case of Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U. S. 654, 55 S. Ct. 890, 79 L. Ed. 1636 (1935), the Supreme
Court held that it was error on the part of the trial court to deny defendant's motion for a dismissal of the complaint and for a directed verdict on the ground
of insufficiency of the evidence after the trial court had, without objection, reserved
decision on the motion and submitted the case to the jury subject to its opinion
on the questions reserved. The court thus limited the decision in the Slocum case
and held the procedure now under consideration constitutional and proper in a
civil action.
11 The United States contended, in the case under discussion, that Rules 1 and
2 of the rules of practice and procedure authorized by 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 (a) affirmatively prohibit the procedure employed. These rules apply to post-trial motions.
whereas in the instant case the motion is a pre-verdict motion.
12 Thus in Matter of Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 40 S. Ct. 543, 64 L. Ed. 919 (1920),
the court appointed an auditor to simplify the facts to be submitted to the jury in
a complicated accounting case; in Patten v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct.
253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930), the court sanctioned the waiver of the constitutional right
to a twelve-man jury, permitting an eleven-man jury to decide the facts; and in
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done so in the past with the sanction of the Supreme Court cannot be
doubted, and, if the decision in Ex parte United States is to stand, it
would seem that the courts will be free in the future to revise criminal
procedure in cases before it, except as such procedure is already regulated by statute or constitutional requirement.1 3
In the adoption of such modifying procedures, the persuasive authority
of common law doctrines, state statutes and decisions, and prior federal
court decisions will no doubt play an important role. The American
system of case decision is in large measure based upon the persuasive
authority found in similar cases and applied to questions specifically new.
In this realm may be found an abundance of such persuasive authority
to support the decision in Ex parte United States. The identical procedure has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States in
civil cases, 14 and the use of similar procedures in civil cases may be
considered in criminal cases, as is illustrated by Sparf v. United States,' 5
where the court said, "The cases thus cited were, it is true, of a civil
nature; but the rules they announce are, with few exceptions, applicable
to criminal causes, and indicate the true test for determining the respective functions of court and jury."
Some of the states have statutes permitting this same procedure in
civil cases' 1 and in many others it has been made the rule without the
aid of statute. 17 Some even authorize such action in criminal cases, as
is true in Wisconsin where the original proceeding was tried.18
The English common law procedure, adopted by the judges traveling
on circuit, of taking the verdict of the jury in criminal cases subject to
the opinion of the twelve judges on questions of law, is of some persuasive value. 19
Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 54 S. Ct. 212, 78 L. Ed. 369 (1933), the court
extended the rules of evidence in criminal cases to allow a wife to testify for her
husband.
'3 See U. S. C. A. Const. Part 2, p. 280, and 23 A. B. J. 355 and 514 (1938).
15 156 U. S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 (1894).
14 See note 10.
16 New York Civil Practice Act, §§ 459, 461; Gen. Laws of Mass. 1932, Ch. 231,
§ 120. Some statutes permit this even though no reservation of ruling on motion
for directed verdict is entered. Deering's Code of Civ. Proc. of Cal. 1937, § 629;
Idaho Code Ann. 1932, § 7-224; Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, III, § 14,531; IIl. Rev. Stat.
1937, Ch. 110, § 192.
17 Scharff Distilling Co. v. Dennis, 113 Ark. 221, 168 S. W. 141 (1914); Fincher
v. Bosworth & Co., 77 Colo. 496, 238 P. 38 (1925); Advance-Rumley Thresher Co.
v. West, 108 Kan. 875, 196 P. 1061 (1921); Richmire v. Andrews Elevator Co.,
11 N. D. 453, 92 N. W. 819 (1902); State v. Smith, 47 S. D. 216, 197 N. W. 231 (1924).
18 State v. Meen, 171 Wis. 36, 176 N. W. 70 (1920). Though criminal procedure in
the federal courts is governed not by state practice, but by federal statutes and
decisions of the federal courts, United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 52 S. Ct.
63, 76 L. Ed. 210 (1931), the federal courts in deciding matters of criminal procedure feel that they clearly have the right under the Conformity Act to apply
the provisions and laws of the state in which the court is held. Avila v. United
States, 76 F. (2d) 39 (1935); United States v. Kelly, 51 F. (2d) 263 (1931); United
States v. Eagan, 30 F. 608 (1887).
19 After the twelve judges at assize time decided questions of law so reserved,
the defendant was discharged. The King v. Isaac Cockwaine, 1 Leach 498, 168
Eng. Rep. 351 (1788); The King v. Parkes and Brown, 2 Leach 776, 168 Eng. Rep.
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Numerous federal court decisions exist where appellate courts, possessing the opportunity for mature deliberation not always found in the
heat of the trial, have reversed convictions and discharged defendants
for the insufficiency of evidence where a motion for directed verdict
should have been granted. 20 The action taken in the instant case will
now allow such opportunity to the trial judge, and the decision should be
attended with beneficial consequences to courts, litigants, and public alike.
D. C. PHILLIPS
INTERNATIONAL LAW-CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY-RELATIvE RIGmHTS OF DE JURE

DE FACTO SOVEREIGNS.-At a time when Britain recognized Italy as
the de facto government of Ethiopia, but still recognized Haile Selassie
as the de jure sovereign, the Negus Negasti brought suit in England for
the payment to him of funds due by the defendant wireless company to
Ethiopia for the use of a State radio station. The company raised as
a defense the right of Italy to the fund. The court held that, regardless
of what might be the effect of the de facto status in the territory actually under control, Haile Selassie, as de jure sovereign, had the right
to the fund. While appeal was pending, Britain recognized the King of
Italy as the de jure sovereign of Ethiopia; and this was held on appeal
to have divested the King of Kings of his right to sue.'
Although a foreign sovereign is exempt from the jurisdiction of the
courts, 2 he has a right to bring suit in them, 3 if he is recognized as
4
a government by the sovereign of the courts in which he seeks to sue.
AND

488 (1796); The King v. Joseph Bazeley, 2 Leach 835, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (1799).
However, the usual procedure in criminal cases at common law for obviating
errors of law made during the trial after verdict was by way of royal pardon.
It is of interest to note that Professor Holdsworth, in reply to a letter addressed
to him by Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General, during the course of the
litigation in Ex parte United States, 101 F. (2d) 870 (1939), suggests that the government's contention that there is no basis at common law for the procedure is
probably right and that the only means of dismissing after a verdict of guilty
was by way of royal pardon.
20 Thus, to mention a few, the Supreme Court held, in France v. United States,
164 U. S. 676, 17 S. Ct. 219, 41 L. Ed. 595 (1897), that the federal statute upon which
the indictment was founded did not cover the instant transaction and that therefore the conviction could not be sustained. In Famous Smith v. United States, 151
U. S. 50, 14 S. Ct. 234, 38 L. Ed. 67 (1894), the evidence did not show that the court
had jurisdiction. In Romano v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 522 (1925), the evidence
failed to show that any criminal act had occurred. In Schaefer v. United States,
251 U. S. 466, 40 S. Ct. 259, 64 L. Ed. 360 (1920), the court did not believe that there
was substantial evidence to sustain defendant's conviction. See also Nosowitz
v. United States, 282 F. 575 (1922); Cherry v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 334 (1935);
Reiner v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 823 (1937).
1 Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless, Limited, [1939] 1 Ch. 182.
2 Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q. B. 149; Duff Development Co., Ld. v.
Kelantan Government, [1924] A. C. 797.
3 The Sapphire v. Napoleon III, 11 Wall. 164, 20 L. Ed. 127 (1871).
4 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N.
E. 259 (1923); City of Berne v. Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347, 32 Eng. Rep. 636
(1804). See also Dolder v. Lord Huntingfield, 11 Ves. 283, 32 Eng. Rep. 1097 (1805),
where defendant failed to raise the question in time.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

In a monarchy, the right has been said to be vested in the sovereign,
"subject to a moral obligation on his part to apply it for the benefit of
his subjects," whereas in a republic the right is in the state and it may
sue in its corporate name. 5 This distinction, apparently a remnant from
the days when rulers were absolute, would necessitate treating such a
fund as this as a private property right of the Emperor, but it has not
been so treated in the cases which follow. More probably, the so-called
"moral obligation" of the sovereign really turns him into a quasi-trustee
for the people, and a later conquest operates to transfer the trusteeship
as an assignment by operation of force. The holding on the original
facts in the Haile Selassie case can be justified upon the ground that,
if the conqueror is not yet a de jure sovereign, he has not yet demonstrated that his regime is permanent enough to entitle him to become
trustee for the people.
The power to recognize a government as de facto or de jure is a
purely political power, within the purview of the executive and legislative
departments, and their decisions are binding on the courts. 6 If a government which is in fact sovereign within its territory is not yet recognized
as de facto sovereign by the government of the forum, its acts and
decrees will be treated as void by the courts of the forum. 7 However,
though the acts of such an unrecognized government are treated as
illegal and void, the courts will not shut their eyes to the facts; and, if
such an illegal act has affected private rights, the courts will take
notice of it 8-this being a judicial function and not one for the State
Department. 9 International policy may affect the question as to whether
the courts will take notice of confiscatory acts or decrees,10 though this
seems to be a usurpation of the State Department's function.
Recognition of the new sovereign, either as de facto or as de jure,
relates back to the time when such sovereign was actually in control
"and validates all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence."1 " The courts will take
5 United States of America v. Wagner, L. R. 2 Ch. 582 (1867).
6 Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 11 S. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 691 (1890); Rose
v. Himely, 4 Cran. (U. S.) 241 (1808); Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A. M. Luther v.
James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 532; Duff Development Co., Ld. v. Kelantan
Government, [1924] A. C. 797; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S.297, 38 S.Ct.
300, 62 L. Ed. 726 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S.304, 38 S. Ct.
312, 62 L. Ed. 733 (1918).
7 The Nueva Anna, 6 Wheat. 193, 5 L. Ed. 239 (1821); Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930),
cert. den. 282 U. S.878, 51 S.Ct. 82, 75 L. Ed. 775 (1930). See also Joint-Stock Co. v.
National City Bank, 240 N. Y. 368, 148 N. E. 552 (1925).
8 Mauran v. Alliance Ins. Co., 6 Wall. 1, 18 L. Ed. 836 (1868); Fred S. James &
Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E 369 (1925).
9 Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925).
10 Hennenlotter v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., 207 N. Y. S. 588 (1924); The
Nueva Anna, 6 Wheat. 193, 5 L. Ed. 239 (1821).
11 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456 (1897);
Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A. M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 532;
Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse,
[1925] A. C. 112; Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 202 (1929);
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judicial notice of the fact of recognition. The acts of either de jure or
de facto sovereigns confiscating property within their territorial jurisdiction are given absolute validity by the courts of other nations without
question. 13 In the words of one English case shortly after the United
States became independent, "It may be a question for private speculation
whether such a law made in Georgia was wise or an improvident one,
whether a barbarous or civilized institution. But here we must take it
as the law of an independent country, and the laws of every country
must be equally regarded in courts of justice here, whether in private
speculation they are wise or foolish."' 14 Conflicting with these decisions
are two cases holding that a law of a recognized power may be dis15
regarded where it is contrary to public policy or to the usage of nations.

The penal law of even a de jure sovereign will not be enforced in other
jurisdictions. 16 Thus an order confiscating all the private property of a
ruler will not be enforced;' T but in the instant case, Haile Selassie was
suing for state funds.
In the United States it is held that the validity of the acts of a de facto
government depends upon its eventual success or failure.' 8 A government which is a successor to one which has failed can only take the
rights of its predecessor in foreign courts subject to its duties. 19 PreviMolina v. Comision Reguladora, 92 N. J. L. 38, 104 A. 450 (1918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U. S.297, 38 S.Ct. 300, 62 L. Ed. 726 (1918); Terrazas v. Holmes,
115 Tex. 32, 275 S. W. 392 (1925); Terrazas v. Donohue, 115 Tex. 46, 275 S. W. 396
(1925); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304, 38 S. Ct. 312, 62 L. Ed. 733
(1918). But see Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L. Ed. 316 (1852), deciding that
a contract with a de facto power made illegal by a treaty with the de jure sovereign
could not be validated by later recognition of the de facto government.
12 Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304, 38 S. Ct. 312, 62 L. Ed. 733
(1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456 (1897).
13 Monte Blanco Real Estate Corp. v. Wolvin Line, 147 La. 563, 85 So. 242 (1920);
Molina v. Comision Reguladora, 92 N. J. L. 38, 104 A. 450 (1918); Hamilton v.
Accessory Transit Co., 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 46 (1857); Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb.
(N. Y.) 140 (1863); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed.
456 (1897); Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A. M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [19211
3 K. B. 532; M. Saimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 262 N. Y. 220, 186
N. E. 679 (1933); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 38 S. Ct. 300, 62
L. Ed. 726 (1918); Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 1 K. B. 718; The Jupiter,
L. R. [19241 Prob. 236; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347,
29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909).
14 Wright v. Nutt, 1 H. Bl. 136, 126 Eng. Rep. 83 (1788).
15 Vladikavkazsky R. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456
(1934); Wolff v. Oxholm, 6 M. & S.92, 105 Eng. Rep. 1177 (1817).
16 Ogden v. Folliot, 3 T.R. 726, 100 Eng. Rep. 825 (1790); Macleod v. AttorneyGeneral for New South Wales, [1891] A.C. 455; Lecouturier v. Rey, [1910] A.C. 262;
Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150, in which case, however, it was held that
the action was remedial of a private right.
17 Banco de Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria, [1935] 1 K.B. 140.
isWilliams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716 (1878); Compania Minera v.
Bartlesville Zinc Co., 115 Tex. 21, 275 S.W. 388 (1925).
19 United States v. Prioleau, 2 Hem. & M. 559, 71 Eng. Rep. 580 (1865); Republic
of Peru v. Dreyfus, 38 Ch. D. 348 (1888); King of Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim.
N.S. 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (1851); United States of America v. McRae, L.R. 8 Eq.
69 (1869).
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ously a distinction has been recognized between acts within the jurisdiction and rights without the nation, 20 a de facto government having no
rights except as to property which has been within its power and has
had that power exerted on it.21 Two recent cases have held that a de
facto power over banks within the jurisdiction operates to give the de
facto sovereign power over the foreign balances of those banks. 22 Though
the one was consistent with the above limitation of de facto powers,
holding that the "acts of the government which His Majesty's Government recognizes as the de facto government . . . cannot be impugned as
the acts of a usurping government, and conversely the court must be
bound to treat the acts of a rival ... de jure government . . . as a mere
nullity," 23 the other case was placed upon the broader ground that a
de facto state must "for all purposes" be treated as "a duly recognized
foreign state," while all that a de jure recognition does is give the
sovereign some color of right to reconquer his country. 24 This ground,
which makes de facto recognition equivalent to de jure recognition, is
obviously contrary to the holding on the original facts in the Haile
Selassie case, which distinguished the above case on its facts. Although
it may involve illogical distinctions between acts within the counti7y and
extraterritorial rights, it is submitted that, not only is the final holding
in the Haile Selassie case sound because the new de jure sovereign is
now entitled to be trustee for the people, but the holding on the original
facts is also sound, (1) because, as before mentioned, the withholding
of de jure status from Italy showed a belief by the State Department
that its regime was not yet permanent enough to entitle it to become
quasi-trustee for the people, and (2) because the probable intent of the
political departments in withholding de jure recognition is to deny the
rights to international comity, while not denying the existence of acts
that do in fact exist. However, attention should be called to a serious
difficulty which will arise in cases where a debtor has property within
the power of the de facto sovereign; a decision of that ruler's courts
awarding the debt to the de facto sovereign, plus a decision of another
ruler's courts awarding the debt to the de jure sovereign, will result in
compelling the debtor to pay his debt twice over. Hence probably the
de facto government should triumph even in an extraterritorial suit in
a case where property of the debtor is within the de facto ruler's power,
this being considered an extension of the proposition that the courts will
not shut their eyes to the fact that a de facto government does exist

and has powers.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DAMAGES-NEcESSITY

R. W.

BERGSTROM

OF RELETTINfG PREMISES FOR

FULL

TERM TO REcOVER FULL DAMAGES ON LONG TERM LEASE WHEN LESSEE
HAS ABANDoNED PROPERTY.-Of interest to landlords with properties rented

20 H. T. Cottam & Co. v. Comision Reguladora, 149 La. 1026, 90 So. 392 (1921).
21 Hamilton v. Accessory Transit Co., 26 Barb. (N.Y.) 46 (1857).
22 Banco de Bilbao v. Rey, [1938] 2 K.B. 176; Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank
of Egypt and Liguori, [1937] Ch. 513.
23 Banco de Bilbao v. Rey, [1938] 2 K.B. 176.
24 Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori, [1937] Ch. 513.
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under long term leases is the recent case of People ex rel. Nelson v. West
Town State Bank,' in which the court held that future damages accruing
under a lease with twenty-eight years to run were, in the absence of a new
lease for the remainder of the term, so uncertain and speculative that the
landlord must await their accrual. The court also held that the distribution of receivership assets need not wait, which would seem to bar the
future damages absolutely.
The lessee in this case was a bank which had ceased operations. The
receiver of the bank vacated the premises while the lease still had about
thirty-three years to run. The lessor took possession, rented the premises
for five years, and, having sustained a loss of $1054 per year for the
said five year period after the abandonment of the premises, filed a
claim in the receivership proceedings for $28,458, the basis of which was
that a similar loss would be sustained for the balance of the term. The
court held that, because of the uncertainty as to the amount of damages
to be sustained, the lessor could not recover damages for the future but
would have to await the accrual thereof.
It is well settled that the measure of damages for the wrongful breach
of a lease is the difference between the rent reserved and the rent received from another letting, provided due diligence was used by the
landlord. 2 It is quite probable that if the plaintiff here had relet the
premises for the balance of the term at a lower rental than the amount
reserved in the bank's lease, the claim would have been allowed. As a
matter of fact, the court distinguishes the case of Smith v. Goodman,s
in which case the premises were so relet, on that ground.
It would seem to be clear in the instant case that the experience of
the first five years after the breach of the lease was not sufficiently
certain to warrant its use to estimate damages for twenty-eight years
in the future, no lease having been entered into for the balance of the

term.
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highest court in the land has
handed down another opinion' in which the following most interesting
question is raised: When an employer, admittedly guilty of unfair labor
RELATION OF MASTER AND SERVANT.-The

1 299 Ill.
App. 242, 20 N. E. (2d) 156 (1939).
2 De Winer v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 560, 33 P. (2d) 356 (1934); Wilson v. National
Refining Co., 126 Kan. 139, 266 P. 941 (1928); Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N.C. 274,
142 S.E. 12 (1928); Jones v. McQuesten, 172 Wash. 480, 20 P. (2d) 838 (1933);
Resser v. Corwin, 72 Il.App. 625 (1897); Hinde v. Madansky, 161 Ill. App. 216
(1911); Levy v. Burkstrom, 191 Ill.
App. 478 (1915).
3 149 Ill.
75, 36 N. E. 621 (1893). A three-year lease was abandoned by the
assignee of the lessee at the end of the first year. It was held that, since the
premises had been relet for the balance of the term and since the lease provided
that the measure of damages should be the difference between the amount received from a reletting and the rent reserved, the claim for damages could be
proven against the insolvent estate.
1 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 83 L. Ed.
(Adv.) 469 (1939).
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practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, discharges employees who are engaged in a "sit-down" strike,2 under what
circumstances does the National Labor Relations Board have authority
to order their reinstatement? 3 Language in the act to the effect that the
board may reinstate only "employees" 4 and do only those things necessary "to effectuate the policies" 5 of the act provides only the skeleton
of an. answer, leaving the meat to be filled in by the courts.
In order to approach the problem effectively, it is necessary to consider the facts in the Fansteel case in some detail. The employer had
engaged in such unfair labor practices as encouraging the formation of
a company union, isolating the president of the employee's organization,
and refusing to bargain with the majority unit. The strikers took over
two key buildings of the plant, thereby suspending operations. The plant
superintendent formally requested a surrender of the buildings, and announced, after a refusal of the men so to do, that all men holding the
buildings were discharged. An injunction proved unavailing, and the
strikers repulsed the sheriff's attempt to enforce a writ of attachment.
A week later the sheriff was successful, the plant resumed operations,
and some of the men were sentenced for contempt. About one-third of
the strikers were taken back, and new men were hired in the places
of the others. None of those found guilty of contempt were recalled.
The basis for reinstatement is not clear, but the board found that none
of the persons named in the complaint were discharged or denied reinstatement by reason of union membership or activity.
The purposes of the act have been variously stated, the declared policy
being to remove obstructions to interstate commerce caused by absence
of collective bargaining in industry. In view of the fact that its validity
is hung upon the interstate commerce peg,6 these statements of the
courts upon that question are perhaps most appropriate: "to safeguard
the flow of interstate commerce by protecting the right of employees
'to organize and bargain collectively' -7 and "to obviate appeals to brute
force which are too often the accompaniment of labor disputes." 8 With
2 The sit-down strike as a labor device appears to have arisen within the confines of the aircraft industry, the United Aircraft incident being the forerunner of
a veritable epidemic during the years 1936 and 1937, the main event being the
Douglas Aircraft affair.
8 Section 8 (3) of the act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (3), forbids an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....
" Section 2 (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152 (3), defines an "employee" as an "individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any
current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not
obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment....
4 29 U.S.C.A. § 152 (3).
5 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (c).
8 NationalLabor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57
S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937).
7 Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 94 F.
(2d) 875 (1938).
s National Labor Relations Board v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., 90 F.
(2d) 520 (1937).
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the provisions and purposes of the act thus in view, it becomes less difficult to decide whether or not these "sit-strikers" remained employees,
eligible for reinstatement and, if not, whether their reinstatement would
accomplish the object which Congress had in mind.
Just what effect does the act have on an employer's right to determine
whom his employees shall be? Section 9 (a) of the act 9 "does not prevent
the employer 'from . . . hiring individuals on whatever terms' the employer 'may be unilateral action determine,' "10 although Section 8 (3)11
rather obviously prohibits the making of "yellow-dog" contracts or hiring
in the first instance on the basis of unionism. Be that as it may, however, the act does not purport to "preclude the discharge of any employee for any reason that seems proper to the employer other than
12
union activities or agitation for collective bargaining with employees."
Such a conclusion is inevitable under the rule that as between two possible constructions of a statute the one which would render the statute
unconstitutional or even raise a serious constitutional question must be
discarded.' 3 Certainly a statute which takes away the right of an employer to discharge for cause would unwarrantably interfere with the
freedom of contract. 14 It is true that the ordinary right to select em9 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (a). In National Labor Relations Board v. Bell Oil & Gas
Co., 91 F. (2d) 509 (1937), the court stated that the act does not " 'interfere with
the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.' " The language was approved in Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 93 F. (2d) 985 (1938). However, there are no
available cases which determine what that normal right to hire and fire might be.
Section 9 (a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (a), provides: "Representatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment: Provided, That any individual employee or group of employees
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer."
10 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937).
11 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (3). The conclusion seems inevitable, despite Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 S. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260 (1917), in
which an injunction restraining violation of such a contract was granted; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441 (1915), in which a state
statute declaring such contracts illegal was held unconstitutional; and Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436 (1908), holding a similar
federal statute invalid.
12 Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S. Ct.
650, 81 L. Ed. 953 (1937).
13 Among a long line of cases so holding are United States v. Delaware &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 29 S. Ct. 527, 53 L. Ed. 836 (1909), and Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598 (1932).
14 In Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 97 F. (2d)
531 (1938), the court said, "The right of an employer to discharge or to refuse to
reinstate a man who has committed a crime which endangers the safety of his
fellow workmen or the integrity of the plant cannot be successfully challenged.
The statute does not purport to destroy this right, or contemplate that an employer must continue to employ or to treat as employees men who have engaged
in unlawful conduct of this character."
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ployees becomes vulnerable 15 on the commission of an unfair labor
practice, but it does not die.
It is difficult to conceive how a general reinstatement in the instant
case would effectuate the policies of the act. 16 It is equally difficult to
see how such reinstatement does not "condone"' 17 violent or illegal employee acts. To say that the board has no regulatory power over employees and does not inquire into the degree of culpability of employees'
acts is no answer. Looking at the matter from a practical standpoint,
the average employee does not know the technicalities of the Wagner
Act, and when reinstated he is of the opinion that his past conduct has
been given a stamp of approval. If that conduct has been violent or
illegal he believes he is justified in engaging in it or similar conduct
again. At least one court has supported the familiar argument that
only serves "to promote discord
reinstatement under such circumstances
8
between employer and employee.'
The cases are apparently irreconcilable as to the character of the
atrocities perpetrated by employees which will preclude the board from
ordering reinstatement after discharge.' 9 Attempting to distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies, or between degrees of violence,2 0 can
only result in the creation of empty distinctions. Certainly it cannot be
said that the right of an employer to employ and discharge is to be controlled by criminal codes. 21 There is also an intimation that the line
must be drawn by the board itself, 22 but the warrant of authority for
such proposition is difficult to find. The board's discretion is limited to
finding the facts and determining what action is necessary under the
facts as so found to effectuate the clearly stated policies of the act.
Comparable attempts to distinguish between degrees of damage, as in
the Douglas Aircraft case, or to determine whether or not the acts constituted "sabotage," as in the Fansteel case, can lead to no better result.
Let us examine the board's argument that the order is justified under
its power to reinstate "employees." If an employee has been discharged
for cause, the board has no power to reinstate, 28 even though union activ15 Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 94 F.
(2d) 875 at 879 (1938).
17 Note, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 208.
16 Section 10, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160.
18 National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, Inc., 97 F. (2d) 13
(1938).
19 Available cases range from dynamiting the plant in the Republic Steel case
to a one and one-half hour sitdown in the Douglas Aircraft case.
20 As was done in the Republic Steel Case, N.L.R.B. Case No. C-184 (Apr. 8,
1938), where the Board in determining whether or not reinstatement was proper
took into consideration evidence of convictions of strikers and pleas of guilty
to acts of violence.
21 In Thompson Cabinet Co. v. C.I.O., 11 N.L.R.B. 99 (Mar. 14, 1939), the
Board refused reinstatement of an employee who had been found to have been
discriminatorily refused reinstatement and who had offered to act as a labor
spy, on the grounds that reinstatement would not effectuate the policies of the Act.
22 Note, 33 Ill.
L. Rev. 208 at 210.
23 In National Labor Relations Board v. Oregon Worsted Co., 96 F. (2d) 193
(1938), the court looked to the evidence to ascertain whether the man was discharged for cause in order to determine whether the court had power to reinstate.
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ity is one of the contributing reasons for the employer's so doing. 24 The
term "employee" was given a peculiarly wide definition 25 in the act for
the single purpose of preserving the employment relation despite a labor
dispute or unfair dismissal. 26 Further expansion beyond this definition
seems unjustified. Congress went far enough in carefully failing to reach
all the evils within its grasp. 27 The courts also went far enough in holding that an employee who goes on strike retains his status although
there is no reasonable justification for his so doing. 28 Certainly it is not
unreasonable to construe vandalism as "a renunciation of the employment relation.''29
The dissenting opinion30 in the Fansteel case took the position that
labor strife commonly gives vent to improper conduct, that Congress
thought it desirable to continue the eligibility of the striker regardless
of such conduct, and that the striker remains amenable to punishment
by the state. 1 Clearly the preservation of the "right to strike" in Section
13 of the act contemplates negative, not affirmative, conduct.3 2 If the
product of a heart "regardless of social duty and plainly bent on mischief" does not look to a termination3 3 of the employment relationship,
Presumably, if it were for cause the Board had no power to reinstate, even
though others discharged for the same cause were reinstated.
The situation bears
24 In the matter of United Fruit Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 896 (1937).
some analogy to the tort rule whereby a man owes no duty to assist another man,
his enemy, out of danger, provided he was not responsible for the circumstances
of the latter.
25 See Note 3.
26 Note, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 187 at 195.
27 In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 at 46, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 at 916, 917 (1937), the court said the validity
of the Act is not affected by the fact "that it subjects the employer to supervision
and restraint and leaves untouched the abuses for which employees may be
responsible.... The legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not
embrace all the evils within its reach."
28 National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S.
333, 58 S. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381 (1938). Query whether such holding conflicts
with the statement in the Black Diamond S. S. case that "each party to a labor
controversy is left to use its own economic strength in all lawful ways to promote its advantage."
29 In National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 59 S. Ct. 508 at 514,
83 L. Ed. (Adv.) 488 (1939), the court said, "The Act does not prohibit an effective discharge for repudiation by the employe of his agreement, any more than
it prohibits such discharge for a tort committed against the employer." The
court thus seems to take the position that the right of the Fansteel Company is
beyond dispute, and that once the relation was severed the employer could deal
with the individuals as It pleased.
30 Justices Reed and Black wrote the opinion.
51 See Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 98 F.
(2d) 375 (1938).
32 The "sit strike" as a labor device was not known at the time the act was
drafted, the ordinary strike being nothing more than a refusal to work.
33 In Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 91 F.
(2d) 134 (1937), the court said, "The relationship existing between employer and
employee is not necessarily terminated by strike, and, in the absence of any
action looking to the termination of that relationship, employees are entitled to
rank as employees."
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it is difficult to conceive how that result may be brought about.
In view of the fact that the employment relationship was effectively
terminated in the Fansteei case and of the additional fact that reinstatement of the strikers would not effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, the board's order holding the discharge unlawful
was "an injustice not only to the employer, but to the unions and their
friends who wish them well." 35
L. BRUNETTE
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An interesting question arose when the helper of a driver on a Times
newspaper truck sued the Times Publishing Corporation for personal injuries sustained as a result of a collision in which the truck driver was
found to be guilty of negligence.' The driver was employed by the defendant corporation to drive one of its trucks in the delivery and distribution of Times newspapers. The driver hired as his helper the minor
plaintiff, whose duties were to assist the driver on his route by loading
and unloading the truck and by counting and binding papers. The helper
was paid three dollars per week and was given one meal a day by the
driver, who was not reimbursed by the corporate defendant.
The plaintiff's action was based on the common-law theory that he
was an invitee to whom the defendant owed a duty to exercise reasonable
care. The complaint alleged that he was riding in the newspaper truck
"at the invitation and request of [the driver] with the knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the corporate defendant upon the business of the defendant .... ,,2 So far as it is pertinent to the appeal the answer admitted
the allegations and concluded that the plaintiff was an employee of the
corporate defendant and therefore was bound by the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The jury found for the plaintiff, assessing
damages at $27,000,3 and from a judgment thereon the defendant appealed. The Appellate Court, denying that the trial court erred in rejecting the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, affirmed the judgment.
It is fundamental that where the evidence as to the existence of a
certain legal relation is undisputed and reasonably susceptible of but a
single inference the finding of the relationship is a matter of law and
34 Cases in which the employer engages in a subtle plan or scheme, the primary purpose of which is to undermine the efforts of his employees to organize
for bargaining purposes, such as In the Matter of Algonquin Printing Co., 1
N.L.R.B. 264 (1936), have not been considered in this comment. Naturally an
employer is not to be allowed to discriminate indirectly, while Sec. 8 (3), 29
U.S.C.A. § 158 (3), forbids him to do so directly.
35 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 98 F. (2d)
375 at 381 (1938).
1 Kijowski v. Times Pub. Corp., 298 Ill. App. 236, 18 N. E. (2d) 754 (1939).
2

At p. 238.

3 The plaintiff's recovery under the compensation act would be limited to

$470.00 for the loss of a leg, plus medical and hospital expenses, plus fifty per
cent of this amount as a penalty, since the plaintiff was illegally employed. Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 48, § 145.
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should not be left to the jury. 4 It follows, therefore, that the determination as to whether the court erred in rejecting the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict depends on whether the undisputed facts establish
an employer-employee status as a matter of law.
The Compensation Act defines an employee as "every person in the
service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral
or written. . . . " The act is designed to replace the ineffectual and uncertain common-law remedy of a servant against his master and to
abrogate the latter's common-law defenses by establishing a fair guaranty of compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of
the employment. 6 It is apparent, therefore, that the act has reference to
those cases arising out of the common-law master and servant relationship. So, too, courts dealing with statutes similar to our own in other
jurisdictions have said that by the employer-employee relation is meant
a master and servant relation. 7 In fact, it has been generally held that
the master and servant relation is "that which arises out of a contract of
employment, express or implied, between a master or employer and a
servant or employee." 8
The question in the instant case then is whether the plaintiff, who is
an assistant to a servant of the defendant, is himself a servant of the
defendant. In the few cases in Illinois 9 where the injured party was an
assistant to a servant helping him in the course of the master's business
it was only necessary for the court to determine that the assistant was
an invitee as distinguished from a mere licensee or trespasser. Since a
servant is also a type of invitee those cases do not negative the possibility that an assistant to a servant working in the course of the master's business is himself a servant of the master.
A frequently cited case on the question is Paducah Box and Basket
10
Co. v. Ruby Parker.
There the plaintiff was hired by two' of the employees of the Paducah Company. The employees operated a machine
that made wire baskets. The plaintiff, with the permission of the employer, was hired by the employees to assist in stitching bottoms on baskets. The plaintiff sued the Paducah Company for injuries sustained
when her apron was caught in a revolving shaft which was negligently
allowed to remain unguarded. The Paducah Company defended on the
See Cinofsky v. Industrial Com., 290 Ill.
521, 125 N. E. 286 (1919).
Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 48, § 142. The fact that the plaintiff was illegally
employed does not affect his right to recover under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, but gives him the additional right to file a notice of rejection of his rights
under the compensation act and to sue under his common-law right, provided the
notice is filed within six months after the injury. See Landry v. Shinner, 344 Ill.
579, 176 N. E. 895 (1931).
6 See Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 274 Ill. 11, 113
N. E. 173 (1916); Kinnan v. Chas. B. Hurst Co., 301 Ill.
597, 134 N. E. 72 (1922).
7 Larson v. Independent School District, 53 Ida. 49, 22 P. (2d) 299 (1933).
8 39 C. J.33, § 1; Cooley, Torts (4th ed.), III, 42.
9 Purtell v. Philadelphia & R. Coal and Iron Co., 256 Ill.
110, 99 N. E. 899 (1912);
Chicago W. & V. Coal Co. v. Moran, 210 Ill.
9, 71 N. E. 38 (1904).
10 143 Ky. 607, 136 S.W. 1012, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 179 (1911).
4
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grounds that the plaintiff was not its employee. The court denied the
merits of this contention, saying: "It is not necessary, to create the relation of master and servant, that the master shall directly employ the
servant, or that the servant shall be directly responsible to the master,
or that the master shall have authority to control his employment, fix his
wages, or discharge him. When a person who undeniably occupies the relation of servant employs, with the consent and approval of the master,
another to assist him in the performance of the duties he is discharging
for the master, the relationship of master and servant is thereupon created between the master and the person so employed, although the person so employed may be compensated by and be under the immediate
control of the person employing him."'"
In an Oregon case, 12 a minor was employed by his father as an assistant
in a mine. The father received their joint earnings, but the car tickets
were made out in the names of both the father and son. The court
there said that the fact that the minor, with the express or implied consent of the owner of the mine, assisted his father was sufficient to create the relation of master and servant between the minor and the owner.
Many other cases,' 3 some of which were relied on in the Oregon case,
affirm the aforementioned rule.
Following the rule of the above cases it would seem that the plaintiff
in the instant case is an employee of the defendant corporation. The I1linois Appellate Court did not question this rule but merely said: "If
knowledge as well as acquiescence was necessary in the employment of
14
the boy, then the record as to fixing his employment is silent.'
Of course the court in the Paducah case and in the Oregon case found
that not only did the employer have knowledge of the employment but
also that he acquiesced in it. Yet, is the instant case so different? Contrary to the court's statement quoted above, it would seem that the employer did have knowledge of the employment. The plaintiff alleged in
his complaint that the defendant had knowledge of the employment, and
the defendant expressly admitted it in his answer. As to the question of
acquiescence, the answer is less obvious. In this connection it is noted
that the court in the Paducah case and in the Oregon case did not
deem it essential to determine whether the acquiescence was created
11 At 136 S. W. 1013.

Ringue v. Oregon Coal & Navigation Co., 44 Ore. 407, 75 P. 703 (1904).
Is Tennessee Coal Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hayes, 97 Ala. 201, 12 So. 98 (1892). See
Chicago W. & V. Co. v. Moran, 210 Ill. 9, 71 N. E. 38 (1904), where under substantially the same facts the court, while actually finding merely that the plaintiff was not a mere licensee, used language which would imply the existence of
an employer-employee relation; Call Pub. Co. v. Ind. Accident Com. of Calif.,
89 Cal. 194, 264 P. 300 (1928), where the facts are almost identical with those of
the Kijowski case but the court found that the employer permitted the employee
to hire the assistant; Schmidt v. Win. Pfeifer Berlin Weiss Beer Brewing Co., Ill.
Ind. Comm. Bulletin No. 1, p. 118, where the driver of a beer delivery truck
had an assistant who helped the driver solicit orders and deliver beer, which
helper was held to be an employee of the brewing company so that he could
recover under the compensation act for his injuries.
14 Kijowski v. Times Pub. Corp., 298 Ill. App. 236 at 243, 18 N. E. (2d) 754 (1939).
12
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by implication or by expressed consent. If acquiescence may be implied, and logic compels such a conclusion, certainly no other case could
present facts and circumstances from which it would be more reasonable
to imply acquiescence than the instant case. As previously stated, the
defendant admitted knowledge of the fact that the driver hired the plaintiff. In addition the evidence shows that the plaintiff's duties required
him to be on the defendant's premises at certain times during the day
to load and unload the papers. Moreover, it would be impossible for the
driver to finish his daily work if he had to park his truck at every
news stand, count and bind the papers himself, and carry them to the
stands. These circumstances, in addition to the fact that there is no
evidence that the defendant ever objected to the employment, might
very well have been grounds for a finding of acquiescence on the part
of the defendant. But the Appellate Court said: "Now the jury in the instant case did find by its verdict that the plaintiff's minor was not an
employee of the defendant company .... -15 If, of course, it was a
proper question for the jury to answer under the circumstances, we
must trust that their decision rested upon a careful consideration of
all the evidence. 16
Aside from a possible difference arising from the question of acquiescence there is another difference between the instant case and
those previously mentioned. In the Paducah case and in the Oregon
case, the plaintiff was trying to establish that he was an employee of
the defendant company. In each case, the cause of action was based
upon a breach of a duty owed by a master to his servants. In the instant case, the plaintiff's right to recover depended on a determination
that he was not an employee of the defendant company. As a matter of
logic it is not material how the question arises or which party is attempting to establish or deny the existence of the relationship. But the
aforementioned difference in the cases does serve a purpose in that it
brings to light another question. Can it be said that, in all cases where
the employer has knowledge of, and acquiesces in, his employee's conduct in hiring an assistant to do work in the furtherance of the employer's business, the assistant becomes an employee of the employer?
The knowledge and acquiescence in the employment merely operate as
a ratification. It would seem to follow, therefore, that if the employee
did not intend to hire the assistant on behalf of the employer the latter
could not by ratification make the assistant his employee. Under such
circumstances, the so-called employee would be, as to his assistant, an
independent contractor, and the employer would not be responsible for
torts to the assistant. In turn it would seem to follow that where an assistant enters a contract with an employee who hires -as an agent and not
Kijowski v. Times Pub. Corp., supra, at page 243.
16 Suppose, however, that the injury was accidental and that consequently the
defendant would not be liable at common-law, it would not have been surprising
had the jury, traditionally philanthropic as it is, found that the plaintiff was an
employee of the defendant company so that he could recover under the compersation act.
15
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as a principal, the contract binds the employer, if the employee had
authority to hire the assistant or if the employer ratified the contract.
Did the plaintiff contract with the driver as a principal in the instant
case? It would seem inconsistent for the plaintiff to claim that he contracted with the driver as principal and not as an agent of the defendant company, and, at the same time, to claim that the defendant
company is responsible for the driver's torts committed against him
and arising out of the employment. In other words, the plaintiff in
bringing his action against the corporate defendant for the tort of the
driver has admitted that he has dealt with the driver in his representative
capacity and not as a principal.
In conclusion it may be said that there is a common-law principle to
the effect that when an assistant enters into a contract of employment
with a servant in his representative capacity and in furtherance of
the master's business, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
master, the assistant becomes a servant of the master; that this principle is applicable to the employer-employee relationship under the
Workmen's Compensation Act; and that the instant case presents facts
and circumstances from which the court might have held that the plain-

tiff was an employee.

W. H.
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